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Paulo has been my office mate for more than two years. I have enjoyed working with Paulo. He 
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mate and co-author, has been a great friend. I have learnt a lot from her during my stay in 
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it without much success. Carla is a special friend and has been a source of encouragement. Her 
warmth and kindness helped me immensely. I still cherish the times Carla, Martyna and I spent 
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Anna, Arjen, Amar, Rian, Mario and llya enriched my social environment in Tilburg. I enjoyed 
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to them for all they have done to make my stay in Tilburg a comfortable and memorable one.
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INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have witnessed a dramatic rise in the use by business firms of alliances of 
various kinds (Hagedoorn, 1995; Hergert & Morris, 1988; Inkpen, 2001), and, with a time lapse, 
an increase in the attention paid to this phenomenon by researchers (Child & Faulkner, 1998; 
Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Yan & 
Luo, 2001). Strategic alliances can be defined as any extended cooperative agreement intended at 
the joint development, manufacture, and/or distribution of products (Gulati, 1998; Zollo, Reuer 
& Singh, 2002: 701). Owing to the complexities inherent in strategic alliances, extant research 
suggests that managing and consciously investing in behavioral aspects, such as trust, becomes 
equally germane to success as choosing the right partner and structuring these strategic alliances 
(Park & Ungson, 2001). Although extant research has identified interorganizational trust as a key 
factor contributing to alliance success, it is not clear from prior research (1) when investing in 
inter-organizational trust pays off, (2) when such an important relational asset is cultivated, (3) 
what are the efficient ways of restoring trust given that trust violation is not uncommon. 
In this dissertation, I address each of these vexing issues. The result is four papers that take stock
of  and  refine  existing  research  on  strategic  alliance  performance  and  its  relation  to 
interorganizational trust, and examine ways of cultivating and restoring inter-organizational trust. 
Specifically, using a meta-analysis of 78 empirical studies the first paper synthesizes existing 
findings on alliance performance and unravels novel relationships that remained unexamined 
thus far due to data limitations. The second and third papers take advantage of a unique survey 
sample of 126 strategic alliances between Indian firms and their foreign partners to examine 
when  trust  matters  to  alliance  performance  and  when  it  is  cultivated.  The  fourth  paper 
theoretically examines the repair of trust in an interorganizational context at two distinct levels of 
analysis-strategic and operational.Chapter 1  2
1.1. SEQUENCE AND CONTENT
The  first  paper  of  the  dissertation  provides  a  meta-analysis  of  the  determinants  of  strategic 
alliance performance using data from 78 empirical studies involving 15,201 alliances in response 
to the prevalence of diverse theoretical perspectives and inconsistent empirical findings. Meta-
analysis is a statistical technique for aggregating results across multiple empirical studies while 
correcting  for  potential  sources  of  variation  in  study  findings,  such  as  sampling  error  and 
measurement error. Specifically, the first paper has three objectives: (a) to identify among the 
wide range of determinants of alliance performance investigated in prior research those factors 
that  effectively  increase  and  decrease  alliance  performance  and  estimate  with  precision  the 
magnitude of their effects, (b) to evaluate the generalizability of these effects across different 
empirical contexts and distinct operationalizations of alliance performance, and (c) to estimate 
the  joint  effect  of  initial  conditions,  governance  structure  and  partner  behavior  on  alliance 
performance by developing  and  testing  an  overall  conceptual framework  that  includes  those 
factors that have been most frequently related to alliance performance. 
The second paper examines the contingent effect of interorganizational trust on strategic alliance 
performance by examining how uncertainty moderates the trust-performance relationship. The 
theory builds on the distinction between behavioral uncertainty, which relates to the potential 
actions of the partners in the alliance relationship, and environmental uncertainty, which results 
from causes external to the alliance. The paper argues that whereas trust matters more to alliance 
performance in the presence of behavioral uncertainty (due to interdependence between partners 
and  inter-partner  competition),  it  matters  less  to  alliance  performance  in  the  presence  of 
environmental uncertainty (due to environmental instability and unpredictability). The analysis is 
based on a survey of 126 international alliances between Indian firms and their foreign partners. I 
relied on survey methodology for this study because of the constrains associated with obtaining 
objective  data  on  focal  independent  (interorganizational  trust)  and  dependent  (alliance 
performance)  constructs  in  my  study.  Survey  and  the  interviews  conducted  during  pretests 
provided a richer data on these constructs and a better understanding of the phenomenon.Introduction 3
The  third  paper relates  the  formal  (equity  alliance)  and  informal  (quality  of  information 
exchanged) determinants to two distinct forms of trust, fragile and resilient trust respectively, 
and examines  the conditions  under which the formal  and informal determinants  facilitate or 
hamper the cultivation of the two distinct types of inter-organizational trust.  This study argues 
that equity alliance facilitate the cultivation of fragile trust under behavioral uncertainty and 
hinders  its  cultivation  under  environmental  uncertainty  whereas  the  quality  of  information
exchanged between partners facilitates the cultivation of resilient trust under both behavioral and 
environmental uncertainty. The analysis, due to the same reasons indicated for the second paper 
of the dissertation, is based on a survey of 126 international alliances between Indian firms and 
foreign companies from 21 countries. 
The  fourth  paper  assumes  a  more  longitudinal  perspective,  taking  into  account  that 
interorganizational trust can be built, broken, and repaired again. The paper analyzes the issue of 
trust  repair in  an  interorganizational  context  by  identifying  two  distinct  levels  of  analysis –
strategic  and  operational  –  distinguished  according  to  the  different  roles  that  incumbents  of 
various positions in organizational hierarchy have in the functioning of their organizations and 
thus also the alliance. We argue that that violations of trust at the strategic level are likely to be 
related to the perceived value incongruity between the partners, while at the operational they are 
likely to have task reliability as its primary object. Consequently, we posit that the appropriate 
remedies  for  mending  strategic-level  trust  violations  are  non-legalistic  in  nature  and  their 
effectiveness would depend on the extent to which the trust violator can prove his innocence to 
the trustee. Repair of operational-level trust violations in contrast could be accomplished both by 
means of legalistic as well as non-legalistic remedies, depending on the frequency with which 
the violation occurs. Finally, we argue that because the repair of operational-level trust violations 
by means of legalistic remedies must be initiated at the strategic level, the degree of vertical 
coordination and control in the organization would affect the speed with which introduction of 
such measures would be undertaken and accomplished.Chapter 1  4
1.2. LINKS BETWEEN PAPERS
Each of the four papers in the dissertation apart from contributing separately to extant research 
reinforce and relate to each other in several ways. The first paper cumulates 78 empirical studies 
to establish a quantitative synthesis of the influence of initial conditions, governance structure 
and post-formation dynamics  on  alliance performance. One of the intriguing  findings of the 
meta-analysis sets the stage for the second study.  The results of the meta-analysis indicate that 
interorganizational trust is the strongest determinant of alliance performance. However, we also 
found  that  the  effect  of  trust  on  alliance  performance,  despite  being  frequently  studied  has 
produced mixed results. Moderator analyses indicated that this result is heterogeneous and found 
no consistent pattern of moderators that accounted for this heterogeneity. Given the centrality of 
trust as a determinant of alliance performance, this raised the question of what theoretically 
relevant moderators  do  indeed condition  the trust-alliance performance  relationship. Because 
research  specifying  the  boundary  conditions  of  the  relationship  between  trust  and  alliance 
performance so far has been limited, the answer to this question has remained vague. As alliance 
partners  not  only  face  the  uncertainty  pertaining  to  their  environment  but  also  uncertainty 
surrounding partner behavior the purpose of the second paper was to understand whether the type 
of uncertainty conditions the relationship between trust and alliance performance. 
The existence of trust between alliance partners cannot be taken for granted, however; partners in 
a relationship might have to consciously cultivate and mutually own this intangible relational 
asset (Parkhe, 1998; Sako, 1991) Hence, while the second paper takes trust as a given, focusing 
on its effects, the third paper examines the formal and informal factors that enable the cultivation 
of inter-organizational trust. Because partners might incur substantial real and opportunity costs 
in cultivating trust (McEvily et al., 2003; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), it is important to understand 
the conditions in which these formal and informal mechanisms do indeed improve trust. Hence, 
the third paper reveals the type of trust produced by formal and informal alliance characteristics 
and the conditions under which the formal and informal mechanisms facilitate or hinder the 
cultivation  of  interorganizational  trust.  This  allows  alliance  partners  to  invest  in  the  right 
mechanisms of trust cultivation under the right conditions.Introduction 5
While  the  third  paper  enhances  our  understanding  of  the  ways  of  fostering  trust  in 
interorganizational relationships, the fourth paper adds to the few existing studies on the issue of 
preserving  and  repairing  trust  (e.g.,  Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993;  Shapiro,  1987).  Given  the  costs 
involved in fostering trust, it is important to understand ways of repairing it in case of a breach. 
Hence,  in  the  fourth  paper  we  identify  trust  repair  measures  appropriate  for  dealing  with 
breaches of trust at the strategic and operational levels. All in all, the four papers that comprise 
my dissertation add to our understanding of interorganizational trust and its impact on alliance 
performance.CHAPTER 2
1
DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE:
A META-ANALYSIS
Strategic alliances have emerged over the past two decades as a prevalent mode of corporate 
development. They have also become a topic of central interest to organizational and strategy 
scholars, who have investigated the antecedents of alliance formation, the choice of governance 
structure, and how these initial conditions and subsequent partner behaviors influence alliance 
performance. Despite continued scholarly effort, Gulati (1998) concluded  in a review of the 
literature that understanding the determinants of alliance performance “remains one of the most 
interesting and also one of the most vexing questions” in the study of strategic alliances (p. 309). 
Indeed, prior empirical research on alliance performance has adopted a variety of theoretical 
perspectives,  which  have  not  often  been  integrated.  The  emphasis  on  the  development  and 
testing  of  new  theory  rather  than  on  empirical  generalization  has  led  to  over  100  distinct 
variables being investigated as antecedents of alliance performance. Also,  prior studies have 
produced inconsistent findings with respect to the relative contribution, magnitude, statistical 
significance, and direction of the determinants of alliance performance. To date, these findings 
have  not  been  systematically  combined  to  establish  the  generalizability  of  the  relationships 
between alliance performance and its antecedents. Thus, although a large volume of empirical 
research has been conducted on the subject, no clear consensus exists regarding what factors 
influence alliance performance.
Given  the  prevalence  of  diverse  theoretical  perspectives  and  the  inconsistency  of  empirical 
findings, the purpose of this study is to provide a meta-analysis of the determinants of strategic 
alliance performance using data from 78 empirical studies involving 15,201 alliances. Meta-
analysis is a statistical technique for aggregating results across multiple empirical studies while 
correcting  for  potential  sources  of  variation  in  study  findings,  such  as  sampling  error  and 
measurement error. Specifically, the present research has three objectives: (a) to identify among
                                                
1 This paper is the result of joint work with Paulo CunhaChapter 2  8
a wide range of determinants of alliance performance investigated in prior research those factors 
that  effectively  increase  and  decrease  alliance  performance  and  estimate  with  precision  the 
magnitude of their effects, (b) to evaluate the generalizability of these effects across different 
empirical contexts and distinct operationalizations of alliance performance, and (c) to estimate 
the  joint  effect  of  initial  conditions,  governance  structure  and  partner  behavior  on  alliance 
performance by developing  and  testing  an  overall  conceptual framework  that  includes  those 
factors that have been most frequently related to alliance performance. By cumulating empirical 
evidence  across  a  wide  range  of  empirical  studies  we  are  able  to  establish  firm  empirical 
generalizations on the determinants of strategic alliance performance.
2.1. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The  performance  of  strategic  alliances  has  been  investigated  from  a  variety  of  theoretical 
perspectives (Kogut, 1988;  Reuer, 2004), including  resource-based  theory  (e.g., Steensma  & 
Corley, 2000), transaction cost economics (e.g., Weiss & Kurland, 1997; Luo, 2002), strategic 
behavior (e.g., Luo, 1997; Park & Russo, 1996), game theory (e.g., Parkhe, 1993b; Heide & 
Miner, 1992) and organizational learning (e.g., Steensma & Lyles, 2000; Lane, Salk & Lyles, 
2001). These diverse perspectives have each emphasized the role of distinct types of factors in 
influencing  alliance  performance.  Collectively,  prior  research  has  shown  that  alliance 
performance is jointly determined by (a) the conditions present at the inception of the alliance 
(e.g., Luo, 2002), (b) the type of governance structure used in the alliance (e.g., Zollo, Reuer & 
Singh, 2002), and (c) the post-formation cooperative dynamics between the alliance partners 
(e.g., Luo, 2001; Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay, 1996). However, prior studies have been generally 
informed by a single theoretical perspective and as a result the different factors have not often 
been empirically investigated simultaneously within an individual study. The model presented in 
Figure 1 draws on these diverse streams of research to examine the structural and behavioral 
determinants of alliance performance. To obtain robust meta-analytic estimates the conceptual 
model focuses on those factors that have been most frequently investigated in prior research.FIGURE 1
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2.1.1. Initial Conditions
Resource  complementarity.  Resource  complementarity  exists  in  strategic  alliances  when 
strategic  and  organizational  resources  contributed  by  partners  are  complementary.  In  such 
alliances, which Hennart  (1988) refers to  as link alliances, the type of  knowledge that each 
partner  contributes  to  the  alliance  is  different.  Indeed,  research  adopting  a  transaction  cost 
perspective has shown that alliances are formed when access to the relevant resources cannot be 
obtained through market transactions and when the relevant resources are coupled by undesired 
assets and cannot be acquired separately (e.g., Hennart, 1991; Hennart & Reddy, 2000). The 
combination of resources owned by different  firms is, therefore, the primary motive  driving 
alliance formation and has a central influence on partner selection. For instance, Ireland, Hitt & 
Vaidyanath (2002) have shown that when forming international alliances firms seek partners that 
possess complementary resources and capabilities.
Alliances may create value by combining similar resources, capabilities or activities to achieve 
economies  of  scale  and  share  risks,  or  by  pooling  complementary  resources,  capabilities  or 
activities to achieve economies of scope (Hennart, 1988). The combination of complementary 
resources may also increase the competitive position of the alliance by creating a distinctive 
bundle of resources and activities that is valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate or substitute (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). Hence,
Hypothesis 1. The level of resource complementarity between the alliance partners will 
be positively related to alliance performance.
The nature of the resources combined in a strategic alliance may also have an indirect effect on 
alliance performance by  influencing the choice  of governance structure.  The combination of 
complementary resources and activities requires considerable coordination between the alliance 
partners arising from the ongoing mutual adjustments needed to couple distinct resources and 
activities into an integrated process of value creation and thus realize the potential synergies 
from  the  alliance.  Thus,  the  interdependence  associated  with  resource  complementarity  may 
entail higher coordination costs in managing the alliance (Gulati & Singh, 1998).Meta-analysis of alliance performance 11
Resource complementarity may create also a situation of cooperative co-specialization in which 
alliances are vehicles for exchanging access to idiosyncratic resources and capabilities owned by 
the alliance partners rather than for the voluntary or involuntary transfer of capabilities. Indeed, 
in a study of technological alliances Mowery et al. (1996) found that most alliances led to the 
cooperative  co-specialization  between  the  alliance  partners  in  terms  of  their  technological 
capabilities, and that in only 24 percent of alliances did the partners’ technological capabilities 
become  similar  over  time.  However,  mutual  interdependence  between  the  alliance  partners 
stemming from cooperative co-specialization may become asymmetrical dependence if one of 
the partners opportunistically internalizes the other partner’s knowledge or capabilities (Zeng & 
Hennart,  2002).  As  a  result,  resource  complementarity  may  also  be  associated  with  high 
appropriation  concerns  (Gulati  &  Singh,  1998;  Zeng  &  Hennart,  2002).  The  anticipated 
coordination  costs  and  appropriation  concerns  associated  with  alliances  where  partners  pool 
complementary resources  are, therefore,  likely to  lead  to  the  development  of more  complex 
contracts  in  an  attempt  to  reduce  opportunism  by  establishing  safeguards  and  rules  for 
responding to a wide range of contingencies (Parkhe, 1993b). Hence,
Hypothesis 2. The level of resource complementarity between alliance partners will be 
positively  related  to  the  level  of  contractual  safeguards  embedded  in  the  strategic 
alliance.
In equity alliances resource complementarity is also likely to influence the equity distribution 
between the alliance partners. Because the resources of all the alliance partners are required for 
value creation, bargaining power is likely to be equally distributed (Yan & Gray, 1994). This 
symmetry in bargaining power is, in turn, likely to lead to a symmetrical equity distribution. 
Thus,
Hypothesis 3. The level of resource complementarity between alliance partners will be 
positively related to a symmetric (shared) equity distribution in the strategic alliance.
By  linking  resource  complementarity  to  symmetric  equity  distribution,  we  assume  that  the 
contributions of the partners are of equal size. Even though the partners’ contribution towards the    Chapter 2  12
alliance is complementary, it need not be of the same size or of equal importance. A firm that 
possesses technological competence inferior to that of its partner is likely be asymmetrically 
dependent on its partner (Hennart & Zeng, 2005). This suggests that partners are likely to rely on 
an asymmetric equity distribution.
Hypothesis 3b.  The level of resource complementarity between the alliance partners will 
be  positively  related  to  an  asymmetric  (unequal)  equity  distribution  in  the  strategic 
alliance.
Prior alliances. Strategic alliances are not always discrete and independent events. Indeed, on 
many occasions firms engage in multiple sequential alliances over time whereby a particular 
alliance may be preceded by a history of cooperation between the alliance partners (e.g., Gulati, 
1995). The accumulation of partner-specific experience through repeated alliances may in turn 
influence  alliance  performance  in  several  ways.  First,  the  accumulation  of  cooperative 
experience at the dyadic level, allows the partnering firms to increase their knowledge of each 
other’s organizational processes, resources and capabilities and develop partner-specific routines 
regarding information exchange, conflict resolution  and cooperation (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 
2002). The presence of these routines at the inception of the alliance is likely to have a positive 
effect on the post-formation interaction between the alliance partners and facilitate information 
exchange. Prior research also suggests that repeated alliance formation between the partnering 
firms is also likely to be accompanied by the development of mutual trust (Gulati, 1995). Hence,
Hypothesis  4.  The  presence  of  prior  alliances  between  the  partnering  firms  will  be 
positively related to the level of information exchange in the strategic alliance.
Hypothesis  5.  The  presence  of  prior  alliances  between  the  partnering  firms  will  be 
positively related to the level of trust in the strategic alliance.
Besides influencing the post-formation dynamics between the alliance partners, the history of 
prior  cooperation  between  the  partnering  firms  may  also  impact  alliance  performance  by 
influencing transactions costs. The initial level of trust stemming from prior alliances and the Meta-analysis of alliance performance 13
accumulated experience of cooperation may, at the stage of alliance formation, reduce fears of 
opportunism and create an expectation of predictability regarding each other’s behavior (Gulati, 
1995).  Because  the  development  of  complex  contracts  that  stabilize  partners’  responses  to 
multiple contingencies is costly and may decrease the flexibility of the alliance, the presence of 
trust may reduce the partners’ reliance on contractual safeguards, and increase their reliance on 
trust  as  a  mechanism  for  ensuring  predictability  and  reducing  opportunism  and  decrease 
transaction costs (Parkhe, 1993b).
Hypothesis  6.  The  presence  of  prior  alliances  between  the  partnering  firms  will  be 
negatively  related  to  the  level  of  contractual  safeguards  embedded  in  the  strategic 
alliance.
National cultural distance. National cultural distance between the alliance partners captures the 
extent  to  which  the  shared  societal  values  and  norms  differ  between  the  countries  of  the 
partnering firms. High levels of national cultural distance are likely to be reflected in differences 
in  the  partners’  management  systems  and  relational  behaviors  (e.g.,  Kogut  &  Singh,  1988; 
Schuler  &  Rogovsky,  1998).  These  differences  may  in  turn  lead  to  conflicts  and 
misunderstanding between the partnering firms, increase coordination costs, and create barriers 
to communication and knowledge transfer (e.g., Lyles & Salk, 1996). Such barriers tend to be 
detrimental to cooperation- the extent to which partners engage in mutual consultation regarding 
decision making and cooperate in implementing and establishing rules in strategic and functional 
domains (Luo, 2002). Hence,
Hypothesis 7. The level of national cultural distance between the partnering firms will be 
negatively related to the level of cooperation in the strategic alliance.
National  cultural  distance  may  also  impact  transaction  costs  by  influencing  the  governance 
structure of the alliance (e.g., Hennart & Reddy, 2000). Indeed, firms may attempt to counteract 
the potential  conflicts arising from  cultural distance by establishing  a  more extensive  set of 
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Hypothesis 8. The level of national cultural distance between the partnering firms will be 
positively  related  to  the  level  of  contractual  safeguards  embedded  in  the  strategic 
alliance.
2.1.2. Governance Structure
Research on  strategic  alliances  has  emphasized  the  importance  of  governance  structure  as  a 
central  determinant  of  alliance  performance  (e.g.,  Poppo  &  Zenger,  2002).  The  choice  of 
governance structure is important because it provides a framework of rules and incentives within 
which cooperation between the partnering  firms  unfolds and thus  on the partners’ ability to 
realize the potential value from pooling complementary resources.
Prior  research  on  the  choice  of  governance  structure  and  its  performance  implications  for 
strategic alliances has been primarily based on transaction cost theory (e.g., Hennart, 1988). The 
core proposition of this theory is that alliance performance is determined by the extent to which 
the partnering firms align the properties of the governance structure with the attributes of the 
underlying transaction in a way that maximizes the partners’ joint incentive to cooperate and 
minimizes  transaction  costs  (Hennart,  1988).  Contractual  safeguards  and  equity  distribution 
constitute two important parameters in the design of governance structures that can be used to 
create joint incentives and curb opportunism.
Contractual safeguards. Contractual safeguards may create joint incentives for cooperation and 
limit opportunism in several ways. First, by establishing more complex contracts that specify 
partners’  responses  to  multiple  contingencies  and  establish  rules  and  procedures  for  dispute 
resolution  and  for  responding  to  unanticipated  outcomes,  partnering  firms  may  increase  the 
predictability  of  each  other’s  behavior  and  restrict  the  range  of  circumstances  in  which 
opportunism might occur (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Second, contracts may reduce opportunism 
by specifying a payoff structure that rewards mutual cooperation and increases the costs arising 
from unilateral or mutual defection (Lui & Ngo, 2004; Parkhe, 1993b). The cooperation that 
contractual safeguards bring about is achieved through the fear of sanctions or loss rather than 
through open  commitment of partners (Rousseau  et al, 1998). Hence,  contractual safeguards 
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Hypothesis 9. The level of contractual safeguards embedded in the strategic alliance will 
be positively related to the level of cooperation in the strategic alliance.
Equity distribution. In equity alliances the distribution of equity ownership between the alliance 
partners  provides  a  powerful  mechanism  for  maximizing  the  partnering  firms’  incentive  to 
cooperate. Equity alliances align joint incentives by rewarding the partnering firms with a share 
of  the  residual  profits  of  the  alliance,  rather  than  by  specifying  in  an  ex-ante  contract  the 
partners’  contribution  and  the  profit  distribution  (Hennart  &  Zeng,  2005).  Thus,  they  are 
particularly valuable under conditions in which it is difficult to evaluate a priori what is being 
exchanged,  such  as  when  partners  are  transferring  tacit  knowledge  (Hennart,  1988).  Equity 
alliances  are  also  be  efficient  in  unstable  and  uncertain  environments  where  changes  in  the 
alliance may be required to ensure adaptation but the direction of these changes in unknown 
(Hennart, 1988). In these conditions, repeated modifications and renegotiation of the alliance 
contract to respond to environmental changes could prove costly and slow. In the context of 
equity alliances an important factor is the distribution of equity ownership between the alliance 
partners. Strategic alliances where both partners have an equal share of the ownership provide 
both partners with an equal claim on the alliance profits. Thus, by providing the maximum joint 
incentive  for  cooperation  shared  equity  alliances  should  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  post-
formation interaction between the partners. Thus,
Hypothesis 10a-b. Shared equity distribution  between the partnering  firms will  be positively 
related to (a) the level of information exchange and (b) the level of cooperation in the strategic 
alliance.
Interorganizational trust. Prior research suggests that interorganizational trust may also operate 
as an important governance mechanism in strategic alliances (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002; 
Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). Interorganizational trust reflects the bilateral expectation 
that the alliance partner’s behaviors will be predicable, consistent with initial commitments and 
non-opportunistic  (Zaheer  et  al.,  1998).  Trust  may  play  multiple  roles  in  governing  the 
combination of resources and activities in the alliance (Zaheer et al., 1998). First, because the 
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accompanied  by  lower  monitoring  activities  and  facilitates  negotiations.  This  in  turn  should 
reduce transaction and monitoring costs, and increase the alliance’s adaptiveness to changing 
environments. Second, the expectations that the partner is both willing and able to fulfill its 
commitments  and  will  refrain  from  acting  opportunistically  should  promote  information 
exchange and increase mutual cooperation in the alliance (Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001). Hence,
Hypothesis 11a-b. The level of interorganizational trust between the partnering firms will be 
positively related to (a) the level of information exchange and (b) the level of cooperation in the 
strategic alliance.
There has been considerable debate regarding the status of contractual safeguards and trust as 
governance mechanisms. A number of authors have suggested that trust provides an alternative 
mechanism for governing the combination of resources relative to contractual safeguards (e.g., 
Aulakh, Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Gulati, 1995). These studies suggest 
that trust may function as a substitute for contract-based control by providing a more effective 
mechanism for reducing opportunism, providing incentives for cooperation, and reducing the 
costs of adaptation. In contrast, other studies suggest that trust may complement, rather than 
substitute,  formal  governance  mechanisms  such  as  contractual  safeguards  (e.g.,  Luo,  2002; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Lui & Ngo, 2004). Poppo & Zenger (2002) suggest, for instance, that 
while  contracts  provide  a  baseline  set  of  procedures  to  regulate  cooperation  and  the  payoff 
structure under a foreseeable set of contingencies, trust promotes cooperation and adaptation 
under conditions of unexpected or unpredictable change and may counteract exchange hazards 
that are not contractually specified. These divergent theoretical perspectives lead to opposing 
predictions. The notion of substitutability suggests that the governance of strategic alliances is 
primarily based  on  one  type of  mechanism,  either  contractual  safeguards  or  trust  (Poppo  & 
Zenger, 2002). Hence,
Hypothesis  12a.  The  level  of  interorganizational  trust  between  the  partnering  firms  will  be 
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The notion of complementarity suggests, instead, that the presence of mutually agreed contracts 
may promote the development of mutual trust between the partnering firms and that the presence 
of trust may also facilitate the renegotiation and flexibility of contractual safeguards (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). Thus,
Hypothesis  12b.  The  level  of  interorganizational  trust  between  the  partnering  firms  will  be 
positively related to the level of contractual safeguards embedded in the strategic alliance.
2.1.3. Post-Formation Dynamics
Although  initial  conditions  and  the  choice  of  governance  structure  are  central  elements  in 
alliance formation, the ability to realize the potential value from pooling resources and activities 
owned by different firms is primarily determined by the post-formation interaction between the 
alliance partners and how it evolves over time. Indeed, a number of theoretical accounts and 
clinical studies on the evolution of alliances suggest that both the imprinting effects of initial 
conditions  and  governance  decisions,  and  the  relational  processes  that  unfold  between  the 
partnering firms are fundamental to understanding alliance performance (e.g., Ariño & de la 
Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Prior research suggests that cooperation and 
information exchange are fundamental parameters that characterize the post-formation dynamics 
between the alliance partners (e.g., Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & 
Aulakh,  2001).  Although  there  might  be  other  factors  that  characterize  the  post-formation 
alliance dynamics, prior research has devoted much of its attention towards co-operation and 
information exchange.
Information exchange reflects the frequency, quality, breath and depth of information exchanged 
between the partnering firms (e.g., Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Frequent and detailed information 
exchange facilitates the coordination of the alliance activities, reduces information asymmetries, 
facilitates the identification of new opportunities for exploiting complementarities between the 
partners, and increases the speed and flexibility of adaptation to internal or external changes with 
positive effects on alliance performance.   Chapter 2  18
Cooperation refers to the extent to which the partners deliberately engage in activities focused on 
ensuring coordination, responding to the needs of the other partner, striving to achieve mutually 
beneficial  solutions  in  conflict  resolution,  and  are  committed  to  maintaining  a  satisfactory 
partnership (e.g., Luo, 2002; Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Thus, cooperation is likely to facilitate 
conflict  resolution,  increase  coordination  and  promote  partners’  investment  in  relationship-
specific assets. Thus,
Hypothesis 13a-b. The level of (a) information exchange and (b) cooperation will be
positively related to alliance performance.
An important feature of post-formation dynamics between the alliance partners is that, rather 
than being static, they are likely to evolve over time as the alliance unfolds (Ariño & de la Torre, 
1998; Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). In particular, the accumulation of collaborative 
experience  is  likely  to  lead  to  the  development  of  relational  routines  between  the  alliance 
partners  (Deeds  &  Rothaermel,  2003;  Zollo  et  al.,  2002).  These  routines  may  encompass 
multiple domains of the relationship including coordination of the operational activities, conflict 
resolution, and information exchange, and may have positive effects on alliance performance. 
Hence,
Hypothesis 14a-c. Alliance age will be positively related to (a) the level of information 




We combined multiple data collection strategies to identify empirical studies of strategic alliance 
performance.  First,  articles  were  identified  through  a  bibliographic  search  of  computerized 
databases. ABI/Inform Global, EconLit, JSTOR, Kluwer Online, Elsevier Science Direct, and 
the Social Science Citation Index were searched using the terms ‘joint venture(s)’ and ‘strategic 
alliance(s)’. Second, we performed manual searches (over the 1980 to 2004 period) of 10 leading Meta-analysis of alliance performance 19
journals  in  management  and  marketing,  including:  Academy  of  Management  Journal, 
Administrative  Science  Quarterly,  Journal  of  International  Business  Studies,  Journal  of 
Management,  Journal  of  Marketing,  Journal  of  Marketing  Research,  Management  Science, 
Organization  Science,  Organization  Studies,  and  Strategic  Management  Journal.  Third,  we 
performed Internet searches using standard search engines. Finally, we examined the reference 
sections  of  all  the  articles  retrieved  and  of  prior  narrative  reviews  of  the  strategic  alliance 
literature (e.g., Gulati, 1998).
Inclusion criteria. We determined the eligibility of studies for the meta-analysis on the basis of 
several criteria. First, we focused on studies that measured alliance performance in terms of 
objective  financial  indicators  or  informants’  perceptual  assessment  of  performance.  Studies 
based on alliance duration as a proxy for performance were excluded because duration fails to 
distinguish between the different causes of termination (alliance termination due to failure or 
alliances that were established for a predefined duration), and because longevity may not reflect 
performance but may instead reflect the presence of barriers to exiting the alliance (Gulati, 1998; 
Hennart, Roehl, Zietlow, 1999). Second, a study had to report on one or more relationships 
between an antecedent of performance and a measure of alliance performance. Third, a study had 
to  report  the  sample  size  and  correlations  or  other  statistics  that  could  be  transformed  into 
correlation coefficients using the formulas provided by Hunter and Schmidt (1990: 272).
Coding. Two judges independently coded each study. The construct operationalizations reported 
in the original studies were used to classify all correlations. The coding process identified five 
distinct operationalizations of alliance performance: (a) measures of alliance performance based 
on informants’ assessment of the extent to which the alliance attained its initial objectives; (b) 
composite measures of alliance performance that typically measured the outcomes of the alliance 
in terms of overall satisfaction with the alliance, economic performance, quality of collaboration, 
and  knowledge  transfer;  (c)  measures  based  exclusively  on  economic  indicators  of  alliance 
performance  such  as  return  on  investment  or  market  share;  (d)  measures  based  on  the 
informants’ overall satisfaction with the alliance; and (e) measures based on the informants’ 
overall  satisfaction  with  the  partner.  Although  we  coded  correlations  relating  the  various 
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(attainment  of  objectives,  composite  performance,  and  economic  performance)  there  was 
sufficient cumulative evidence (three or more independent estimates) to warrant their inclusion 
in the meta-analysis (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). The overall level of interrater 
reliability for coding decisions was 98%. Inconsistencies were resolved through discussion.
Nonindependence. To ensure that our analysis met the assumption of sample independence, we 
used two criteria. First, if a sample reported more than one correlation for a single relationship, 
these correlations were averaged and only the average correlation was included in the meta-
analysis.  Second,  if  multiple  publications  were  based  on  the  same  or  partially  overlapping 
dataset, we did not include correlations between the same variables from more than one study. In 
such cases, we included the correlation based on the larger sample size.
Outliers. We computed Hufcutt and Arthur’s (1995) sample-adjusted  meta-analytic deviancy 
statistic to identify outlying correlations. On the basis of these analyses, 15 outliers were dropped 
from the dataset. This process resulted in a final dataset of 265 correlations from 78 empirical 
studies each corresponding to an independent sample with a total sample size of 15,201 strategic 
alliances. 
2.2.2. Meta-Analytic Procedure
Our  meta-analysis  was  conducted  using  Hunter  and  Schmidt’s  (1990)  psychometric  meta-
analysis method. This approach allows for the correction of statistical artifacts and thus provides 
a more precise estimate of the magnitude and variance of a relationship in the population of 
interest.  Correlations  were individually corrected  for  artificial  dichotomization  of continuous 
independent  and  dependent  variables,  range  restriction  in  independent  and  dependent 
dichotomous variables, and for the downward bias in r as a measure of the population correlation 
(Hunter  &  Schmidt,  1990).  These  correlations  were  then  meta-analyzed  and  corrected  for 
sampling error. Finally, and since information on measurement error was not available for all 
individual correlations, the meta-analytic correlations were then corrected for measurement error 
in the dependent and independent variables using the method of artifact distributions (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 1990). We also estimated 95 percent confidence intervals around the mean-weighted 
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each cell corresponds to an individual meta-analysis. The table reports a sample-size-weighted 
average correlation corrected for statistic artifacts (ρ), the standard deviation of ρ (SDρ), the 
number of independent samples used to estimate each ρ (k), and the total sample size for each 
correlation (N).
Moderator analysis. For each meta-analytic correlation we conducted homogeneity analyses to 
evaluate the extent to which the estimated correlations were drawn from the same population. 
Homogeneity  analyses  were  based  on  the  Q  statistic that  follows  a  chi-square  distribution 
(Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Significant values of Q indicate that the relationship is heterogeneous 
and suggest the presence of moderators in the relationship.
For the determinants of alliance performance that were heterogeneous we investigated the effect 
of  three  potential  substantive  moderators  capturing  important  alliance  and  environmental 
characteristics:  (a) form of the alliance: equity vs. non-equity alliances; (b) industry sector of the 
alliance:  manufacturing  vs.  non-manufacturing;  and  (c)  geographic  scope  of  the  alliance: 
domestic  vs.  international  alliances.  To  test  the  effect  of  these  potential  moderators  we 
performed weighted regression analyses in which sample size is used as a weight (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985)
2.
Structural equations modeling. The meta-analytic correlation matrix was used as an input to test 
our model. The measure of alliance performance based on economic indicators was not included 
as the number of correlations between this measure and the independent variables was too low. 
Because  our  model  is  recursive,  parameters  can  be  estimated  using  Ordinary  Least  Squares 
regression (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 1998). Since correlations in each cell were 
based on different sample sizes, model estimation was based on the harmonic mean N of 461.
                                                
2 To ensure stability in our results we restricted our moderator analyses to correlations based on five or more 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Age - 787 (7) 882 (6) 1,360 (8) 882 (5) 322 (3) 1420 (9) 531 (3) 260 (3) 513 (6) 1,087 (10)
2. Communication -.07 (.00) - 184 (2) 282 (2) 1,020 (6) 143 (2) 581 (4) 191 (2) 765 (8) 374 (5) 844 (7)
3. Contract .03 (.15) .03 (.00) - 513 (2) 1,246 (4) 276 (3) 667 (5) 922 (4) 601 (5) 378 (3) 1744 (10)
4. Equity .10 (.13) -.18 (.1) -.1 (.2) - 599 (3) 504 (3) 959 (5) 373 (2) 255 (1) 280 (4) 883 (7)
5. Cooperation .12 (.00) .39 (.09) .1 (.00) .06 (.00) - 960 (4) 737 (4) 821 (4) 792 (7) 728 (8) 1,065 (7)
6. Complementarity -.03 (.00) .05 (.00) .1 (.00) .06 (.00) .18 (.05) - 410 (4) 190 (2) 535 (5) 257 (4) 451 (5)
7. Culture -.02 (.00) .08 (.15) 0 (.14) .02 (.00) .09 (.12) .04 (.02) - 493 (3) 249 (2) 114 (2) 1,146 (9)
8. Ties -.11 (.00) -.09 (.00) .07 (.00) .08 (.06) .19 (.22) -.08 (.00) -.05 (.14) - 499 (4) 522 (4) 1,170 (9)
9. Trust -.04 (.09) .42 (.1) -.05 (.00) .13 (.00) .41 (.21) .04 (.2) -.35 (.00) .24 (.00) - 529 (6) 1117 (10)
10. Objectives .39 (.17) .33 (.00) -.07 (.03) -.01 (.23) .41 (.09) .23 (.00) -.11 (.00) .31 (.00) .58 (.22) - 335 (3)
11. Composite .17 (.08) .32 (.07) .09 (.11) .14 (.00) .49 (.17) .22 (.07) -.09 (.08) .3 (.00) .41 (.11) .3 (.00) -
a Lower diagonal: mean corrected correlations ρ and standard deviations SDρ of ρ (in parentheses). Upper diagonal: total sample size N and number 
of studies k (in parentheses) from which the ρ were estimated. 
* indicates significant Q-statistic, suggesting the presence of moderators.Meta-analysis of alliance performance         23
2.3. RESULTS
2.3.1. Meta-Analysis
Table 2 presents the meta-analytic results for the direct effects of initial conditions, governance 
structure, and post-formation dynamics on three  dimensions of alliance  performance: (a) the 
extent to which the initial objectives of the alliance were attained (objectives); (b) a composite 
indicator of alliance performance (composite); and (c) economic performance (economic).
The results indicate that initial conditions, interorganizational trust, and post-formation dynamics 
between  the  partnering  firms  are  key  drivers  of  alliance  performance.  Indeed,  the  type  of 
resources- strategic and organizational- pooled in the alliance (ρobjectives = .23, ρcomposite = .22), the 
existence  of  prior  alliances  (ρobjectives  =  .31,  ρcomposite  =  .30,  ρeconomic  =  .21),  the  level  of 
interorganizational trust (ρobjectives = .58, ρcomposite = .41, ρeconomic = .41), the age of the alliance 
(ρobjectives = .39, ρcomposite = .17, ρeconomic = .32), information exchange (ρobjectives = .33, ρcomposite = 
.32), and cooperation between the alliance partners (ρobjectives = .41, ρcomposite = .49, ρeconomic = .35) 
have relatively large and positive effects on the extent to which the partners are able to achieve 
the objectives driving alliance formation, the composite performance of  the alliance, and its 
economic performance. In contrast, the cultural distance between the partners (ρcomposite = .09, 
ρeconomic = .10), asymmetric ownership structure (ρobjectives = -.01, ρcomposite = .14, ρeconomic = .09), 
and the level of contractual safeguards (ρobjectives = .07, ρcomposite = .09) have relatively small direct 
effects on alliance performance.
The positive performance effects of initial conditions reflect the importance of the resources 
combined in the alliance as the primary source of potential value creation.  In addition, the strong 
direct  effects  of  post-formation  dynamics  highlight  the  role  of  the  collaborative  behavior 
between the partnering  firms in  realizing  this  potential  value.  Finally, the  limited  impact of 
formal governance mechanisms and cultural distance on alliance performance is likely to reflect 
the fact that,  as hypothesized,  these factors primarily influence the post-formation  dynamics 
between the partnering firms rather than having a direct effect on performance.   
TABLE 2
Meta-Analytic Results for the Determinants of Strategic Alliance Performance
a














Complementarity Attainment of objectives 4 257 .19 .23
** .00 .07 .31 .00 87.57 4.57
Composite performance 5 451 .18 .22
** .00 .09 .27 .00 76.95 6.50
Cultural distance Composite performance 9 1,146 -.08 -.09
** .01 -.14 -.02 .01 6.70 14.83
Economic performance 3 1,311 -.08 -.10
** .00 -.14 -.03 .00 79.02 3.80
Prior ties Attainment of objectives 4 522 .23 .31
** .00 .15 .31 .00 123.72 3.23
Composite performance 9 1,170 .23 .30
** .00 .17 .28 .00 159.04 5.66
Economic performance 3 529 .15 .21
** .00 .06 .23 .00 131.15 2.29
Governance Structure
Contractual safeguards Attainment of objectives 3 378 -.05 -.07 .00 -.15 .05 .00 95.00 3.16
Composite performance 10 1,744 .07 .09
** .01 .03 .12 .01 43.03 23.24
**
Interorganizational trust Attainment of objectives 6 529 .48 .58
** .05 .42 .55 .03 18.20 32.96
**
Composite performance 10 1,117 .34 .41
** .01 .29 .39 .01 48.41 2.65
*
Economic performance 4 658 .32 .41
** .01 .25 .39 .01 48.06 8.32
*
Asymmetric ownership Attainment of objectives 4 280 -.01 -.01 .05 -.13 .11 .03 31.17 12.83
**
Composite performance 7 883 .11 .14
** .00 .04 .17 .00 136.87 5.11
Economic performance 6 2,616 .07 .09
** .00 .03 .11 .00 77.72 7.69
Post-Formation Dynamics
Information exchange Attainment of objectives 5 374 .27 .33
** .00 .17 .36 .00 165.38 3.02
Composite performance 7 844 .26 .32
** .07 .20 .33 .00 67.59 1.01
Cooperation Attainment of objectives 8 728 .33 .41
** .01 .27 .40 .01 61.64 12.98
Composite performance 7 1,065 .40 .49
** .03 .35 .45 .02 21.96 31.88
**
Economic performance 4 905 .27 .35
** .00 .20 .33 .00 352.47 1.13
Alliance age Attainment of objectives 6 513 .32 .39
** .03 .24 .40 .02 33.92 17.68
**
Composite performance 10 1,087 .14 .17
** .01 .08 .20 .00 68.33 14.63
Economic performance 7 4,503 .24 .32
** .02 .22 .27 .01 12.30 56.89
**
a k = number of correlations from independent studies; N = total sample size; Mean r = sample-size-weighted mean uncorrected correlation; ρ = 
estimate of population correlation; Varρ = estimate of the true population variance ρ; CIρ 5% = lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for ρ; 
CIρ 95% = upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for ρ; Residual Var. = residual variance; % Var. explained. = percentage of observed 
variance accounted for by statistical artifacts; Q = chi-square test for heterogeneity. 
* p < .05; 
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2.3.2. Moderator Analysis
The  results,  reported  in  Table  2,  show  that  the  effects  of  most  determinants  of  alliance 
performance generalize across primary studies. In fact, of the 23 effects investigated only 8 had 
heterogeneous  effects  on  alliance  performance,  as  indicated  by  significant  Q-statistics. 
Specifically,  our  results  show  the  presence  of  moderators  on  the  effects  of  contractual 
safeguards, interorganizational trust, cooperation, and alliance age on alliance performance.
Table 3 reports the results of the moderator analyses. Results show that the performance effect of 
contractual safeguards is lower for equity alliances than for non-equity alliances (β = -.47; p < 
.10).  Although  only  marginally  significant,  this  finding  suggests  that  contracts  and  equity 
function to a certain extent as substitute governance mechanisms. In addition, results suggest that 
the performance effects of contractual safeguards are higher for international relative to domestic 
alliances (β = .75; p < .01). This is consistent with the notion that international alliances are 
generally more difficult to govern as a result of cultural distance and environmental uncertainty 
and thus benefit from more complex contracts.
Regarding the effects of trust on alliance performance our results do not provide support for a 
consistent pattern of moderators across the various performance measures. We found, however, 
that the link between trust and the attainment of alliance objectives is stronger for equity than for 
non-equity alliances (β  = .49; p < .05). This suggests that trust  and equity  governance may 
function as complementary mechanisms for governing strategic alliances.
Our results also show that the benefits from cooperation are marginally higher for international 
alliances  (β  =  .48;  p  <  .10)  suggesting  that  the  partners’  collaborative  behavior  may  help 
overcome cultural differences. Finally, we found that the performance effects of alliance age are 
higher for alliances in manufacturing (β = .78; p < .05), indicating that perhaps the benefits from 
experience accumulation are higher for these type of alliances.   
TABLE 3
Results of Weighted Regression Analyses for the Determinants of Strategic Alliance Performance
a













Interorganizational trust Attainment of objectives .49
* -.21 .16 .27 15.25
** 529 6
Interorganizational trust Composite performance -.08 -.31 -.17 .22 13.01
* 1,117 10
Cooperation Composite performance -.33 .48
† -.02 .15 21.34
** 1,065 7




Alliance age Economic performance .28 .08 13.20
* 4,503 7
a Cell entries are standardized coefficient estimates. k = number of correlations from independent studies; N = total sample size; Q residual = chi-
square test for heterogeneity in regression residuals.
† p < .10
* p < .05
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2.3.3. Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Alliance Performance
In  Figure  1  we  report  the  results  for  our  hypotheses  regarding  the  determinants  alliance 
performance  using  OLS  regression.  Since  multiple  regression  controls  for  the  relationships 
between the independent variables, this analysis provides a more precise test of our hypotheses 
relative to the results of bivariate analyses.
Initial conditions. According to Hypothesis 1, the combination of complementary resources, 
capabilities,  and  activities  in  the  alliance  has  a  positive  effect  on  alliance  performance. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, complementarity had a positive effect on both the attainment of 
alliance objectives (β = .19; p < .01) and composite performance (β = .15; p < .01). In addition, 
we predicted that complementarity would not only impact alliance performance directly, but also 
indirectly by influencing the governance structure of the alliance. Corroborating Hypotheses 2 
but  not  Hypothesis  3  we  found  that  complementarity  had  a  positive  effect  on  the  level  of 
contractual safeguards embedded in the alliance (β = .11; p < .05), but had no significant effect 
on the distribution of equity ownership among the alliance partners (β = .06; n.s.). Thus, the 
higher  the  degree  of  partner  interdependence  stemming  from  combining  complementarity 
resources and activities, the higher the level of contractual safeguards established in the alliance.
Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 propose that the existence of prior ties between the alliance partners 
would  influence  the  governance  structure  of  the  alliance  and  the  post-formation  dynamics 
between the partners by creating a baseline level of interorganizational trust and fostering the 
development of collaborative routines. Providing support for Hypothesis 5, our results show that 
the presence of prior ties had a positive effect on the level of interorganizational trust (β = .25; p 
< .01). In contrast to Hypothesis 4, however, we found that prior ties had a negative effect on 
information exchange (β = -.19; p < .05). That is, a history of prior mutual cooperation between 
the  alliance  partners  was  associated  with  lower  rather  than  higher  levels  of  information 
exchange. This finding may perhaps reflect the fact that prior alliances provided partners with 
extensive  opportunities  for  information  exchange  and  for  the  development  of  collaborative 
routines, which in turn, attenuate the need for intensive exchange of information in subsequent 
alliances. Contrary to Hypothesis 6, the existence of prior ties was associated with higher and not 
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notion that the accumulated trust and joint experience arising from prior ties allow firms to 
reduce the complexity of subsequent contractual arrangements. What the results suggest, instead, 
is that the knowledge obtained from joint collaborative experience is used by firms to tighten 
their  subsequent  contractual  agreements,  perhaps  in  an  attempt  to  establish  more  effective 
governance mechanisms.
Hypothesis 7 and 8 focused on the potential negative impact that differences in national culture 
between the partners may have on the collaborative relationship and how firms may attempt to 
mitigate these effects by increasing the level of contractual safeguards. Interestingly we found 
that, contrary to Hypothesis 7, the level of cultural distance had a positive, rather than negative, 
effect on interorganizational cooperation (β = .28;  p < .01). Thus, firms appear to  generally 
respond to cultural differences by engaging in a higher level of cooperation with their partners. 
However, this response is not typically effective as indicated by the negative direct effect of 
cultural distance on alliance performance (see Table 1). The predicted positive effect of cultural 
distance  on  the  level  of  contractual  safeguards  was  nonsignificant  (β =  -.03;  n.s.).  Thus, 
Hypothesis 8 was not supported.
Governance  structure.  Hypothesis  9,  10a,  10b,  11a,  and  11b  predicted  that  the  governance 
structure of the alliance would be a key determinant of the post-formation dynamics between the 
alliance partners. Hypothesis 9 focused on the role of contractual safeguards. It predicted that 
because more complex contracts create a normative framework to deal with a wide range of 
contingencies and increase  predictability and the costs  of opportunism,  they should  promote 
cooperation.  Corroborating  this  hypothesis,  the  results  show  that  the  level  of  contractual 
safeguards has a positive effect on cooperation (β= .12; p < .01).
Hypothesis 10a  and 10b  focused on the structure  of incentives  associated  with  a symmetric 
distribution of equity ownership between the partners, relative to an asymmetric distribution. It 
predicted  that  symmetric  equity  ownership  would  be  associated  with  higher  incentives  to 
exchange information and cooperate. Support for our hypotheses was mixed. Results show a 
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.01), and a nonsignificant link between asymmetric ownership and cooperation (β = -.02; n.s.). 
Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 10a but not for 10b.
Hypotheses  11a  and  11b  examined  the impact of  interorganizational  trust  on  post-formation 
collaboration between the partnering firms. They predicted a positive effect of trust on both 
information exchange and cooperation, respectively. Consistent with both hypotheses, we found 
a positive relationship between interorganizational trust and the level of information exchange (β
= .50; p < .01), and between trust and cooperation (β = .53; p < .01). Importantly, trust was the 
determinant that had the strongest effect on post-formation dynamics, suggesting its importance 
in shaping the evolution of strategic alliances.
The relative status of trust and contractual safeguards as governance mechanisms was tested by 
examining the direction of this relationship (cf. Poppo & Zenger, 2002). A negative relationship 
between trust  and  contractual  safeguards  would  provide  support  for  a substitute  relationship
between these two governance mechanisms, whereas a positive relationship would suggest a 
complementary relationship. Meta-analytic results reported in Table 2 show that the bivariate 
relationship between these two variables is nonsignificant (ρ = -.05; n.s.) and that this result is 
homogeneous  and  thus  generalizes  across  primary  studies  (Q-statistic  =  1.84;  n.s.).  When 
examining this relationship while controlling for the effect of other variables, the evidence is 
similar.  Results  reported  in  Figure  1  show  that  the  level  of  contractual  safeguards  has  no 
significant effect on interorganizational trust (β = -.07; n.s.), and that trust has a negative effect 
on contractual safeguards, which is marginally significant (β = -.10; p < .07). In sum, the meta-
analytic  evidence  suggests  that  contractual  safeguards  and  trust  are  independent  governance 
mechanisms that evolve and operate in parallel.
Post-formation  dynamics.  Hypotheses  13a  and  13b  examined  the  impact  of  post-formation 
dynamics between the alliance partners on alliance performance. Specifically, we predicted that 
higher levels of information exchange and cooperation would allow partners to fully exploit the 
potential  value arising from  combining assets,  activities, and capabilities  in  the alliance and 
would thus lead to higher performance. Consistent with these hypotheses, our results show that 
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objectives  (βinformation  exchange  =  .25,  βcooperation  =  .22  ;  p  <  .01)  and  composite  performance 
(βinformation exchange = .18, βcooperation = .37 ; p < .01).
Finally, we investigated the effect of alliance age on the partners’ collaborative behavior and 
alliance  performance.  Our  results  provide  support  for  the  positive  effect  of  alliance  age  on 
cooperation (β = .14;  p  < .01),  the  attainment  of alliance  objectives  (β = .39;  p  < .01)  and 
composite performance (β= .14; p < .01), corroborating all Hypotheses 14b and 14c. We did not 
find support for Hypothesis 14a as the effect of alliance age on information exchange was not 
significant  (β =  -.05;  n.s.).  These  findings  suggest  that,  over  time,  partners  develop  dyadic 
routines for cooperating and that these routines are beneficial for alliance performance.
2.4. DISCUSSION
The study of the determinants of alliance performance has been one of the most popular topics in 
research on strategic alliances. However, prior research has emphasized the development and 
testing of new theory rather than the establishment of empirical generalizations. Thus, despite 
extensive research no clear consensus exists regarding the antecedents of alliance performance. 
The present research cumulates 78 empirical studies to establish a quantitative synthesis of the 
influence of initial conditions, governance structure and post-formation dynamics on alliance 
performance. Table 4 provides a summary of our results.  
To  estimate  the  relative  contribution  of  initial  conditions,  governance  structure,  and  post-
formation  dynamics  in  explaining  alliance  performance  we  conducted  two  hierarchical 
regression  analyses  of  the  two  measures  of  alliance  performance  (attainment  of  alliance 
objectives  and  composite  performance)  on  all  the  distinct  predictors  included  in  our  meta-
analysis. Our results show that, collectively, the determinants investigated account for 67 percent 
and 41  percent  of the  variation  in  alliance  performance  measured in  terms  of attainment of 
objectives  and  composite  performance,  respectively.  Importantly,  all  three  classes  of  factors 
contributed  to  explain  heterogeneity  in  strategic  alliance  performance.  Specifically,  initial 
conditions explained 17 percent (F (3,437) = 3.43; p < .01), governance structure 27 percent (F 
(3,434)  =  7.06;  p  <  .01),  and  post-formation  23  percent  (F  (3,431)  =  101.11;  p  <  .01)  of Meta-analysis of alliance performance 31
TABLE 4
Summary of results





Prior ties → Trust + 0.25
** Yes
Contract → Trust +/- -0.07 No
Complementarity → Asymmetric ownership - 0.06 No
Complementarity → Contract + 0.11
* Yes
Prior ties → Contract - 0.11
* No
Cultural distance → Contract + -0.03 No
Trust → Contract +/- -0.10
† No
Post-Formation Dynamics
Prior ties → Information exchange + -0.19
** No
Alliance age → Information exchange + -0.05 No
Trust → Information exchange + 0.50
** Yes
Asymmetric Ownership → Information exchange - -0.22
** Yes
Cultural distance → Cooperation - 0.28
** No
Trust → Cooperation + 0.53
** Yes
Asymmetric Ownership → Cooperation - -0.02 No
Contactual safeguards → Cooperation + 0.12
** Yes
Alliance age → Cooperation + 0.14
** Yes
Strategic Alliance Performance
Complementarity → Attainment of objectives + 0.19
** Yes
Alliance age → Attainment of objectives + 0.39
** Yes
Information exchange → Attainment of objectives + 0.25
** Yes
Cooperation → Attainment of objectives + 0.22
** Yes
Complementarity → Composite performance + 0.15
** Yes
Alliance age → Composite performance + 0.14
** Yes
Information exchange → Composite performance + 0.18
** Yes
Cooperation → Composite performance + 0.37
** Yes
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01Chapter 2    32
variation  in  the  attainment  of  alliance  objectives.  Similarly,  initial  conditions  explained  16 
percent (F (3,437) = 27.09; p < .01), governance structure 11 percent (F (3,434) = 22.02; p < 
.01),  and  post-formation  variables  14  percent  (F  (3,431)  =  34.26;  p  <  .01)  of  variation  in 
composite  alliance  performance.  These  supplementary  analyses  provide  support  for  the 
importance of these three different classes of factors for understanding alliance performance. 
Below we summarize and interpret our findings regarding the various determinants of alliance 
performance and discuss potential directions for future research.
2.4.1. Initial Conditions
The meta-analytic evidence reported in this study suggests that the resources combined in the 
alliance are a key factor shaping the formation and performance of the strategic alliance. Indeed, 
we found that complementarity in the assets, activities, and capabilities combined in the alliance 
influenced its governance structure by increasing the level of contractual safeguards and also had 
a direct impact on alliance performance.
The development of collaborative routines and a baseline level of trust as a result of a prior 
history of cooperation between the partnering firms also had a relatively strong effect on both the 
governance  structure  and  on  the  subsequent  evolution  of  the  collaborative  relationship. 
Specifically,  our  findings  show  that  the  presence  of  prior  ties  increases  the  level  of 
interorganizational trust. Remarkably, and contrary to our predictions we found that prior ties led 
to higher, rather than lower, levels of contractual safeguards. This finding is in contrast with 
research suggesting that, because prior ties are associated with higher levels of mutual trust (e.g., 
Gulati, 1995), they should reduce the risks of opportunism and lead to lower levels of contractual 
safeguards (e.g.,  Parkhe,  1993b). Our  evidence  seems to  suggest, instead,  that the increased 
partner-specific collaborative experience developed over time is used to craft more complex and 
detailed  contracts.  We  also  found  that  prior  ties  led  to  lower,  rather  than  higher  levels  of 
information exchange. This finding may reflect the fact that considerable knowledge may have 
been exchanged between the partners in prior alliances and that, as a result, there is a lower 
knowledge asymmetry between the alliance partners in subsequent alliances. In addition, it may 
also suggest that the development of partner-specific collaborative routines may reduce the need 
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Finally, despite the considerable volume of research examining the impact of cultural distance on 
internationalization and on alliance performance the present research suggests that this factor has 
a limited effect on the formation, evolution, and performance of strategic alliances. Our findings 
show that the cumulative correlation between cultural distance and alliance performance is small 
and  that  cultural  distance  had  a  positive,  rather  than  negative,  effect  on  cooperation.  These 
results are consistent with recent meta-analytic evidence by Tihanyi, Griffith, and Russell (2005) 
suggesting that, on average, cultural distance has no significant effect on entry mode choice, 
international diversification, and the performance of multinational firms.
Taken together, our findings on the role of initial conditions highlight several potential avenues 
for future research. First, research could extend the range of initial conditions beyond those that 
have  been  addressed  in  the  present  study.  Although  research  exists  on  factors  such  as 
organizational culture distance (e.g., Pothukuchi et al., 2002), the degree of relatedness between 
the  partnering  firms  (e.g.,  Saxton,  1997),  the  motives  underlying  alliance  formation  (e.g., 
Hatfield and Pearce, 1994) and the partners’ overall alliance experience (e.g., Zollo, Reuer and 
Singh, 2002) there was no sufficient cumulative evidence relating these factors to other variables 
in  our model to  allow their inclusion  in our meta-analysis.  Second, the unexpected findings 
regarding the link between prior ties and both contractual safeguards and information exchange 
emphasize the need  for  new theoretical  and  empirical  work  investigating in  more  detail  the
nature of these relationships and the underlying mechanisms. Third, the evidence obtained in this 
research regarding the limited role of national cultural distance, together with similar findings on 
the impact of this variable on the behavior and performance of multinational firms (Tihanyi  et 
al., 2005) suggests that more research is needed to understand the role of cultural distance in 
alliances.
2.4.2. Governance Structure
Our meta-analytic findings attest to the importance of governance mechanisms in influencing the 
post-formation dynamics of the alliance and, in turn, its performance. Specifically, our findings 
show that higher levels of trust are associated with higher levels of information exchange and 
cooperation  between  the  partnering  firms.  We  found  that  interorganizational  trust  was  the Chapter 2    34
strongest determinant of partners’ collaborative behavior and alliance performance. However, we 
also found that the effect of trust on alliance performance, despite being frequently studied has 
produced mixed results. Moderator analyses indicated that this result is heterogeneous and found 
no consistent pattern of moderators that accounted for this heterogeneity. Given the centrality of 
trust as a determinant of alliance performance, future research should explore other potential 
moderating factors beyond those explored here.
Our findings also emphasize the importance of contractual safeguards and equity distribution in 
shaping  cooperation  in  the  alliance.  We  found  that  the  presence  of  contractual  safeguards 
promotes cooperation between the  alliance partners  and that  a symmetric  equity distribution 
increased information exchange. However, in contrast with the notion that equity distribution 
may influence the structure of incentives to cooperate in the alliance, the meta-analytic evidence 
did not find support for a link between these two variables. This may perhaps reflect the fact that 
firms align the equity distribution in the alliance with the characteristics of the transaction in 
order to maximize cooperation and, therefore, that different ownership structures are equally 
effective to the extent that they are aligned.
An  important  debate  in  the  strategic  alliance  literature  concerns  the  nature  of  relationship 
between  trust  and  contractual  safeguards  as  substitutes  or  complements  (e.g.,  Lui  and  Ngo, 
2004).  The  cumulative  evidence  obtained  in  this  study  suggests  an  interesting  possibility 
regarding the link between these two governance mechanisms: rather than being substitutes or 
complements  our  results  suggests  that  these  two  mechanisms  may  be  independent.  In  other 
words,  the  processes  underlying  the  development  of  trust  and  the  design  of  contractual 
safeguards  appear  to  operate in  parallel  and  do  not  influence each other.  Future research  is 
needed, not only on the performance implications of distinct governance structures varying in the 
levels of trust and contractual safeguards, but also on the processes driving the configuration of 
governance structures in strategic alliances.
2.4.3. Post-Formation Dynamics
Finally, our results show that the post-formation collaborative dynamics between the alliance 
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cooperation had consistent and relatively strong effects on performance. Importantly, our results 
also suggest that, over time, partners tend to develop dyadic routines for collaboration and that 
these routines are beneficial for alliance performance. Specifically, our results show that older 
alliances  generally  exhibited  higher  levels  of  performance.  These  findings  emphasize  the 
importance of investigating the evolutionary and  behavioral aspects of collaboration to  fully 
understand  the  development  and  performance  of  strategic  alliances.  However,  to  date  our 
understanding of alliance evolution remains limited. Future research may expand the range of 
variables measuring the post-formation collaborative processes that emerge between the alliance 
partners. In addition, considerable theoretical and empirical progress can be made by increasing 
the  focus  on  longitudinal  designs  that  capture  more  closely  the  evolutionary  dynamics  of 
collaboration.
In sum, our study is the first to conduct a quantitative synthesis of the extensive literature and 
obtain empirically precise generalizations on the determinants of strategic alliance performance. 
The empirical evidence provided strong evidence for the importance and the unique contribution 
of  initial  conditions,  governance  structure,  and  post-formation  dynamics  for  understanding 
alliance-performance.CHAPTER 3
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WHEN DOES INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST MATTER TO STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE?
Strategic  alliances  blur  firm  boundaries  and  create  mutual  dependence  between  previously 
independent firms (McEvily, Perrone & Zaheer, 2003). A distinctive characteristic of strategic 
alliances is that partners have to deal not only with the uncertainty in the environment but also 
with the uncertainty arising from each other’s behavior (Harrigan, 1985). Because of partners’ 
dependence on each other, previous research has emphasized the importance of relational factors 
for  the  smooth  functioning  of  strategic  alliances  (Powell,  1990).  While  various  relational 
mechanisms  and  norms  have  been  studied,  including  for  instance  norms  of  solidarity  and 
flexibility (Poppo & Zenger, 2002: 712), none has received more attention than trust (Zand, 
1972;  Gambetta, 1988;  Sako, 1991;  Mayer,  Davis  & Schoorman,  1995;  Zaheer, McEvily  & 
Perrone, 1998; McEvily et al., 2003). Furthermore, much research in this tradition has identified 
interorganizational trust as a key factor contributing towards alliance success, the general view 
being that trust has a positive effect on alliance performance (e.g., Dyer & Chu, 2003; Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994; Zaheer et al., 1998).
The existence of trust between alliance partners cannot be taken for granted, however; partners 
might not only have to cultivate trust intentionally (Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Parkhe, 1998; Sako, 
1991), but also incur substantial real and opportunity costs in its pursuit (McEvily et al., 2003; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Furthermore, interorganizational trust need not always improve alliance 
performance  (McEvily  et  al.,  2003).  Indeed, researchers  are  beginning  to  recognize  that  the 
relationship between trust and alliance performance may be complicated and contingent on other 
factors. Thus, Carson, Madhok, Varman & John (2003) argue that the effect of trust on task 
performance in vertical R&D collaborations strengthens with the client’s ability to understand 
the  tasks  involved.  Langfred  (2004)  argues  that  the  effect  of  trust  on  performance  of  self-
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managing teams reverses under high individual autonomy. These studies suggest that the benefits 
derived from trust may magnify under certain conditions and diminish under other conditions. 
However, contingent reasoning has yet to be applied to the effect of uncertainty, which in its dual 
form is potentially the most fundamental strategic factor in alliances (Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 
1989).
There  is  extensive  support  in  prior  research  for  the  overall  beneficial  effect  of  trust  in  the 
presence of one form of uncertainty. Scholars have shown that trust, by bringing about good faith 
in the intent, reliability and fairness of partner behavior (Sako, 1991; Zaheer et al., 1998), allows 
for constructive interpretation of partner motives (McEvily et al., 2003; Uzzi, 1997), reduces the 
potential for conflict (Zaheer et al., 1998), and encourages smooth information flow between 
partners (Sako, 1991; Zand, 1972). Trust thus mitigates concerns about uncertainty in partner 
behavior.  Yet,  the  same  qualities  of  trust  that  reduce  uncertainty  in  partner  behavior  and 
engender its beneficial effects may also limit cognitive efforts of partners. Previous research has 
shown that the perception of reliability of the information from the partner and the cognitive 
comfort that trust brings about also limits the variety of thought and action and the attentiveness 
to details of the firms (e.g., Langfred, 2004; Webb, 1996: 292). Therefore trust may reduce the 
alertness needed when alliance partners have to respond to uncertainty in the environment. The 
result may be that partners inadequately respond, or even fail to respond, to the challenges posed 
by the environment. Thus trust seems to entail a trade-off between the capacity to deal with 
behavioral and with environmental uncertainty.
In this paper we examine this possible trade-off by theorizing that trust has differential effects on 
alliance performance, depending on the levels of behavioral and environmental uncertainty. We 
define strategic alliances as any extended cooperative agreement intended at joint development, 
manufacture, and/or distribution of products (Gulati, 1998; Zollo, Reuer & Singh, 2002: 701). 
While trust helps alliance partners to cope with uncertainties pertaining to each other’s behavior, 
trust also tends to constrain partners’ responses to environmental demands, thus hindering them 
from responding appropriately to environmental uncertainty. Below, we develop these arguments 
in greater detail, and test the resulting hypotheses on a sample of 126 international strategic 
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3.1. TRUST AND ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE
The concept of trust has received ample attention from various disciplines, and although diverse 
interpretations  of  trust  have  been  put  forward  in  prior  research,  a  common  core  emerges. 
Building on this prior research, we define interorganizational trust as the expectation held by one 
firm that another would not exploit its vulnerabilities when faced with the opportunity to do so 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Sako, 1991). This expectation is 
confirmed when parties (1) demonstrate reliability by carrying out their promises; (2) act fairly 
when dealing with each other; and (3) exhibit goodwill when unforeseen contingencies arise. Our 
definition thus bases interorganizational trust on three related components: reliability, fairness 
and goodwill (Dyer & Chu, 2003).
The goodwill component in the definition of trust extends beyond contractual obligations in that 
partners  commit  themselves  and  contribute  to  the  relationship  beyond  what  was  explicitly 
guaranteed (Sako, 1991: 453). Hence, trust stands to be relevant in situations where firms make 
substantial and open commitments  to a partnership. This most prominently include alliances 
(Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Gulati, 1995).
One prominent concern with alliances is that conflict between partners can occasion high costs or 
a premature breakdown of the relationship (Zaheer et al., 1998) Trust helps defuse such conflict, 
because trusting partners are more likely to interpret each other’s equivocal actions in a manner 
conducive to the stability of the relationship. As Noorderhaven (2004) argued on the basis of 
case studies by Doz (1996), if a firm encounters unexpected actions by the partner that could be 
ascribed  to  both  good  and  bad  intentions,  the  presence  of  trust  reduces  the  likelihood  of  a 
negative interpretation. For instance, when confronted with disappointing sales of a product line, 
a  partner  might  either  explain  the  inadequate  performance  on  the  basis  of  an  ineffective 
promotional campaign, or view the failure as signaling a lack of commitment of the other party’s 
distributors. Under such equivocal situations, trust facilitates mutual understanding and allows 
for the benefit of the doubt. It thus reduces the costs of interpartner conflict as well as other 
transaction costs (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Zaheer et al., 1998). Research also shows that such costs 
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trust improves alliance performance. Hence:
Hypothesis 1. Trust is positively related to alliance performance.
The above hypothesis does not mean that trust improves performance of all alliances equally. 
Next, we argue that the relationship between trust and alliance performance is moderated by the 
type of uncertainty that alliance partners encounter. In this respect, we distinguish between two 
types  of  uncertainty  that  are  relevant  to  interfirm  relations  (Sutcliffe  &  Zaheer,  1998; 
Williamson, 1985): environmental uncertainty, which results from exogenous sources outside the 
scope of the alliance; and behavioral uncertainty, which results from the unpredictability and the 
potential impact of the actions of an exchange partner. Below, we develop predictions such that 
the  trust-performance  relationship  is  likely  to  be  stronger  under  behavioral  uncertainty  but 
weaker under environmental uncertainty.
3.1.1. Trust, Behavioral Uncertainty Concerns and Alliance Performance
Concern about partner behavior is a predominant source of internal tension in strategic alliances 
(Parkhe,  1993b;  Park  &  Ungson,  2001;  Sutcliffe  &  Zaheer,  1998).  Behavioral  uncertainty 
concerns (henceforth ‘behavioral uncertainty’, in short) refer to alliance (or transaction) partners’ 
concerns  about  their  inability  to  accurately  predict  each  other’s  actions  in  the  relationship, 
particularly in view of the possibility of intentional or unintentional harm resulting from such 
actions (Nooteboom, 2002; Williamson, 1985). Behavioral uncertainty arises from possibilities 
such as poor performance or withholding of information by an alliance partner (Parkhe, 1993b; 
Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998), or the attempts by one partner to opportunistically appropriate the 
other’s valuable resources (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998).
Although  behavioral  uncertainty  is  never  completely  absent,  its  magnitude  varies  across 
alliances.  Such  concerns  are exacerbated  in  alliances with  two  characteristics  (Das  &  Teng, 
2000; Park & Ungson, 2001): those in which contributions of the partners are highly intertwined 
(Nooteboom,  2002;  Stinchcombe,  1985),  i.e.  in  alliances  involving  high  interdependence 
between partners (Park & Russo, 1996); or those where each partner is likely to further private 
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most  prominently in  alliances between potential competitors (Bleeke &  Ernst, 1993; Hamel, 
1991; Kogut, 1988; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996).
Interdependence. The degree of interdependence in an alliance increases with the importance 
and extent of the resources shared between partners and with the resulting overlap in division of 
labor between them (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Thompson, 1967). Alliances 
that are set up to share production facilities typically create only weak interdependencies (Gulati 
&  Singh,  1998).  Resource  allocations  and  role  assignments  in  these  partnerships  tend  to  be 
straightforward and stable, and the division of labor is thus likely to be simple.  In contrast, 
alliances formed for joint development of new technology or to speed up innovation such as 
‘designing a leading edge microprocessor’ lead to high interdependence (Nickerson & Zenger, 
2004:  620;  Park  &  Russo,  1996).  These  alliances  are  characterized  by  substantial  overlap 
between the partners’ responsibilities, and involve ongoing mutual adjustment between partners 
(Gulati & Singh, 1998).
With high interdependence activities, including alliances, coordination is difficult because the 
uncertainty  or  non-routineness  due  to  interdependence  discourages  both  the  assigning  of  a 
specific division of labor between parties and the formalization of standard operating procedures 
(e.g. Miller, Glick, Wang & Huber, 1991). Instead, the overlapping division of labor requires 
coordination by mutual  adjustment (Thompson, 1967). The timing and effectiveness of such 
adjustment is all the more uncertain as interdependence precludes the use of standard interfaces
and integrative devices (Park & Russo, 1996). Thus, the higher the interdependence, the more 
likely that any change made by one partner will affect the other in unplanned ways, and the more 
immediate and severe the adverse impact of any mistake (intentional  or not) by the partner 
(Thompson,  1967;  Nooteboom,  2002).  Therefore,  behavioral  uncertainty  increases  with  the 
interdependence between alliance partners.
In addition, high interdependence requires the partners to share and expose valuable knowledge-
intensive resources to their partner (Kumar & Seth, 1998; Nooteboom, 2002; Park & Russo, 
1996;  Park  &  Ungson,  2001).  Being  harder  to  observe,  value  and  protect,  such  knowledge 
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intents  and  contributions  to  the  alliance  (Oxley,  1999).  This,  magnified  by  the  closely 
intertwined  partner  contributions,  renders  coordination  all  the  more  uncertain  in  high-
interdependence alliances (Park & Russo, 1996). Difficulty in discerning contributions further 
threatens the open sharing of resources and information among partners, and consequently the 
management of the ongoing relationship.
Interorganizational trust stands to be especially beneficial in the presence of such behavioral 
uncertainty. By asserting good faith in the intent and reliability of partner behavior, trust allows 
partners to engage in constructive interpretation of each other’s actions (Zaheer et al., 1998). It 
also encourages partners to be aware of the processes and procedures that each partner follows 
(Gulati & Singh, 1998). Thus, trust alleviates apprehensions regarding the sharing of information 
concerning valuable resources and encourages partners to discover better ways of managing their 
interface.  The  resulting  information  exchange  and  socialization  assist  in  crafting  effective 
integration and coordination mechanisms. Under high interdependence, interorganizational trust 
is therefore essential for alliance performance, as it facilitates mutual adjustment and allows the 
smoother synchronization of critical tasks.
Conversely,  we  expect  trust  to  have  a  weaker  effect  on  alliance  performance  under  low 
interdependence conditions, as the overlap in the division of labor between partners is lower and 
hence the scope for misinterpretations and tensions is likely to be lower as well (Gulati & Singh, 
1998). Hence, the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis  2.  The  positive  relation  between  trust  and  alliance  performance  will  be 
stronger in alliances with a high degree of interdependence between partners than in 
alliances with low interdependence.
Inter-partner competition. Inter-partner competition exists when a partner tries to maximize its 
private  interests  at  the  expense  of  the  alliance  or  the  other  partner  (Baum,  Calabrese  & 
Silverman, 2000; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001). In alliances formed between 
potential competitors, concerns about opportunistic exploitation loom especially large, in that 
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Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Prior research has shown that alliances between potential competitors 
engender greater tendencies of partners to engage in such ‘de-facto internalization’ (Baum et al., 
2000; Hamel, 1991: 84). Moreover, because potential competitors are familiar with the areas that 
their partner operates in, they have superior capacity to absorb and reuse proprietary knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Park & Russo, 1996).
As a result, potential inter-partner competition also exacerbates partners’ tendencies to protect 
their own resources, especially knowledge, at the risk of hampering the alliance relationship 
(Hamel, 1991; Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000). By detracting partners from contributing fully 
towards the performance  of the  alliance,  these  concerns interfere  with  the realization of the 
synergistic benefits of the alliance (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Grindley, Mowery & Silverman, 
1994).
Trust can counteract such problems by increasing partners’ confidence that each will not abuse 
the vulnerabilities of the other (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Mayer et al., 1995). As a result of faith 
in the intentions and fairness of the other, the partners are more likely to respect the boundaries 
of each other’s resources and proprietary knowledge. This encourages partners to provide the 
substantive resources and accurate and timely information that enhance collaborative benefits 
(Sako, 1991; Zand, 1972). Trust is all the more advantageous when the potential for inter-partner 
competition is high, because it counteracts the attendant failure to cooperate.
In  alliances  where  the  potential  for  inter-partner  competition  is  low,  conversely,  the 
appropriation of resources is less likely to be of strategic concern. Hence, partners’ suspicions 
regarding  each  other’s  intents  within  and  outside  the  alliance  are  less  crippling.  Thus,  the 
benefits of interorganizational trust are lower.
Hypothesis  3.  The  positive  relation  between  trust  and  alliance  performance  will  be 
stronger in alliances where the potential for inter-partner competition is high than in 
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3.1.2. Trust, Environmental Uncertainty and Alliance Performance
Environmental  uncertainty  results  from  changes  in  the  economic  conditions  faced  by  the 
organization that are outside its control and hard to anticipate (Dess & Beard, 1984; Koopmans, 
1957), such as instability or unpredictability in markets (Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984; 
Wholey & Brittain, 1989). Environmental uncertainty demands speedy and responsive decisions 
(Huber, Miller & Glick, 1990: 13; Mintzberg, 1978). This, in turn, requires organizations to 
engage in significant scanning of the environment in search of accurate and reliable information 
that  would  enable  them  to  interpret  and  act  upon  the  threats  and  opportunities  facing  them 
(Aguilar, 1967; Anderson & Paine, 1975; Hambrick, 1982).
Unpredictable  changes  in  the  environment  stand  to  affect  the  performance  potential  of  the 
alliance (Harrigan, 1985; Kogut, 1989). To sustain performance in an uncertain environment, 
alliance partners need to monitor changes and adjust the alliance’s strategy accordingly, even 
though  the  conditions  may  be  different  in  the  parent  firms  themselves  (Harrigan,  1985). 
Anderson and Paine argue that in adjusting strategy “the critical area is not uncertainty per se but 
the processing of accurate information to deal with uncertainty” (1975: 814). This information 
processing may be a bottleneck because of problems of information overload (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Robertson, 1980), which are exacerbated by information unfamiliarity (Park & Sheath, 1975). In 
highly uncertain environments, cognitive limitations may introduce considerable limitations and 
biases in the decision making process, by prompting the application of inappropriate rules of 
thumb (Barnes, 1984; Cyert & March, 1963; Schwenk, 1984).
The risk that biases enter decision-making in uncertain environments is greater in the presence of 
trust, especially in alliances. Scholars are beginning to recognize the heuristic quality of trust 
(McEvily et al., 2003;  Nooteboom, 2002;  Uzzi,  1997).  Like cognitive  heuristics (Bazerman, 
1998),  trust  enables  decision-making  under  conditions  of  uncertainty,  but  may  also  produce 
systematic biases that can result in significant errors (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003). Specifically, when 
partners trust each other, their tendency to screen for accuracy of the information provided by the 
other is reduced, and their inclination to accept the information at face value increases (McEvily 
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accustomed to relying on each other without doubt, each partner tends to rely more extensively 
on the other’s knowledge of the environment when scanning the opportunities and threats faced 
by the alliance, while paying less attention to the completeness and veracity of the information 
thus  obtained. Trust encourages  partners  to  minimize  redundancies in  the  search process  by 
exploiting  each other’s  purported  expertise  to  engage  in  specialized  search.  For  instance,  in 
international alliances it is common for the local partner to scan the environment for regulatory 
changes  or  changes  in  consumer  preferences  in  the  local  market,  while  the  foreign  partner 
monitors technological changes, global demand or new competition from foreign firms (Beamish 
& Banks, 1987); such tendencies tend to be more pronounced in the presence of trust.
Prior  research  has  also  shown  that  confronting  alternative  views  and  diverse  information 
stimulates creativity and constructive criticism (Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999; Simons, Pelled 
&  Smith,  1999).  Specialized  search  as  described  above,  on  the  contrary,  reduces  variety  in 
information and restricts the cross-fertilization of viewpoints required for crafting well-informed 
responses to the environment (Webb, 1996). In alliances, because trust functions as a simplifying 
heuristic that constrains cognitive effort (McEvily et al., 2003), it also stands to bias partners’ 
efforts to scan and make sense of the environment, and thereby result in sub-optimal responses.
Trusting alliance partners may even experience ‘strategic blindness’, i.e., outright insensitivity to 
changes in  the  environment  (McEvily  et al., 2003:  97).  Because partners commit  resources, 
effort and time in the process of cultivating trust, they tend to be wary of actions that may 
damage  the  relationship  (Nooteboom,  2002).  For  instance,  if  responding  to  environmental 
change would require major changes such as bringing in a new partner or ending the alliance 
(Harrigan, 1985), partners may be apprehensive about the eventuality of having to cultivate trust 
and adjust to a new partner all over again, or having to go it alone. In the presence of such 
apprehensions, partners tend to weigh losses resulting from responding to the environment more 
than the gains that might come about (Bazerman, 1998; Nooteboom, 2002). Partners may prefer 
‘inaction over action and status quo over any alternatives’ (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993:18) -
culminating in the alliance failing to respond to demands of the environment.Chapter 3 46
Overall, interorganizational trust stands to result in inadequate response to the challenges posed 
by  an  uncertain  environment  because  it  limits  cognitive  efforts  or  even  causes  strategic 
blindness.  Notwithstanding  good  intentions,  trust  may  thus  lead  partners  into  making  sub-
optimal and slow decisions for the alliance, or even no decision at all. This places the alliance at 
variance with the demands of the environment. As a result, we expect that trust will dampen 
down alliance performance in the presence of high environmental uncertainty.
Under low environmental  uncertainty, on the contrary, complete and accurate environmental 
scanning is less critical. Furthermore, less effort is required to adjust to the environment because 
of its stability and predictability. Therefore, the limiting effects of trust discussed above tend to 
be less relevant.
Scholars have consistently argued that hard to predict changes in the market environment create 
critical  uncertainty  for  organizations  (Cameron,  Kim  &  Whetten,  1987;  Delacroix  & 
Swaminathan,  1991;  Dess  &  Beard,  1984:  56).  Many  researchers  have  used  the  concept  of 
‘instability’, i.e. the degree of difference involved in each environmental change (Child, 1972), 
to capture environmental uncertainty (e.g., Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Snyder 
&  Glueck,  1982).  Others  have  argued  that  instability  is  but  one  dimension  of  uncertainty. 
Unpredictability, i.e. the degree of irregularity in the overall pattern of environmental change 
(Child, 1972), also magnifies the consequences of a changing environment (e.g., Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1973; Wholey & Brittain, 1989). Because environmental uncertainty is magnified by 
both instability and unpredictability (Buchko, 1994), these two distinct dimensions of market 
variation  are  both  relevant  to  our  investigation  of  the  joint  consequences  of  trust  and 
environmental uncertainty. That is, we expect instability and unpredictability to each have a 
dampening effect on the trust-performance relationship.
Hypothesis 4: The positive effect of interorganizational trust on alliance performance 
will be weaker when market instability is high than when it is low.
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of interorganizational trust on alliance performance 
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3.2. METHODS
3.2.1. Data
Data were collected through a survey of international strategic alliances operating in India. As 
stated above, we identified strategic alliances as extended cooperative agreements intended at the 
joint  development,  manufacture,  and/or  distribution  of  products  (Gulati,  1998;  Zollo,  et  al., 
2002). In the last 15 years, India has become one of the most attractive investment locations in 
the world (A.T. Kearney, 2004). Strategic alliances have been a prevalent mode of entry into the 
Indian market, as in the rest of the world, and the number of strategic alliances in India has also 
risen by more than 50  percent over  the past decade (Bhaumik,  Beena,  Bhandari & Gokarn, 
2003).  Furthermore,  variable  demand  levels  and  shifts  in  the  competitive  landscape  across 
industries make this a relevant empirical setting to study the role of environmental uncertainty. 
Thus, India provides a rich and suitable context in which to study the conditions for successful 
strategic alliances.
To  obtain  a  target  population  of  international  strategic  alliances,  we  examined  Capitaline,  a 
secondary database, and member lists of various international chambers of commerce in India. 
We thus identified a sample of 700 dyadic international strategic alliances operating in India. 
Following Parkhe (1993b) and Simonin (1999), the research was designed to aim at respondents 
highly knowledgeable about the alliances. The sensitive nature of the questions, and the fact that 
most international alliances in India are directly dealt with by the top executives, demanded that 
the questionnaire be filled in by managing directors or chief executive officers. These target 
respondents’ names were identified using Capitaline and chambers of commerce data.
3.2.2. Data Collection
The questionnaires were designed and the survey implemented according to Dillman’s (2000) 
Tailored Design Method, which suggests several ways to encourage response. The measurement 
items were generated through a review of prior alliance literature. We used university faculty and 
doctoral students to assess the content of the items to ascertain whether the items tapped into the 
conceptual domain  of  the  focal  construct  (DeVellis,  1991).  This  yielded  a  set  of  fine-tuned Chapter 3 48
questionnaire items that were used in personal  interviews and early pre-tests  with managing 
directors of Indian firms involved in international strategic alliances to verify for item ambiguity. 
We  made  slight  modifications  to  the  wording  of  a  few  items  as  a  result,  and  enriched one 
measure as  described  below.  This  process  further strengthened  content  validity. Appendix  1 
reports the survey items used in this study.
The first wave of questionnaires was sent to managing directors and senior executives of 700 
Indian firms with international alliances. This was followed, four weeks later, by a second wave 
of  survey  mailings. Of  the  700  managing  directors  and  senior  executives  that  received 
questionnaires,  126  responded,  yielding  an  18%  response  rate.  This  is  comparable to  recent 
surveys of alliance managers in other emerging economies: e.g.14.4% for China (Isobe, Makino 
& Montgomery, 2000), 19% for Mexico (Robins, Tallman & Lindquist, 2002). All the responses 
to  our  survey  came  from  individuals  directly  responsible  for  the  alliances:  80  came  from 
chairpersons and managing directors of the alliances, 30 from presidents, vice presidents and 
general managers, and 16 from full-time directors. Nearly 75% of the respondents had been with 
the firm for more than five years, and of these almost 25% for more than 20 years. The alliance 
partners of Indian firms were spread over 21 countries. All alliances in our sample are dyadic, 
and all belong to industries in the manufacturing sector where alliances are more prevalent (e.g., 
Parkhe, 1993b; Simonin, 1999). Tests of proportions show that the distribution of our responses 
according to their two-digit manufacturing SIC is not statistically different from those reported in 
the two landmark studies by Harrigan (1988) and Ghemawat, Porter & Rawlison (1986) (chi-
squares of 8.11 for 16 d.f. and 10.04 for 17 d.f., respectively). The top four industries in our 
sample rank in the same order as in these studies, and as others have also found (e.g. Parkhe, 
1993b),  are  relatively  high-tech  (industrial  machinery  and  equipment,  chemicals  and  allied 
products, electrical and electronic equipment, and transportation equipment).
Though we obtained data for most of our moderators from archival sources, some of our key 
measures were collected using the same survey instrument and from a single respondent. We 
undertook  multiple  procedural  and  statistical  remedies  to  address  the  potential  concern  of 
common method bias and single informant bias. Specifically, we undertook procedural remedies 
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anonymity,  scale  reordering  and  reducing  item  ambiguity.  Our  statistical  remedies  included 
triangulating survey data with data obtained from secondary sources and from field interviews, 
partial correlation adjustment, and Harman’s (1967) one factor test. Appendix 2 reports details 
on  each  of  these  steps.  Based  on  these  we  are  confident  that  common  method  or  single 
respondent bias was not a serious problem in our study.
We checked the potential for non-response bias by comparing the characteristics of the respondents to 
those of the targeted population sample. T-tests for the size of the firms (p = 0.284) and age of the local 
firm (p = 0.344) revealed no significant differences between respondent and non-respondent groups. In 
line with Mohr & Spekman (1994) and Poppo & Zenger (2002), we also tested for non-response bias 
by comparing early and late respondents. Armstrong & Overton (1977) argue that late respondents are 
more representative of non-respondents. We found no significant difference between early and late 
respondents on characteristics such as number of employees of the Indian partner (p = 0.18), alliance 
duration (p = 0.29) and investment size (p = 0.51).
3.2.3. Dependent Variable
Alliance performance. Despite numerous studies on alliance performance (e.g., Aulakh, Kotabe 
&  Sahay,  1996;  Lane,  Salk  &  Lyles,  2001;  Mohr  &  Spekman,  1994;  Parkhe,  1993b),  no 
consensus exists on measuring alliance performance. The hybrid structure and transitional nature 
of alliances (Buckley & Glaister, 2002; Olk, 2002) present unique challenges for evaluating 
performance  and  hinder  the  use  of  two  common  indicators  of  firm  performance,  financial 
profitability and survival. Most alliances do not report financial performance, which even then 
could be biased according to partners’ accounting preferences. Survival is an imperfect indicator 
of success because an alliance may be successful and discontinued - e.g., because it has served 
its purpose – or unsuccessful and not (yet) discontinued - e.g., because the partners still hope to 
improve the relationship (Yan & Zeng, 1999). To circumvent such hurdles, much of the alliance 
performance research has relied on the manager’s evaluation of alliance success (e.g., Aulakh et 
al., 1996; Isobe et al., 2000; Lin & Germain, 1998; Saxton, 1997). This is appropriate when the 
respondent  represents  top  management  (see  Olk,  2002).  Because  the  key  informants  in  our 
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managerial  evaluations  of  its  success.  Moreover,  Geringer  &  Hebert  (1991)  found  strong 
correlations between subjective and objective measures of alliance performance.
Alliance Performance is measured using a 5-item Likert scale reflecting: (1) the extent to which 
the local partner is satisfied with the overall performance of the alliance, (2) the extent to which 
the local partner perceives the foreign partner to be satisfied with the overall performance of the 
alliance, (3) the partners’ satisfaction with respect to the attainment of goals, (4) the extent to 
which the local partner is satisfied with the financial performance of the alliance, and (5) the 
extent to which the local partner perceives its foreign partner to be satisfied with the financial 
performance  of  the  alliance.  With  a  Cronbach’s  alpha  of  0.90,  the  performance  scale 
demonstrates high reliability (DeVellis, 1991; Nunally, 1978).
3.2.4. Independent Variables
Trust. Trust is measured on a 5-item Likert scale capturing the fairness, reliability and goodwill 
dimensions of trust. Items are adapted from Aulakh et al. (1996) and Sako & Helper (1998). For 
details, see Appendix 1. The trust scale has high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha=0.85).
Interdependence. Strategic rationales for forming an alliance, eight of which Gulati & Singh 
(1998)  identified  through  an  extensive  review  of  the  literature,  capture  the  range  of  value 
creation motives of the partners. Based on our pre-test with Indian alliance managers, we added 
one item to their list: access to technology. As in Gulati & Singh (1998), we assigned the nine 
strategic rationales into one of the three classes of interdependencies identified by Thompson 
(1967):  pooled,  sequential  and  reciprocal  interdependence.  We  classified  as  pooled 
interdependence three strategic rationales that require limited coordination: sharing costs (e.g., 
materials procurement), sharing production facilities and sharing financial resources. Three other 
strategic  rationales  were  classified  under  sequential  interdependence:  access  to  financial 
resources, access to new markets, and access to technology; these require intermediate levels of 
coordination. Reciprocal interdependence included the remaining three strategic rationales, that 
require  extensive  coordination:  sharing  complementary  technology,  joint  development  of 
technology  and  reduction  of  time  needed  for  innovation  (see  Gulati  &  Singh,  1998:  796). 
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(respondents  could  identify  more  than  one  strategic  rationale),  weighted  by  the  type  of 
interdependence  each  rationale  represents.  We  assigned  ordinal  weights  of  3,  2  and  1  for 
reciprocal, sequential and pooled interdependence respectively. Degree of interdependence is 
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where SIi = weighted composite interdependence score for alliance i
wi,j  = weights reflecting the level of interdependence implied by each strategic rationale j 
in alliance i, j = 1,….., 9
SRi,j = presence of strategic rationale j in alliance i
To ensure that the weighting scheme did not affect the robustness of our findings, we ran several 
alternative specifications as in Gulati & Singh (1998). 
Inter-partner  competition. Prior  empirical  research  classified  alliances  as  being  between 
potential competitors when both partners operate in the same four-digit SIC code (e.g., Johnson,
Cullen, Sakano & Takenouchi, 1996; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996). To capture 
more accurately the extent of inter-partner competition present in the alliances, we refined the 
implied binary measure into three categories indicating different degrees of competitive overlap. 
We assigned a score of 2 if the alliance operates in the same four-digit SIC code as both partners 
and  neither  partner  is  active  in  any  other  four-digit  SIC  code.  Because  the  partners  are 
horizontally related and the alliance’s activities are central to their businesses, the concerns about 
breeding a potential competitor are likely to be very high. We gave a score of 1 if both partners 
operate in the same four-digit SIC code as that of the alliance, but one or (most often) both
partners are active in other four digit SIC codes as well. This indicates a horizontal relationship 
among partners,  but  with  concerns about  potential competition  somewhat  lower because  the 
overlap is less central to the partners’ businesses. Finally, we assigned a score of 0 if the partners 
did not operate in the same industries. This category includes pure cases where the partners are 
vertically related via the alliance (e.g., one partner supplies inputs for the alliance which operates 
in the same business as the other partner). Though the alliance might be strategic to the partners, 
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competitors  (Harrigan,  1985).  Various  specification  checks,  including  comparisons  with  the 
previous  binary  variable,  showed  our  measure  to  be  robust  and  to  discriminate  effectively 
between various degrees of rivalry.
Environmental instability. Although environmental instability may have various sources, we 
have chosen to concentrate on product market instability in our empirical analysis. The reason is 
that because all of our alliances operate within the same country, instability caused by other 
sources such as the regulatory regime is typically the same for many alliances. The dynamics of 
product markets, on the contrary, vary between industries, and are therefore a better source of 
environmental instability to test our hypotheses. Like previous research that followed the same 
logic,  our  measure  captures  five-year  patterns  of  instability  in  the  sales  of  each  alliance’s 
industry (Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988). We regressed 
industry sales on year and divided the standard error of the regression slope coefficient by the 
mean of industry sales. Larger values indicate greater environmental instability.
Environmental  unpredictability.  For  the  reasons  explained  above,  we  concentrate  on  the 
unpredictability of product markets to gauge the effect of environmental unpredictability. Our 
measure captures the extent to which alliance partners can predict future trends in the product 
market from the recent past (Glick, Ogilvie & Miller, 1990; Wholey & Brittain, 1989). We 
measured unpredictability as (1-R
2 ) of the regression of industry sales in the current year on the 
previous year’s industry sales (e.g., Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991). 
3.2.5. Control Variables
Investment size. Because prior research suggests that the size of the investment in an alliance 
may  affect  partners’  commitment  to  alliance  operations  (influencing  the  performance  of  the 
alliance), we controlled for investment size (Parkhe, 1993b). Consistent with prior research (Luo, 
2002), we operationalized  investment  size  based  on  the total  amount  of investment  by  both 
partners. To measure this, we used a five-point interval scale.
Cultural  distance. Cultural  distance  could  be  related  to  alliance  performance  (  Luo,  2002; 
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using Kogut & Singh’s (1988) index, based on Hofstede’s (1980) four cultural dimensions.
Equity alliance. The governance mode within the alliance (Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1999; Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004) may be indicative of the motives of the partners and have a large impact on 
alliance performance (Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Saxton, 1997). We coded equity alliances by a 
binary variable assigning a score of 1 for alliances that involved the use of equity, and 0 for non-
equity alliances (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Saxton, 1997).
Alliance duration. Partners in long-lasting alliances have had enough time to develop mutual 
understanding and thus conflicts that tend to hamper relationship performance may be less likely 
(Lin & Germain, 1998; Martin, Swaminathan & Mitchell, 1998). Duration is measured by an 
item capturing the number of years the alliance has been in existence at the time of measurement 
(e.g. Kotabe, Martin & Domoto, 2003; Simonin, 1999).
Quality of information exchanged. A higher quality of information exchange may influence 
alliance performance and trust, irrespective of the level of uncertainty (Aulakh et al., 1996). 
Quality  of  information  exchanged  is  measured  with  a  5-item  scale  capturing  the  frequency, 
density and openness of communication as distinguished by Gupta & Govindarajan (1991). This 
construct had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81.
Position of respondent. We assigned a value of 1 if the respondent held the CEO’s position or its 
equivalent in the firm, and 0 otherwise.
Local partner size. We controlled for the size of the local partner by using the log of the number 
of employees (e.g., Deeds & Rothaermel, 2003).
Industry dummies. Alliances in certain industries may systematically perform better than those 
in other industries due to differences in industry structure (Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles & Dhanaraj, 
2005). To control for industry differences, we used dummy variables for the major industries in 
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3.2.6. Analysis
Measurement  analysis  was  conducted  using  LISREL’s  8.3  maximum  likelihood  program 
(Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996). We performed confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL to check 
for  convergent  and  discriminant  validity.  Our  sample  includes  both  equity  and  non-equity 
alliances. Prior research argues that managers consciously select the alliance governance mode 
that is likely to enhance performance (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Sampson, 2004); therefore it is likely 
that  alliance  performance  depends  on  unobservable  characteristics  that  determine  alliance 
governance choices. To account for this potential endogeneity, we used Heckman’s (1979) two-
stage technique (see Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998). Using this procedure, we first 
estimates a probit model of governance choice and generates the inverse Mills ratio. We then 
estimate the alliance performance model using the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage as a 
control variable. Incorporating the inverse Mills ratio as a correction term in the second-stage 
model yields unbiased estimates of the predictors of alliance performance (Greene, 1997).
We used ordinary least squares regression to examine alliance performance. Before calculating 
the interaction terms used to test hypotheses 2-5, the variables involved were mean centered 
(Aiken & West, 1991).
3.3. RESULTS
3.3.1. Reliability and Validity 
All constructs display satisfactory levels of reliability, as indicated by the composite reliabilities 
ranging from 0.81 to 0.90 (Nunally, 1978; see the Appendix 1 for reliabilities of constructs). 
Convergent  validity,  the  extent  to  which  different  attempts  to  measure  a  construct  agree 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959), can be judged by looking at the factor loadings. Each loading () was 
significantly related to its underlying factor and all standardized item loadings were well above 
the cut-off of 0.50 (Hildebrandt, 1987), supporting convergent validity. 
A  series  of  chi-square  difference  tests  on  the  factor  correlations  showed  that  discriminant 
validity, the extent to which a construct differs from others, is achieved among all constructs 
(Bagozzi,  1993;  Joreskog,  1971).  It  is  particularly  important  that  discriminant  validity  be 
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We constrained the estimated correlation parameter between trust and performance to 1.0, and 
then performed a chi-square difference test on the values obtained for the constrained (2 = 
180.78, df = 35, p < 0.000) and unconstrained models (2 = 135.19, df = 34, p < 0.000). The 
significant difference in chi-square (2 = 45.59, df = 1, p < 0.000) indicates that the two 
constructs are not perfectly correlated and that discriminant validity is achieved (see Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). We also compared the fit indices, CFI and GFI, between the constrained and 
unconstrained models, and found that the difference was moderately large (CFI = .11, GFI = 
.09), again suggesting sufficient discriminant validity (e.g., Bagozzi & Yi, 1990). We carried out 
the same procedures for other constructs too, with similar results.
3.3.2. Tests of Hypotheses
Table 1 reports means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables. Tables 2 and 3 
report the results of the first stage probit and the second stage regression models respectively. 
Table 2 displays results of the first-stage probit model. As predictors of whether the alliance is an 
equity-based venture, we included tenure and position of the respondent with the local partner 
firm,  a  dummy for  alliances  formed  before  liberalization,  investment  size,  cultural  distance
between the partner countries, local partner size, interdependence, inter-partner competition, 
environmental instability and unpredictability. As suggested in prior research, we use tenure of  
respondent  (e.g.,  Poppo  &  Zenger,  2002)  and  alliance  formed  before  liberalization  (e.g., 
Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003) as identifying instruments in our governance choice model. The 
respondent’s  experience  with  the  firm  proxies  for  firm  knowledge  about  interorganizational 
relationships (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Managers’ experience with the firm is likely to influence 
the choice of governance mode of the alliance. This is valid as all our respondents hold positions 
of high responsibility. Before a major episode of liberalization in 1991, the Indian government 
exerted pressure on  foreign firms to  contribute  some form of equity to  the  Indian  economy 
(Balasubramanyam,  2003;  Bowonder  &  Richardson,  2000).  Hence,  alliances  formed  before 
liberalization  were  more  likely  to  be  equity  alliances,  though  not  all  were.  We  have  no 
theoretical  basis  to  expect  a  relationship  between  either  of  these  variables  and  alliance 
performance. The choice of equity governance is negatively related to the tenure of respondent
(p < 0.01) and environmental unpredictability (p < 0.10), and is positively related to investment TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
a
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Alliance performance 3.75 0.78
2. Position of respondent 0.58 0.49 -.04
3. Investment size 2.42 0.95 .17 -.06
4. Cultural distance 1.86 0.42 .09 -.03 .18
5. Local partner size 5.46 1.63 .15 -.20 .39 .23
6. Equity alliance 0.58 0.49 .14 .03 .17 -.02 -.06
7. Alliance duration 12.10 9.33 .18 -.19 .15 .02 .25 .09
8. Quality of information exchanged 3.12 0.74 .49 -.07 .30 .04 .19 .34 -.06
9. Interdependence 0.50 0.38 .11 -.03 .23 -.03 -.02 .14 -.12 .32
10. Inter-partner competition 1.28 0.63 -.24 .15 -.06 -.18 -.22 .06 .03 -.14 .03
11. Environmental instability 0.04 0.03 -.03 -.01 -.07 -.01 .06 .00 .01 .03 -.03 .01
12. Environmental unpredictability 0.57 0.32 .11 -.03 -.04 -10 -.05 -.15 -.00 -.03 -.04 .11 -.19
13. Trust 3.74 0.77 .52 -.09 .15 .01 .05 .27 .17 .43 .14 -.12 -.14 .07
14.  (Correction for endogeneity) 0.00 0.76 .13 .03 .00 -.05 -.00 .62 .11 .27 .00 .00 .00 -.00 .29
aN=126. Correlations with absolute value greater than .17 are significant at the .05 level. Means and standard deviations reported here are for raw 
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TABLE 2
Probit Estimates For First-Stage Governance Choice Model:
Equity vs. Non-equity alliances
a
a Standard 
errors are within parentheses. p values (two tailed): † p < 0.100, * p < 0.050, ** p < 







































Results of Regression Analysis: Alliance Performance as Dependent Variable
a
aN=126. R
2  in models 3 through 5 is in comparison to R
2 in model 2. The coefficients reported are unstandardized estimates, with standard errors 
in parentheses. p values (two tailed): † p < 0.100, * p < 0.050, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001








Quality of information exchanged
 .58     (0.56)
 .07     (0.12)
 .12     (0.11)
 .13     (0.15)
-.04     (0.05)
-1.06† (0.61)
 .02*   (0.01)
 .58***(0.08)
-.92      (0.72)
 .15      (0.11)
-.11      (0.11)
 .10      (0.14)
 .03      (0.05)
 .78      (0.81) 
 .02*    (0.01)
 .29**   (0.09)
-1.02     (0.72)
  .13      (0.10) 
-.12      (0.11)
  .12       (0.14)
 .04       (0.05)
  .91       (0.80)
  .02*     (0.01)
  .29**   (0.09)
-1.06     (0.73)
  .17      (0.11)
-.14      (0.11)
  .07      (0.13)
  .05      (0.05)
  .97      (0.81)
  .02*    (0.01)
  .27**   (0.09)
-1.17      (0.75)
   .15      (0.10)
  -.15      (0.11)
   .09      (0.13)
   .05      (0.05)
  1.08     (0.81) 
   .02*    (0.01)
   .27**  (0.09)
   .14      (0.10)
  -.16      (0.11)
   .10      (0.14)
   .06      (0.05)
  1.19     (0.80) 
   .02*    (0.01)







-.19      (0.32)
-.22*    (0.10)
 .17      (1.13)
 .45†    (0.26)
 .51*** (0.09)
-.24      (0.31)
-.22*    (0.09)
-.12      (0.89)
  .48†     (0.26)
  .47*** (0.09)
-.19      (0.31)
-.23*    (0.09)
-.98      (1.12)
  .49†    (0.26)
  .51*** (0.09)
  -.25     (0.32)
  -.23*   (0.09)
-1.03    (0.97)
   .52†   (0.27)
   .46***(0.08)
  -.25     (0.33)
  -.23*   (0.09)
  -.99     (1.04)
   .53†   (0.27)
   .47***(0.08)
Interactions
Trust x Interdependence
Trust x Inter-partner competition 
Trust x Environmental instability
Trust x Environmental unpredictability
Industry dummies
 (Correction for endogeneity - equity 
alliance)
   .62   (0.40)  -.57      (0.50)
  .62*     (0.27)
  .30*     (0.12)
-.67      (0.51)
-1.75†   (0.90)
  -.43†   (0.23)
  -.71     (0.50)
   .64*    (0.31)
   .29*    (0.11)
-1.31†    (0.77)
  -.49*    (0.21)
  -.80      (0.51)
   .65*    (0.31)
   .30*    (0.12)
-1.33†    (0.78)
  -.50*    (0.20)
 Not Significant
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size (p < 0.05) and alliance formed before liberalization (p < 0.01). We included the Inverse 
Mills ratio from this model into the second stage model. The correction term is insignificant in 
the second-stage models and the results remain the same regardless of its inclusion.
We tested six regression equations for the alliance performance variable, as reported in Table 3. 
After including only the control variables in model 1, we introduced the main variables in model 
2.  We  introduced  the  interactions  of  trust  with  behavioral  and  environmental  uncertainty 
variables  separately  in  models  3  and  4.  In  model  5,  we  included  all  the  interaction  terms 
simultaneously. Finally, we re-ran model 5 with industry dummies to create model 6. Model 1 is 
significant (p < 0.001), and the control variables explain 31 percent of the variance in alliance 
performance. Alliance duration (p < 0.01) and quality of information exchanged (p < 0.001) are 
positively  related  to  alliance  performance,  whereas  the  equity  alliance  dummy  is  negatively 
related to alliance performance (p < 0.10) (but only in the base model).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that trust will be positively related to alliance performance. The coefficient 
for trust in Model 2 is positive and significant (b = 0.51, p < 0.001), thus supporting Hypothesis 
1. Given mean centering, this coefficient shows the magnitude of the relationship between trust 
and alliance performance, holding other variables at their mean values.
Trust, Behavioral Uncertainty Concerns and Alliance Performance.
The incremental variance accounted for by the interactions between the behavioral uncertainty 
variables and trust is significant in Model 3 (R
2 = 0.042, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2 predicts that 
alliances will benefit more from interorganizational trust when the degree of interdependence is 
higher. Hypothesis 3 predicts that alliances will benefit more from interorganizational trust when 
the degree of potential inter-partner competition is higher. The coefficient of the interaction of 
trust with interdependence is significant and positive (b = 0.62, p < 0.05 in Model 3), supporting 
Hypothesis 2. We also find a significant interaction between trust and inter-partner competition
(b  = 0.30,  p < 0.05), thereby supporting Hypothesis  3.  These results show that the positive 
impact  of  trust  on  alliance  performance  increases  with  interdependence  and  inter-partner 
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To further assess the implications of the regression results, we plotted the relationship of trust 
and  alliance  performance  over  the  observed  range  of  trust,  with  separate  regression  lines 
representing different levels of interdependence. We created a similar plot  with inter-partner 
competition. The plotted lines represent the performance values expected on the basis of un-
standardized  regression  coefficients  from  the  complete  regression  (Model  5).  The  low 
interdependence and low inter-partner competition lines indicate values one standard deviation 
below the mean, and the high interdependence and high inter-partner competition lines indicate 
values one standard deviation above the mean. Figures 1 and 2 graphically support Hypotheses 2 
and 3, respectively. The simple slope test (Aiken & West, 1991) reveals that the magnitude of 
the  slope  of  alliance  performance  regressed  on  trust  is  nearly  twice  as  large  for  high 
interdependence (simple slope: b = 0.57, t = 5.29) as that for low interdependence (simple slope: 
b = 0.32, t = 3.55). The slope for high inter-partner competition (simple slope: b = 0.66, t = 6.35) 
is nearly thrice as large as that for low inter-partner competition (simple slope: b = 0.26, t = 
2.41). These results show that the trust- performance relationship strengthens at high levels of the 
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Trust, Environmental Uncertainty and Alliance Performance.
The additional variance accounted for by the interactions between the environmental uncertainty 
variables and trust is significant in Model 4 (R
2 = 0.026, p < 0.05). Hypothesis 4 predicts that 
the benefits that alliances derive from interorganizational trust will diminish when environmental 
instability  is  higher.  Hypothesis  5  predicts  that  the  benefits  that  alliances  derive  from 
interorganizational trust will diminish when environmental unpredictability is higher. Marginally 
significant  negative  effects  are  found  for  the  coefficient  of  the  interaction  of  trust  with 
environmental instability in models 4 (b = -1.75, p < 0.10) and 5 (b = -1.31, p < 0.10), giving 
some support to Hypothesis 4. Model 4 also shows a negative interaction effect between trust
and environmental unpredictability (b = - 0.43, p < 0.10), as does model 5 (b = - 0.49, p < 0.05), 
thereby  supporting  Hypothesis  5.  These  results  suggest  that  the  positive  impact  of  trust  on 
alliance performance diminishes with high instability and unpredictability in the environment.
To illustrate these interactions, we created plots for the trust- alliance performance relationship 
with  separate  regression  lines  representing  different  levels  of  environmental  instability  and Chapter 3 62
unpredictability one standard deviation above and below the mean. Figures 3 and 4 graphically 
support Hypotheses 4 and 5 respectively. The simple slope test (Aiken & West, 1991) reveals 
that  the  magnitude  of  the  slopes  of  alliance  performance  regressed  on  trust  is  nearly  twice 
smaller for high environmental instability (simple slope: b = 0.33, t = 3.44) as that for low 
environmental instability (simple slope: b = 0.59, t = 5.06). The slope for high environmental 
unpredictability (simple slope: b = 0.30, t = 3.1) is more than twice smaller than that for low 
environmental  unpredictability  (simple  slope:  b  =  0.61,  t  =  5.75).  Further  probing  of  the 
interactions  (Aiken  &  West,  1991)  revealed  that  for  very  high  levels  of  environmental 
unpredictability the relationship between trust and alliance performance becomes insignificant. 
The  sign  of  the  simple  slope  coefficient  of  trust  may  reverse  for  very  high  environmental 
unpredictability (b = -0.05, t = -0.28 at three standard deviations above the mean). These results 
indicate that the trust-performance relationship weakens and may disappear altogether at high 
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In model 6, we find that the addition of fixed effects for the main sample industries does not 
substantially add to the explanatory power of the regression (R
2 = 0.002, n.s.). The industry 
dummies are not significant as a set (F = 0.16, n.s.). Furthermore, the results as reported above, 
including all tests of hypotheses, do not change substantially. Thus, our results appear robust 
across industries.
All in all, the results consistently support our argument that the positive relationship between 
interorganizational  trust  and  alliance  performance  strengthens  under  conditions  that  foster 
behavioral uncertainty, but weakens severely under environmental uncertainty.
3.4. DISCUSSION
By now there appears to be general support for the idea that trust is beneficial to alliances. Chapter 3 64
However, recent studies have suggested that the impact of trust on alliance performance may be 
contingent on other factors. Yet previous research has not yielded a general theory regarding the 
conditions under which trust facilitates and hinders alliance performance. We have presented 
such a theory, based on the distinction between behavioral and environmental uncertainty, and 
shown empirically that, apart from the positive direct relationship between trust and alliance 
performance, more subtle interaction effects can be distinguished. The relationship between trust 
and alliance performance is moderated by the type of uncertainty prevailing, with behavioral 
uncertainty strengthening, and environmental uncertainty weakening, the relationship between 
trust and performance.
3.4.1. Contributions and Implications
We believe our research makes several contributions. First, we extend the interorganizational 
trust-performance literature by demonstrating that the type of uncertainty facing alliance partners 
conditions the relationship between trust and alliance performance. Specifically, behavioral and 
environmental uncertainties have opposite moderating effects on the relationship between trust 
and alliance performance. The quite distinct nature of the challenges posed by these two types of 
uncertainties brings about these differential effects. Trust essentially reduces the likelihood of 
negative  interpretations  of  partner  actions  by  allowing  for  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  This 
facilitates openness in sharing knowledge and reduces fear of mis-performance or resource mis-
appropriation by partners. Hence, the benefits from trust are magnified under conditions where 
potential  behavioral  uncertainty  is  high.  In  contrast,  the  benefits  from  trust  are  reduced  if 
environmental uncertainty is strong, because overconfidence in the information provided by each 
partner restrains the vigilant environmental scanning and cross-fertilization of views that is of 
vital importance under this condition. This has implications for research on trust in that it shows 
trust to be a double-edged sword, with a performance-enhancing potential that increases under 
certain conditions but decreases under other conditions.
Second, extant research suggests that potential competition and high interdependence between 
partners are likely to hamper alliances. Behavioral concerns such as the fear of mis-appropriation 
of proprietary know-how are considerable in such alliances. We contribute to this stream of 
research  by  empirically  showing  that  trust  brings  about  benefits  by  attenuating  behavioral When does trust matter to alliance performance? 65
concerns in alliances where potential inter-partner competition and interdependence are high. 
This  underscores  the  potential  benefits  of  investing  in  trust  when  behavioral  concerns  are 
considerable and also suggests that trust figures among the relational mechanisms and norms that 
can play an important role in facilitating alliance performance by allowing partners to realize 
their potential synergies (see Madhok & Tallman, 1998). Moreover, our findings underline the 
necessity of taking into account both operational features (e.g., interdependence) and behavioral 
characteristics (e.g., trust) in studying alliance success. This runs counter to the emphasis on the 
isolated influence of either tangible alliance features or behavioral patterns in much of prior 
research (Doz, 1996; Yan & Zeng, 1999). Likewise, our study shows the benefits of examining 
industry factors simultaneously with alliance- and partner-level effects in alliance research.
Third,  the  challenges  posed  by  environmental  uncertainty  for  firms  are  well  documented. 
However,  our  knowledge  about  the  role  of  environmental  uncertainty  in  strategic  alliance 
performance is limited. This is all the more relevant as environmental uncertainty is commonly 
advanced as a leading reason for forming alliances in the first place (e.g., Harrigan, 1988; Pfeffer 
& Nowak, 1976). Because alliances involve the interests of more than one firm, relational norms 
such as trust also shape the manner in which partners respond to various external challenges. 
Therefore it is vital for alliance research to understand the role of trust in shaping responses to 
the challenges posed by environmental uncertainty, and the implications of this for performance. 
Prior research, for the most part, stresses the beneficial effects of trust. However, our study 
shows that trust tends to dampen down the performance of alliances facing high environmental 
uncertainty. The sense of cognitive comfort provided by trust may reduce the alertness and cross-
fertilization needed in the presence of strong environmental uncertainty. Hence, alliance partners 
should exercise caution in depending on inter-organizational trust, and accelerate scanning and 
search efforts under environmental uncertainty rather than relying unduly on each other for this. 
Thus, our study adds to the research agenda on the limits of trust (e.g., McEvily et al, 2003).
As for relevance to practice, we have established that successful international alliances take into 
account  the  differential  impact  of  trust,  depending  on  the  type  of  uncertainty.  Because  the 
intentional cultivation of interorganizational trust involves costs as well as opportunities forgone 
(Poppo  &  Zenger,  2002;  Sako,  1991),  such  an  effort  should  be  undertaken  only  when  the Chapter 3 66
expected  pay-off  is  positive.  Our  results  reveal  that  at  very  high  levels  of  environmental 
unpredictability the trust- performance relationship disappears and possibly reverses. The costs 
of cultivating trust might thus outweigh the expected benefits. Hence, firms ought to expend 
efforts  in  developing  interorganizational  trust  specifically  when  it  has  the  potential  to  help 
address  behavioral  uncertainty  (in  the  presence  of  high  interdependence  and/or  latent 
competition among partners), and exercise caution when trusting each other under conditions of 
strong environmental uncertainty (as caused by product market instability or unpredictability).
3.4.2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This study has some limitations. First, we collected data concerning perspectives of both partners 
on the alliance through a survey of the Indian partners only. Geringer & Hebert (1991: 252, 256) 
found  a  significant  positive  correlation  between  a  focal  parent’s  satisfaction  with  alliance 
performance and the perception by the other partner of this focal parent’s satisfaction. However, 
it would be valuable to gain both partners’ perspectives on the alliance. Yet, gathering such 
information  could  be  very  challenging,  especially  with  parent  firms  originating  from  many 
countries, as is the case in our sample (21 partner countries). Second,  the trust-performance 
relationship  may  be  reciprocal.  The  cross-sectional  nature  of  our  data  does  not  allow  us  to 
establish  causality.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  reverse  causality  in  the  presence  of 
significant interaction terms. Hence, we believe reverse causality is not a serious concern in our 
study.
Third,  the  operationalization  of  our  moderating  constructs,  behavioral  and  environmental 
uncertainty, does  not  preclude  other  sources.  We  do believe  that interdependence  and inter-
partner  competition  are  key  aspects  of  behavioral  uncertainty  (Das  &  Teng,  2000;  Park  & 
Ungson,  2001),  though  there  may  be  others.  Likewise,  product  market  instability  and 
unpredictability  are  critical  sources  of  environmental  uncertainty,  and  perhaps  its  most 
commonly  used  indicators  in  organizational  research  (e.g.  Buchko,  1994;  Delacroix  & 
Swaminathan, 1991; Glick et al., 1990; Wholey & Brittain, 1989). Nevertheless, uncertainty 
stemming from regulatory and political instability may be expected to also matter in the case of 
alliances located in various transition economies (e.g. Delios & Henisz, 2003). However, as the When does trust matter to alliance performance? 67
alliances we studied were all located within a single country and the data were cross-sectional, 
we could not test for these effects.
Our study suggests a number of interesting opportunities for future research. First, our approach
to the study of trust may be generalized beyond interfirm alliances. For instance, trust has been 
suggested  to  benefit  knowledge  sharing  in  intra-organizational  contexts  too  (e.g.  Makino  & 
Inkpen, 2003; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). It would  be interesting to explore to what extent the 
moderating effects of behavioral and environmental uncertainty can also be found in the intra-
organizational context. Our reasoning suggests that under conditions of strong environmental 
uncertainty, high intra-organizational trust may lead to the same dampening effects we found in 
the inter-organizational context. Relatedly, our results on environmental uncertainty and trust 
may have implications for research on team performance. Langfred (2004) has shown that teams 
that  depend  on  trust  are  less  likely  to  monitor  their  team  members.  Future  research  could 
examine the implications of reliance on trust for performance of teams operating under different 
levels of environmental uncertainty.
Second, concerns about appropriation of proprietary knowledge and related behavioral concerns 
such as honest and complete sharing of information are salient in knowledge intensive alliances. 
It has been argued that trust enables firms to cooperate despite such concerns (e.g. Dyer & Chu, 
2003).  Nevertheless,  in  knowledge-intensive  contexts  such  as  R&D  and  new  product 
development,  environmental  uncertainty  may  be  high  –  and  occur  alongside  behavioral 
uncertainty in the case of allied firms (Harrigan, 1988; Martin & Salomon, 2003). Research 
examining such contexts could yield further insights into the conditions under which the net 
benefits of trust can be sustained.
Third, we examined the impact of trust on alliance performance. Other relational mechanisms 
and norms may have similar contingent effects on alliance performance. For instance, Parkhe 
argued  that  tension  within  alliances  may  also  result  from  factors  other  than  behavioral 
uncertainty, such as cultural differences (Parkhe, 1991). Parkhe (1991) suggests that routines 
such as training – rather than trust – may go a long way towards reducing cultural conflict and 
improving  alliance  performance.  Moreover,  relational  governance  may  involve  “norms  of Chapter 3 68
flexibility, solidarity, bilateralism and continuance” (Poppo & Zenger, 2002: 712), which can be 
operative  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty.  Further  research  exploring  such  alternatives  and 
complements  to  trust,  then,  would  be  well  warranted.
4  Partner  reputation,  especially  when 
amplified through a network of alliances, can have potent effects too (Gulati, 1998). Finally, 
prior ties between partners are a potent source of shared understanding (Zollo et al., 2002) whose 
role deserves attention alongside trust.
3.4.3. Conclusion
Our  research  provides  significant  insights  into  the  advantages  and  limitations  of  inter-
organizational trust for strategic alliances. Specifically, the study underscores the need to move 
beyond  the  direct  link  between  trust  and  alliance  performance  in  order  to  understand  the 
conditions  under  which  trust  promotes  or  inhibits  alliance  performance.  Researchers  (and 
managers) ought to take into account the type of uncertainty facing the alliance partners, that is, 
whether the source of uncertainty is internal or external to the alliance. In our study, the type of 
uncertainty moderates  the relationship between trust  and alliance performance, such that the 
trust-alliance performance relationship strengthens  under behavioral uncertainty and weakens 
under environmental uncertainty. We hope that our study may serve as a trigger for future studies 
that  look  in  more  detail at  the  complicated  and  contingent role  of  trust  in  inter  and  intra  -
organizational relationships.
                                                
4 It should be noted that distinguishing trust from alternative norms is not straightforward. Thus Gibson & 
Birkinshaw (2004), examining intra-organizational functioning, found that nine items meant to measure “support” 
and “trust” (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994) loaded onto a single factor (α = .93). Still, we believe that further scale 
development can yield finer differentiations to support the type of research suggested here.CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL ALLIANCE CHARACTERISTICS IN THE 
CULTIVATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST
Research  examining  alliances  have  in  many  cases  followed  the  transaction  cost  tradition  of 
treating strategic alliances as discrete exchanges falling between the extremes of market and 
hierarchy (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Hennart, 1988; Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). In contrast, relational 
theorists  (Axelrod,  1984;  Heide  &Miner,1992;  MacNeil,  1980)  emphasize  the  relational  and 
ongoing nature of alliances, shaped by partner interaction. Alliances in this view are a distinct 
form characterized by reciprocity and trust; where trust between partners in an alliance exhibits 
the characteristics of an intangible relational asset (Powell, 1990; Sako, 1991: 455).
Scholars  have  recognized  that  the  existence  of  trust  between  partners  cannot  be  taken  for 
granted; partners in a relationship might have to consciously cultivate and mutually own this 
intangible relational asset (Sako, 1991). Consequently, researchers have focused their attention 
towards the determinants of interorganization trust (e.g., Sako & Helper, 1998; Dyer & Chu, 
2000).  Research  has  identified  formal  and  informal  mechanisms  of  cultivating  trust;  the 
prominent among formal mechanisms being safeguards (Gulati, 1998) and that among informal 
mechanisms being information exchange (Sako, 1991).
Prior  research  that  adopts  a  TCE  lens  in  studying  the  structuring  of  alliances  stresses  the 
importance of  crafting  contracts covering  as many  contingencies  as possible  (Pisano, 1989), 
since  these  would  safeguard  the  partners  against  opportunistic  behavior  arising  from  poor 
monitoring and control possibilities quintessential of alliances (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). The 
relational theorists, on the other hand, have highlighted the vital role played by information 
exchange in the cultivation of trust (Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Sako & Helper, 
1998).  Sako  (1991)  reveals  that  alliance  partners  in  Japan  create  trust  through  frequent  and 
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Prior studies have enhanced our understanding  of the formal (sanctions and safeguards) and 
informal (information exchange) determinants of interorganizational trust. However, the type of 
trust produced by sanctions and mutual hostages and trust produced by information exchange 
might  be  different.  Moreover,  scholars  have  established  the  threats  to  a  relationship  due  to 
uncertainty-behavioral  and  environmental  (Williamson,  1991;  Park  &  Ungson,  2001).  The 
manner in which the formal and informal determinants operate under uncertainty might have 
important implications for trust cultivation. Hence, it is vital to examine whether these formal 
and  informal  determinants  facilitate  or  hamper  trust  cultivation  under  the  two  types  of 
uncertainty. Building on prior research, we distinguish between two types of trust, fragile and 
resilient (Ring, 1996; Barney & Hansen, 1994; Rousseau et al, 1998). 
In  this  paper,  we  argue  that  the  greater  incentive  alignment  and  administrative  control 
mechanisms in equity alliances are likely to produce fragile trust, where partners in a relationship 
cooperate because it is in their private interest to do so (Ring, 1996).  The quality of information 
exchanged between partners, on the other hand, is likely to produce resilient trust, which is based 
on the goodwill between partners. We shall explain the distinction between the two types of trust 
in  greater  detail  later  in  the  paper.  Regarding  the  conditions  under  which  these  formal  and 
informal  determinants  produce  trust,  we  further  argue  that  the  relationship  between  equity 
alliances  and  fragile  trust  strengthens  under  behavioral  uncertainty,  and  weakens  under 
environmental uncertainty. The relationship between the quality of information exchanged and 
resilient trust strengthens under both behavioral uncertainty and environmental uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we develop our theory and hypotheses. After this we 
describe the data and methodology, followed by the presentation of results. Finally we discuss 
the findings and draw conclusions.
4.1. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
4.1.1. Interorganizational Trust
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interpretations  of  trust  have  been  put  forward  in  prior  research,  a  common  core  emerges. 
Building on this prior research, we define interorganizational trust as the expectation held by one 
firm that another would not exploit its vulnerabilities when faced with the opportunity to do so 
(Barney  &  Hansen,  1994;  Mayer,  Davis  &  Schoorman,  1995;  Sako,  1991).    Furthermore, 
building on Ring (1996) we distinguish between two distinct types of interorganizational trust-
fragile trust and resilient trust. 
We define fragile trust as “a type [of trust] that permits economic actors to deal with each other, 
but in guarded ways” (Ring 1996: 152). Prior research has referred to this form of trust variously 
as  situational  trust  (Noorderhaven,  1996),  weak  form  trust  (Barney  &  Hansen,  1994)  and 
deterrence based trust (Rousseau et al, 1998). Fragile trust derived from sanctions and hostages 
can break down if expectations are not met by trusting parties.
We  define resilient trust as a type  of trust  that extends  beyond fragile  trust  in  that partners 
commit themselves and contribute to the relationship beyond what was explicitly guaranteed 
(Sako, 1991: 453; Ring, 1996). Such a trust exists when parties (1) demonstrate reliability by 
carrying out their promises; (2) act fairly when dealing with each other; and (3) exhibit goodwill 
when unforeseen contingencies arise. Our definition thus bases resilient trust on three related 
components: reliability, fairness and goodwill (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Resilient trust is also referred 
to  by  scholars  as  relational  trust  (Rousseau  et  al.,  1998)  and  goodwill  trust  (Sako,  1991). 
Resilient  trust  stands  to  be  relevant  in  situations  where  firms  make  substantial  and  open 
commitments to a partnership and “will also survive the occasional fall from grace of A in the 
eyes of economic actor B” (Ring 1996: 156).
4.1.2. Governance Structure and Fragile Trust
The governance structure of an alliance refers to the formal contractual and ownership structure 
(Gulati  &  Singh,  1998),  which  may  vary  in  terms  of  inherent  attributes  such  as  incentive 
intensity  and  administrative  controls  (Williamson,  1991).  Below,  we  discuss  how  these  two 
governance  attributes  -  incentive  intensity  and  administrative  controls  -  vary  across  alliance 
governance structures and the manner in which these attributes contribute to safeguarding the 
alliances against concerns about opportunism.  Chapter 4 72
At one end we find non-equity alliances with minimal administrative controls built into them and 
at the other  end are equity  alliances  or joint  ventures,  where partners  share ownership  with 
greater hierarchical controls built into them (Gulati, 1998; Pisano 1989; Gulati, 1995). Equity 
ownership by partners alleviates appropriation concerns through greater incentive alignment and 
administrative control mechanisms (Williamson, 1999). The private incentives of the partners, 
who invested their equity in an alliance, are more closely aligned, due to the “mutual hostage” 
situation.  Because  the  incentives  are  not  aligned  to  the  same  extent  as  in  the  case  of 
internalization under a single hierarchy, alliance partners additionally introduce administrative 
control mechanisms to attenuate the incentive intensity, that is, the maximization of individual 
partner interests at the expense of the alliance (Oxley, 1997). 
Greater incentive alignment in equity alliances or joint ventures attenuates partners’ incentives to 
defect,  thereby  curbing  opportunistic  behavior  of  partners.  Partners  refrain  from  behaving 
opportunistically because the built in sanctions are likely to penalize them otherwise. In other 
words,  partners  behave  in  a  trustworthy  manner  because  it  serves  their  economic  interests. 
Hence, mutual hostage present in equity alliances will produce fragile trust, in that the fear of 
sanctions prevents partners from behaving opportunistically and abstention from opportunistic 
behavior lasts only as far as it yields private economic benefits (Rousseau et al., 1998). Hence, 
the incentive alignment mechanisms built in equity alliances are conducive to the cultivation of 
fragile trust.
Hypothesis 1: Equity alliances are likely to be characterized by fragile trust.
However, mutual hostages present in equity alliances are less likely to produce resilient trust as 
this type of trust involves suspension of calculativeness (Dyer & Chu, 2000). Inkpen & Currall 
(2004)  even  argued  that  extensive  use  of  formal  control  mechanisms  might  hold  back  the 
development  of  trust.  Development  of  resilient  trust  demands  an  investment  in  informal 
communication mechanisms that extends beyond formal sanctions.
4.1.3. Quality of Information Exchanged and Resilient Trust
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communication (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). Frequency and density refers to the regularity 
with  which  partners  meet  each  other;  openness,  to  the  extent  of  sensitive  and  relevant 
information shared between the partners. The quality of information exchanged between partners 
reflects both the openness of communication and the spatial characteristics of the interaction 
processes, viz., how much of the interaction between the partners has the form of face-to-face 
contacts. Thus, the quality of information exchanged refers to the level of communication, and 
the  degree  of  whole  person  involvement  (Dyer  &  Chu,  2000;  Noorderhaven,  1996;  Parkhe, 
1993b). Prior research has shown that information exchange plays a vital role in the cultivation 
of interorganizational trust (Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Sako & Helper, 1998). Sako 
(1991) reveals that alliance partners in Japan engage in frequent and intense communication that 
sometimes extends beyond what is required by current business.
High quality of information exchange reduces potential for opportunistic behavior of partners as 
well  as  enables  the  nurturing  of  well-developed  routines  between  partners.  Frequency  and 
density of communication between partners develops routines needed for information processing 
and co-ordination of activities between partners. Such routinized behavioral patterns assist in 
attenuating the misunderstanding and conflicts arising out of the differences in the operating 
procedures of each partner organization (Zollo et al, 2002). The speed with which partners open 
up to each other their actions concerning the alliance and share sensitive information reduces 
concerns  about  opportunistic  partner  behavior  (Parkhe,  1993b).  Such  openness  of 
communication between partners assists  in  aligning expectations  and perceptions  about  each 
other’s  behavior  (Aulakh  et  al,  1996).  Thus,  high  quality of  information  exchange,  through 
intense  and  open  communication  between  partners  assists  in  the  crafting  of  well-developed 
routines and attenuates opportunistic concerns. This, in turn, promotes resilient trust.
Hence,
Hypothesis 2: The quality of information exchanged is positively related to resilient trust.
4.1.4. Moderating Effects of Behavioral Uncertainty
Concern about partner behavior is a predominant source of internal tension in strategic alliances 
(Parkhe,  1993b;  Park  &  Ungson,  2001;  Sutcliffe  &  Zaheer,  1998).  Behavioral  uncertainty Chapter 4 74
concerns (henceforth ‘behavioral uncertainty’, in short) refer to alliance (or transaction) partners’ 
concerns  about  their  inability  to  accurately  predict  each  other’s  actions  in  the  relationship, 
particularly in view of the possibility of intentional or unintentional harm resulting from such 
actions (Nooteboom, 2002; Williamson, 1985). Behavioral uncertainty arises from possibilities 
such as poor performance or withholding of information by an alliance partner (Parkhe, 1993b; 
Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998), or the attempts by one partner to opportunistically appropriate the 
other’s valuable resources (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998).
Although  behavioral  uncertainty  is  never  completely  absent,  its  magnitude  varies  across 
alliances.  Such  concerns  are exacerbated  in  alliances with  two  characteristics  (Das  &  Teng, 
2000; Park & Ungson, 2001): those in which contributions of the partners are highly intertwined 
(Nooteboom,  2002;  Stinchcombe,  1985),  i.e.  in  alliances  involving  high  interdependence 
between partners (Park & Russo, 1996); or those where each partner is likely to further private 
interests at the expense of collaborative interests (Khanna et al., 1998; Park & Ungson, 2001), 
most  prominently in  alliances between potential competitors (Bleeke &  Ernst, 1993; Hamel, 
1991; Kogut, 1988; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996).
Interdependence. The degree of interdependence in an alliance increases with the importance 
and extent of the resources shared between partners and with the resulting overlap in division of 
labor between them (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Thompson, 1967). Alliances 
that are set up to share production facilities typically create only weak interdependencies (Gulati 
&  Singh,  1998).  Resource  allocations  and  role  assignments  in  these  partnerships  tend  to  be 
straightforward and stable, and the division of labor is thus likely to be simple.  In contrast, 
alliances formed for joint development of new technology or to speed up innovation lead to high 
interdependence (Park & Russo, 1996). These alliances are characterized by substantial overlap 
between the partners’ responsibilities, and involve ongoing mutual adjustment between partners 
(Gulati & Singh, 1998).
In  high-interdependence  alliances,  the  closely  intertwined  partner  contributions  and  the 
characteristics  of  the  resources  involved  work  together  to  render  the  coordination  of  tasks 
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1996;  Stinchcombe,  1985).  These  alliances  involve  valuable  knowledge-intensive  resources 
(Kumar & Seth, 1998; Nooteboom, 2002; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001). Because 
the resources are knowledge-intensive and the contributions of partners highly intertwined, even 
an unintentional mistake by one of the partners in managing the resources or in performing its 
tasks can have severe consequences for the other partner (Nooteboom, 2002). 
The  highly  intertwined  contributions  of  partners  in  high  interdependence  alliances  make  it 
difficult to ascertain whether partners are contributing fairly to the alliance. The greater incentive 
alignment  in  equity  alliances  provides  partners  the  confidence  that  each  will  be  more 
forthcoming with the sharing of information and the confidence that each will not violate the 
terms of the contract. The greater administrative control mechanisms allow partners to introduce 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that they are contributing fairly to the alliance. Thus, under 
high interdependence, equity alliances facilitate the development of fragile trust.
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between equity alliances and fragile trust will be 
stronger under high interdependence between partners.
The quality of information exchanged between partners plays a vital role in promoting extensive 
co-ordination  between  partners  (Galbraith,  1977;  Larson,  1992).  Frequent  and  dense 
communication  between  partners  contributes  to  the  development  of  routines.  This,  in  turn 
minimizes mistakes arising from the inability to understand each other’s operating procedures. 
The openness of communication between partners improves the faith in each other’s behavior. 
Therefore, the socialization and communication between partners improves the resilient trust 
between partners.
Hypothesis  4.  The  positive  relation  between  the  quality  of  information  exchanged 
between partners and resilient trust will be stronger in alliances with a high degree of 
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Inter-partner competition. Inter-partner competition exists when a partner tries to maximize its 
private  interests  at  the  expense  of  the  alliance  or  the  other  partner  (Baum,  Calabrese  & 
Silverman, 2000; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001). In alliances formed between 
potential competitors, concerns about opportunistic exploitation loom especially large, in that 
partners may have strong incentives to appropriate each other’s resources (Khanna et al., 1998; 
Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Prior research has shown that alliances between potential competitors 
engender greater tendencies of partners to engage in such ‘de-facto internalization’ (Baum et al., 
2000; Hamel, 1991: 84). Moreover, because potential competitors are familiar with the areas that 
their partner operates in, they have superior capacity to absorb and reuse proprietary knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Park & Russo, 1996). Hence, interpartner competition is likely to 
hamper the cultivation of trust.
Equity  alliances  can  counteract  such  problems  through  greater  incentive  alignment.  Because 
opportunistic behavior by any partner is likely to be penalized, partners’ fear of opportunistic 
exploitation through breach of contract is likely to be less. Equity alliances encourage potential 
competitors to craft safeguards covering as many contingencies as possible. Moreover, greater 
monitoring mechanisms in equity alliances enable partners to protect their proprietary assets. 
Thus, equity alliances cultivate in a partner the trust that the other will not breach the terms of 
the contract.
Hypothesis 5: The positive relationship between equity alliances and fragile trust will be 
stronger under high inter-partner competition.
High quality of information exchange encourages partners to craft well-developed routines and 
facilitate the open sharing of valuable information between partners. The frequent, dense and 
open communication assists in developing attachment and open commitment between partners 
by way of developing fairness and reliability in behavior. Moreover, because high quality of 
information  exchange  encourages  both  partners  to  share  their  proprietary  information,  both 
partners are likely to possess each other’s sensitive information; hence partners will hesitate to 
use such information against each other. However, we can also argue that  intense and open 
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information to their own advantage when a fitting opportunity presents itself. Hence, high quality 
of information exchanged between partners might even reduce partners’ resilient trust in each 
other. Following the above arguments we present the two contrasting hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 6a: The positive relationship between the quality of information exchanged 
between partners and resilient trust will be weaker under high inter-partner competition.
Hypothesis 6b: The positive relationship between the quality of information exchanged 
between  partners  and  resilient  trust  will  be  stronger  under  high  inter-partner 
competition.
4.1.5. Moderating Effects of Environmental Uncertainty
Environmental  uncertainty  results  from  changes  in  the  economic  conditions  faced  by  the 
organization that are outside its control and hard to anticipate (Dess & Beard, 1984; Koopmans, 
1957). Environmental uncertainty demands speedy and responsive decisions (Huber, Miller & 
Glick, 1990: 13; Mintzberg, 1978). This, in turn, requires organizations to engage in significant 
scanning of the environment in search of accurate and reliable information that would enable 
them  to  interpret  and  act  upon  the  threats  and  opportunities  facing  them  (Aguilar,  1967; 
Anderson & Paine, 1975; Hambrick, 1982).
In an uncertain environment, alliance partners need to monitor changes and adjust the alliance’s 
strategy accordingly, even though the conditions may be different in the parent firms themselves 
(Harrigan, 1985). Anderson and Paine argue that in adjusting strategy “the critical area is not 
uncertainty per se but the processing of accurate information to deal with uncertainty” (1975: 
814).  This  information  processing  may  be  a  bottleneck  because  of  problems  of  information 
overload  (Mintzberg,  1978;  Robertson,  1980),  which  are  exacerbated  by  information 
unfamiliarity (Park & Sheath, 1975). 
Equity  alliances  involve  greater  monitoring  and  standard  operating  procedures  and  partners 
expect each other to fulfill their obligations. That is, partners expect each other to contribute 
appropriately  toward  enhancing  alliance  performance.  However,  the  knowledge  of  the Chapter 4 78
environment will  be  far  from perfect  due  to  information unfamiliarity  and overload.  Hence, 
partners might find it difficult to meet the greater expectations associated with equity alliances. 
As either of the parties fail to derive the expected benefit from the alliance, they tend to interpret 
it as a failure of a partner to contribute adequately rather than attributing it to the uncertainty in 
the environment, thereby impeding the cultivation of trust. 
Hypothesis 7: The positive relationship between equity alliances and fragile trust will be 
weaker under high environmental uncertainty.
High quality of information exchange is highly essential under environmental uncertainty. The 
intensity  and  openness  of  communication  between  partners  allows  greater  and  fine-grained 
information exchange regarding changes in the environment (Uzzi, 1997). This, in turn, eases the 
information  processing  demands  on  the  partners.  Moreover,  such  intense  and  open 
communication is likely to encourage partners to accept information from each other without 
doubt and at face value. Thus, high quality of information exchange improves resilient trust 
under high environmental uncertainty.
Hypothesis 8: The positive relationship between the quality of information exchanged 
between  partners  and  resilient  trust  will  be  stronger  under  high  environmental 
uncertainty.
4.2. METHODS
4.2.1. Data and Data Collection
Chapter 3 and 4 are based on the same survey data. Chapter 3 provides details on data collection 
extensively. Hence, the details on data and data collection are not repeated here.
4.2.3. Dependent Variables
Resilient  Trust. Resilient  trust  is  measured  on  a  5-item  Likert  scale  capturing  the  fairness, 
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Sako & Helper (1998). For details on all items used in scales, see Appendix 1. The resilient trust 
scale has high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha=0.85).
Fragile Trust. Fragile trust is measured on a 3-item Likert scale capturing the extent to which a 
partner trusts that the other will faithfully carry out its obligations toward the relationship.  Items 
are adapted from Sako & Helper (1998). The fragile trust scale exhibited a high Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.82.
4.2.4. Independent Variables
Quality of information exchanged. Quality of information exchanged is measured with a 5-item 
scale capturing the frequency, density and openness of communication as distinguished by Gupta 
& Govindarajan (1991). This construct had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81.
Equity  alliance.  We  coded  equity  alliances  by  a  binary  variable  assigning  a  score  of  1  for 
alliances  that  involved  the use  of  equity, and  0  for  non-equity  alliances  (e.g., Gulati,  1995; 
Saxton, 1997).
Interdependence,  inter-partner  competition  and  environmental  uncertainty  are  the  other 
independent variables in this study. The details on operationalization of these three variables are 
provided in Chapter 3.
4.2.5. Control Variables
Investment size. We operationalized investment size based on the total amount of investment by 
both partners. To measure this, we used a five-point interval scale.
Country of origin. We included dummies for partners originating from Europe and Asia with 
North America being the reference category.
Alliance duration. Partners in long-lasting alliances have had enough time to develop mutual 
understanding and is likely to be conducive to the development of trust (Parkhe, 1998). Duration Chapter 4 80
is measured by an item capturing the number of years the alliance has been in existence at the 
time of measurement (e.g. Simonin, 1999).
Local partner size. We controlled for the size of the local partner by using the log of the number 
of employees (e.g., Deeds & Rothaermel, 2003).
Procedural justice. Higher procedural justice might not only improve the trust between partners 
but the realization that a partner has been just in its dealings with the other might result in open 
sharing of sensitive information between partners. Hence, procedural justice can be expected to 
be  empirically  related,  while  conceptually  distinct  from  trust.  Therefore  we  controlled  for 
procedural justice in order to partial out its effect. Procedural justice is measured using a 4-item 
scale that captures the engagement, explanation and clarity of explanation as distinguished by 
Kim  and Mauborgne (1998).  Convergent validity was  established as item  loadings () were 
significantly related to the underlying factor with the lowest t-value being 5.41 and the lowest 
squared multiple correlations being 0.44. This variable exhibited a high Cronbach’s alpha (0.81).
4.2.6. Analysis
Measurement  analysis  was  conducted  using  LISREL’s  8.3  maximum  likelihood  program 
(Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996). We performed confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL to check 
for convergent and discriminant validity. We used ordinary least squares regression to examine 
alliance performance. Before calculating the interaction terms used to test hypotheses 3-8, the 
variables involved were mean centered (Aiken & West, 1991).
4.3. RESULTS
4.3.1. Reliability and Validity 
All constructs display satisfactory levels of reliability, as indicated by the composite reliabilities 
ranging from 0.81 to 0.90 (Nunally, 1978; see the Appendix 1 for reliabilities of constructs). 
Convergent  validity,  the  extent  to  which  different  attempts  to  measure  a  construct  agree 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959), can be judged by looking at the factor loadings. Each loading () was 
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the cut-off of 0.50 (Hildebrandt, 1987), supporting convergent validity. A series of chi-square 
difference tests on the factor correlations showed that discriminant validity, the extent to which a 
construct differs from others, is achieved among all constructs (Bagozzi, 1993; Joreskog, 1971). 
4.3.2. Tests of Hypotheses
Table 1 reports means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables. Table 2 reports the 
results of the OLS regression model. We tested three regression equations each for the fragile 
and resilient trust variables, as reported in Table 2. For each type of trust, after including only the 
control variables in model 1, we introduced the main variables in model 2. We introduced the 
interaction terms in model 3. Model 1 for fragile and resilient trust is significant (p < 0.001), and 
the control variables explain 24 percent of the variance in fragile trust and 23 percent of the 
variance in resilient trust. Procedural justice (p < 0.001) is positively related to both fragile and 
resilient trust; whereas Alliance duration (p < 0.01) is positively related to resilient trust it is not 
significantly related to fragile trust. This might suggest that whereas resilient trust improves with 
the duration of the alliance, fragile trust does not.
Hypothesis  1  predicts  that  equity  alliance  will  be  positively  related  to  fragile  trust.  The 
coefficient for equity alliance in Model 2 with fragile trust as the dependent variable is not 
significant (b = 0.13, p = n.s), thus rejecting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 predicts that quality of 
information  exchanged  between  partners  will  be  positively  related  to  resilient  trust.  The 
coefficient for quality of information exchanged in Model 2 with resilient trust as the dependent 
variable is positive and significant (b = 0.12, p < 0.05), thus supporting Hypothesis 2. Given 
mean  centering, this  coefficient  shows  the  magnitude  of  the  relationship  between quality  of 
information exchanged and resilient trust, holding other variables at their mean values.
Equity Alliance, Uncertainty and Fragile Trust
The  incremental  variance  accounted  for  by  the  interactions  between  the  behavioral  and 
environmental uncertainty variables and equity alliance is significant in Model 3 (R
2 = 0.041, p
< 0.10). Hypothesis 3 predicts that the positive relationship between equity alliances and fragile TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
a
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Resilient trust 3.74 0.77
2. Fragile trust 3.90 0.84 .61
3. Investment size 2.42 0.95 .16 .07
4. Europe 0.58 0.49 -.11 -.11 -.08
5. Asia 0.21 0.41 .03 .02 .02 -.59
6. Local partner size 5.46 1.63 .05 .08 .39 -.18 .21
7. Procedural justice   3.05 1.00 .43 .45 .10 -.05 .03 .07
8. Alliance duration 12.10 9.33 .15 -.02 .15 .09 -.12 .25 -.06
9. Equity Alliance 0.58 0.49 .27  .23 .17 .15 -.12 -.06 .23 .09
10. Quality of information exchanged 3.12 0.74 .50 .51 .29 -.07 .08 .19 .45 -.06 .35
11. Interdependence 0.50 0.38 .15 .08 .23 -.13 .12 -.06 .15 -.12 .15 .32
12. Inter-partner competition 1.28 0.63 -.12 -.22 -.06 .21 -.20 -.19 -.09 .03 .06 -.15 .03
13. Environmental uncertainty 0.57 0.32 .07 .15 -.02 -.05 -.08 -.05 .19 .02 -.14 -.02 -.01 .13
aN=126. Correlations with absolute value greater than .17 are significant at the .05 level. Means and standard deviations reported here are for raw 
scores. TABLE 2
Results of Regression Analysis
a
aN=126. The coefficients reported are unstandardized estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p values (two tailed): † p < 0.100, * p < 
0.050, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001
Dependent Variable: Fragile Trust Dependent Variable: Resilient Trust
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-.09      (0.07)
-.13      (0.24)
-1.61    (1.17)
 .16      (0.11)
 .12*    (0.05)
-.14      (0.21)
-.72      (0.45)
-5.27** (1.70)
 .13      (0.11)
 .12*    (0.05)
Interactions
Equity alliance x Inter-partner competition
Equity alliance x Interdependence
Equity alliance x Environmental uncertainty
Information exch. x Interpartner competition
Information exchange x Interdependence
Information exch.x Environment uncertainty
  .13       (0.19)
  .73*     (0.30)
-.32†     (0.17)
  
  .02      (0.08)
 .30†     (0.16)








   2.33*
0.348
0.041
   2.27†
0.227 0.308
    0.081**
    2.70* 
0.351
0.043
         2.40†Chapter 4 84
trust will be stronger under high interdependence between partners. Hypothesis 5 predicts that 
the positive relationship between equity alliances and fragile trust will be stronger under high 
inter-partner  competition.  The  coefficient  of  the  interaction  of  equity  alliance  with 
interdependence  is  significant  and  positive  (b  =  0.73,  p  <  0.05  in  Model  3),  supporting 
Hypothesis 3. However, the coefficient of the interaction of equity alliance with inter-partner 
competition is insignificant (b = 0.13, p =  n.s ), thereby rejecting Hypothesis 5. These results 
yield partial support to the argument that the relationship between equity alliance and fragile 
trust  will  be  stronger  under  behavioral  uncertainty  (interdependence  and  inter-partner 
competition).
Hypothesis 7 predicts that the positive relationship between equity alliances and fragile trust will 
be weaker under high environmental uncertainty. The coefficient of the interaction of equity 
alliance with environmental uncertainty is significant and negative (b = - 0.32, p < 0.10 in Model 
3), supporting Hypothesis 7. This result suggests that equity alliances are an inefficient mode of 
governance for the production of fragile trust under environmental uncertainty.
Quality of Information Exchanged, Uncertainty and Resilient Trust
The additional variance accounted for by the interactions between the uncertainty variables and 
the  quality  of  information  exchanged  is  significant  in  Model  3  (R
2  =  0.043,  p  <  0.10). 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the positive relation between the quality of information exchanged 
between  partners  and  resilient  trust  will  be  stronger  in  alliances  with  a  high  degree  of 
interdependence  between  partners.  Hypothesis  6  renders  contrasting  predictions  for  the 
relationship between the quality of information exchanged between partners and resilient trust. 
Marginally significant positive effect is found for the coefficient of the interaction of quality of 
information  exchanged  with  interdependence in  model  3  (b  =  0.30,  p <  0.10),  giving some 
support to Hypothesis 4. Model 3 shows an insignificant interaction effect between quality of 
information exchanged and inter-partner competition (b = 0.02, p = n.s), thereby rejecting both 
the contrasting hypotheses (6a & 6b). These results suggest that the positive impact of quality of 
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Hypothesis 8 predicts that the positive relation between the quality of information exchanged 
between  partners  and  resilient  trust  will  be  stronger  in  alliances  facing  high  environmental 
uncertainty.  The  coefficient  of  the  interaction  of  quality  of  information  exchanged  with 
environmental uncertainty is significant and positive (b = 1.91, p < 0.05 in Model 3), supporting
Hypothesis 8. This result suggests that good quality of information exchange is essential for the 
cultivation of resilient trust under high environmental uncertainty.
All in all, the results mostly support our argument that whereas a good quality of information 
exchange  is  essential  for  the  cultivation  of  resilient  trust  under  both  behavioral  and 
environmental  uncertainty,  equity  alliances  facilitate  the  cultivation  of  fragile  trust  under 
behavioral uncertainty and hinder its cultivation under environmental uncertainty. 
4.4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we focused on the formal (i.e., equity alliance) and informal (quality of information 
exchanged) determinants of trust and the conditions under which they facilitate or hamper the 
cultivation  of  trust.  Specifically,  we  argued  that  the  greater  incentive  alignment  and 
administrative control mechanisms in equity alliance is positively related to fragile trust and the 
quality of information exchanged between partners is conducive to the cultivation of resilient 
trust. We further argued that the relationship between the formal and informal determinants of 
trust is contingent on the type of uncertainty facing the alliance. Specifically, whereas the quality 
of  information  exchanged  will  matter  more  to  resilient  trust  under  both  behavioral 
(interdependence and inter-partner competition) and environmental uncertainty, equity alliance 
will  matter  more  to  fragile  trust  under  behavioral  uncertainty  and  matter  less  under 
environmental uncertainty. Consistent with prior research, our findings indicate that the quality 
of  information  exchanged  between  partners  is  conducive  to  the  cultivation  of  resilient  trust 
(Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2000). However, we did not find a significant relationship 
between equity  alliances  and fragile trust.  Yet, even more importantly,  our findings provide 
support for our argument that the quality of information exchanged between partners matters 
more  to  resilient  trust  when  both  behavioral  and  environmental  uncertainty  are  high.  Our Chapter 4 86
findings also support our argument that equity alliances facilitate the cultivation of fragile trust 
under behavioral uncertainty and hinder its cultivation under environmental uncertainty. 
4.4.1. Contributions and Implications
These findings provide several insights into the formal and informal determinants of trust. First, 
prior  research  has  repeatedly  linked  equity  alliance  and  information  exchange  to  inter-
organizational trust. We extend this stream of research by distinguishing between two important 
types of trust, namely fragile and resilient trust and linking the formal determinants to fragile 
trust and the informal determinants to resilient trust.  Our results suggest that the quality of 
information exchanged between partners is vital for the cultivation of resilient trust. We did not 
find  a  significant  relationship  between  equity  alliance  and  fragile  trust  but  only  moderating 
effects,  which  suggest  that  equity  alliance  functions  as  a  quasi  moderator  and  not  a  pure 
moderator. This finding in a way also confirms Inkpen & Currall’s (2004) argument that formal 
control mechanisms places a brake on trust development, even if happens to be fragile trust.  
Second,  we  refine  the  relationship  between  the  informal  and  formal  predictors  of  trust  by 
examining  the  contingent  effects  of  these  predictors  under  behavioral  and  environmental 
uncertainty.  Our  results  show  differential  effects  of  equity  alliance  under  behavioral  and 
environmental  uncertainties.  Equity  alliance  facilitates  the  cultivation  of  fragile  trust  under 
behavioral uncertainty, implying that  the  safeguards  present  in  equity  alliances  facilitate  the 
development of fragile trust only when those safeguards are essential. The interaction of equity 
alliance  with  environmental  uncertainty  was  negative,  implying  that  the  superior  incentive 
alignment  and  monitoring  mechanisms  in  equity  alliances  are  ineffective  at  facilitating 
information  processing  required  under  environmental  uncertainty.  Instead,  the  monitoring 
mechanisms work against accepting information from a partner without reservations. That is, the 
stringent monitoring mechanisms result in doubting information provided by a partner and hinder 
the development of  fragile  trust.  Thus, this  implies  that the  greater incentive  alignment and 
monitoring mechanisms in equity alliance will facilitate trust production only when concerns 
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Our results show that the quality of information exchanged between partners is highly essential 
for  the  cultivation  of  resilient  trust  under  both  behavioral  and  environmental  uncertainties. 
Frequent  and  dense  communication  between partners  helps  partners  understand  each  other’s 
operating  procedures  and  assists  in  the  crafting  of  well-developed  routines.  This,  in  turn, 
alleviates conflicts due to misunderstanding. The open exchange of information between partners 
develops attachment between them and provides each other the trust that each will contribute 
fairly to the alliance and will not appropriate valuable resources. Furthermore, the quality of 
information  exchanged  between  partners  enhances  a  partner’s  confidence  in  the  information 
provided by the other during environmental uncertainty, thereby improving resilient trust. 
Furthermore,  our  results  also  show  that  whereas  alliance  duration  has  a  significant  positive 
relationship with resilient trust, it has no significant relationship with fragile trust. This result 
implies that whereas resilient trust develops with time due to the development of attachment and 
goodwill between partners, no amount of time spent between partners is likely to improve fragile 
trust.
As for practice, our paper implies that managers ought to understand the extent to which they 
intend to be involved in a particular alliance and invest in a type of trust accordingly. Taking into 
account the distinction between fragile and resilient trust is crucial as mechanisms to cultivate 
each type of  trust  are different.  Because trust  building  mechanisms  involve costs,  managers 
ought to understand what type of mechanisms to invest in and when such mechanisms improve 
or  hinder  interorganizational  trust.  Our  paper shows  that  managers ought  to  understand  that 
investing  in  formal  mechanisms  improves  fragile  trust  only  under  behavioral  uncertainty, 
whereas investing in informal mechanisms improves resilient trust under both behavioral and 
environmental uncertainties.
4.4.2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This  study’s  limitations  indicate  a  number  of  additional  opportunities  for  research  on 
international alliance processes. First, this study focuses on the perspective of one of the parties 
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gain  both  partners’  perspectives  on  the  alliance.  Gathering  such  information  could  be  very 
challenging however, especially with 21 countries, like in this sample.
Second, this study also has a methodological limitation, in that we largely rely on data collected 
through a cross-section survey. Though we supplemented the survey with field interviews, the 
interviews were not sufficiently in-depth to yield data for case study purposes. We welcome 
future research that adopts a case study approach. Alternatively, a sample of firms collected from 
a field survey could be tracked over a period of time. The longitudinal data collected this way 
could be analysed to examine the pattern of change of the relational process elements over time. 
Yet  another  possibility  would  be  to  bridge  the  methodology  gap  by  bringing  the  two 
complementary  research  methods  (survey  and  case  studies)  under  one  study.  Bresman, 
Birkinshaw  &  Nobel  (1999)  have  used  this  approach  to  identify  the  factors  that  facilitate 
knowledge transfer and the patterns of international knowledge transfer in cases of international
acquisitions.
Third, we examined certain formal and informal determinants of trust. Future research could 
examine other formal and informal determinants of inter-organizational trust, such as contractual 
complexity or open commitment respectively.
All in all, we hope that this study may serve as a trigger for future studies that examine the 
contingent effects of formal and informal predictors of interorganizational trust.CHAPTER 5
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TRUST REPAIR: TAKING IT TO THE NEXT LEVEL
The  last  two  decades  have  witnessed  a  dramatic  surge  of  research  on  various  forms  of 
interorganizational collaboration. Alliances constitute  a distinct organizational form in which 
previously independent firms allow themselves to become dependent on each other’s actions to 
obtain  mutual  benefits  (Powell,  1990).  In  light  of  such  dependence  and  the  inherent 
unpredictability  of  the  partner’s  behavior  (i.e.,  behavioral  uncertainty)  extant  research  has 
identified interorganizational trust as a key factor contributing towards alliance success (Aulakh, 
Kotabe & Sahay, 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
Our understanding of the benefits of sustaining trusting relationships between partners as well as 
ways of fostering trust in such relationships is considerable (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998; Dyer & 
Chu, 2000; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Parkhe, 1998; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998). More recently, 
scholars have increasingly turned their attention to investigating the negative consequences of 
excessive trust (e.g., Langfred, 2004), trust violations (Zucker, 1986) and increased distrust (e.g., 
Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998). 
However, there are but a few studies on the issue of preserving and repairing trust (e.g., Sitkin & 
Roth, 1993; Shapiro, 1987). Moreover, the ones that do exist focus primarily at the inter-personal 
level (e.g., Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) or alternatively at the societal level of 
analysis (e.g., Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 1986). The issue of trust repair in an interorganizational 
setting  has  not,  to  our  best  knowledge,  so  far  been  addressed.  However,  when  considering 
interorganizational relationships, one has to take into account that strategic alliances constitute a 
very specific context where those who frame the strategic intentions of the organizations are 
often distinct from those who implement them. Those who design strategy - the strategic level -
can thus be expected to play very different roles in the interorganizational collaboration than 
those who implement it - operational level (cf. Floyd & Lane, 2000).   
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Therefore, the nature of trust at these two levels is likely to be different and thus the ways of 
repairing would need to be different as well. Various tools for repairing trust have been identified 
in the literature, as well as their applicability to dealing with specific kinds of breaches of trust. 
However, the questions of how trust restoration should proceed in an interorganizational context, 
in terms of the types of measures, what circumstances make it more or less feasible, where 
should the repair efforts originate, and many others remain largely unexplored. Drawing on the 
work in the area of organizational psychology and organizational behavior, we identify measures 
for trust repair appropriate for dealing with breaches of trust at the strategic and operational 
levels. Hence, because the nature of trust violations at the two levels would be different, the 
appropriate remedial action would be different as well. Additionally, organizational actors at 
both levels by virtue of the different positions they hold in the organizational hierarchy have 
unequal  degrees  of  power  regarding  decision-making.  That  is,  the  boundary  spanners  at  the 
strategic level would have greater power in making strategic decisions compared to those at the 
operational level. Therefore they would also play a dominant role in undertaking trust repair 
efforts.
In sum, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, building on the assumption that repairing 
trust in a relationship between organizations is indeed worthwhile we propose a model of trust 
repair in an interorganizational context, that takes into account two distinct roles organizational 
actors play in the collaborative setting. Second, we discuss the efficiency of different trust repair 
measures depending on the ‘location’ of the breach, i.e., at what level in the organizational 
hierarchy does the breach of trust occur. 
5.1. TRUST
5.1.1. Benefits and Costs of Building Trust 
Our  understanding  of  the  benefits  of  sustaining  trusting  relationships  between  partners  is 
considerable (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Parkhe, 1998; 
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improves alliance performance by minimizing costs of transacting, negotiating, monitoring and 
enforcing (Dyer  & Chu,  2003;  Zaheer  et al., 1998),  as well  as by  diminishing  opportunism 
concerns (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Saxton, 1997; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Trust is also 
shown to reduce conflict in the relationship (Zaheer et al., 1998) by allowing partners to interpret 
each other’s equivocal actions in a manner more favorable to the preservation of the relationship. 
In face of an unprecedented event, the presence of trust is likely to reduce the likelihood of 
negative interpretation (Noorderhaven, 2004). 
Factors affecting the build-up of trust in an interorganizational context have been extensively 
discussed in the literature. Various authors have pointed to factors such as the length of the
relationship and its intensity (Dyer & Chu, 2000), the flexibility of the partners and information 
exchange  between  them  (Aulakh  et  al.,  1996)  as  being  conducive  to  trust  formation.  Yet, 
building trust  in  a  relationship  involves  costs (Poppo  &  Zenger, 2002;  McEvily, Perrone  & 
Zaheer,  2003).  The  costs  arise  because  cultivation  of  trust  requires  provision  of  assistance 
between exchange partners (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Sako & Helper 1998), frequent and intense 
communication (Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Sako & Helper, 1998; Sako, 1991), and 
commitments to the alliance in the anticipation of continuation of the relationship (Aulakh et al., 
1996; Lorenz 1988; Sako & Helper, 1998). Through such commitments of time, resources and 
opportunities foregone partners demonstrate benevolence towards each other (Larson, 1992). 
Therefore, partners should expend efforts towards building interorganizational trust only when 
considerable improvement in alliance performance justifies such an effort (Poppo & Zenger, 
2002: 710). All of the above is likely to also be true with respect to trust restoration effort; it 
should only be undertaken if the potential short- and long-term benefits outweigh its cost and if 
deriving  the  benefits  from  the  ongoing  relationship  is  preferred  to  obtaining  them  in  an 
alternative manner (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). In other words, the parties must be willing to 
invest time and effort in the trust restoration process (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) We choose not 
to focus on the question of whether trust repair is worthwhile or not. Rather we will focus on the 
question of effectiveness of different trust repair methods at the different levels of analysis. In 
other words, we assume that the parties consider the repair of trust to be beneficial and take this 
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5.1.2. Defining Interorganizational Trust and its Levels
For the purpose of  this  study we define  trust  as the positive  expectation  with  regard to  the 
partner’s reliability, predictability and fairness in face of the possibility for opportunism and the 
resulting willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the partner (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 
1995; Sarkar, Cavusgil & Evirgen, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). In an interorganizational context, 
we  can  speak  of  ‘organizations  trusting  each  other’  only  because  they  are  made  up  of  and 
managed  by  individuals  (Aulakh  et  al.,  1996).  Prior  research  has  repeatedly  stressed  the 
importance of individuals and their relationships in trust between organizations (e.g., Inkpen & 
Currall 1997; Lewis & Weigert 1992; Macaulay 1963; Ring & Van de Ven 1994). It is because 
of the crucial role individuals play in organizations that the idea of trust, which in itself can only 
be attributed to an individual (Zaheer et al. 1998), may be extended to an organization. It is 
through  those  individuals  that  the  interfirm  relations  come  into  effect  (Aulakh  et  al.,  1996; 
Inkpen and Currall 1997; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997). Therefore in considering 
trust  between collaborating organizations  trust held by the individuals  in  boundary spanning 
roles  would  likely  be  of  greater  relevance  compared  to  trust  of  the  non-boundary  spanning 
individuals.  Building  on  this  assumption,  we  further  focus  on  the  roles  that  organizational 
boundary spanners at different levels in organizational hierarchy play in shaping the course of 
organizational activities. From a methodological standpoint, trust at different levels in extant 
research means trust existing in alliances at the individual, group and firm level (e.g., Currall & 
Inkpen,  2002).  Trust  at  different  levels  in  our  research  refers  to  trust  between  individual 
boundary  spanners  that  occupy  different  levels  in  the  organizational  hierarchy-strategic  and 
operational. 
Extant literature stresses the systematically different roles and modus operandi of top managers 
compared to their colleagues at lower levels in the corporate hierarchy (e.g., Bower 1970; Ring 
& Van de Ven 1994; Zaheer, Lofstrom & George, 2002). This is because different positions in 
organizational hierarchy are associated with specific expectations with regard to the position 
holder’s contribution to the organizational tasks and thus with different roles of their incumbents 
(Floyd & Lane 2000). Organizational roles of individuals in turn affect their perceptions and 
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to develop by virtue of the roles the actors perform in their organizations (cf. Ring & Van de Ven 
1994). Since the roles of organizational actors vary significantly across the hierarchical levels it 
is to be expected that the nature of trust across those levels would also vary (Zaheer et al. 2002). 
In particular, trust of boundary spanners at different hierarchical levels is likely to have distinct 
consequences for the collaborative relationship, due to their unique strategy related roles. 
Accordingly the roles of top management may be assumed to be dominated by decision-making 
tasks,  like  ratifying  or  directing,  while  those  of  the  non-executive  managers  (middle  and 
operating managers) encompass primarily communication of and reaction to information, for 
example  implementing,  facilitating,  conforming  or  responding  (Floyd  &  Lane  2000).  This 
implies that the roles of strategic-level boundary spanners regarding an alliance are likely to be 
quite  different  from  those  of  operational-level  boundary  spanners.  Therefore,  while  the 
executive-level boundary spanners are well positioned to influence the cooperation policy of the 
organization, this is much less so for operational level boundary spanners. That is also why the 
attitude  towards  the  cooperation  of  those  who  frame  strategic  intentions  of  an  organization 
should be considered as distinct from those who actually implement them at the operational level 
(Salk & Simonin 2003).
5.1.3. Strategic-level Trust 
We have argued above that top managers, by virtue of their role as the primary decision-makers, 
play qualitatively different roles in the functioning of their organizations than the lower-level
managers.  Specifically,  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  participation  in  the  strategy-making 
process, top managers play two crucial roles in the collaborative context: that of initiating the 
alliance (cf., Larson 1992, Zaheer et al. 2002) and that of shaping its structural context (cf. 
Burgelman 1983, Zaheer et al. 2002). Trust of the top-level boundary spanners, therefore, would 
be demonstrated in the collaborative arrangements of the alliance. Top management trust may 
also be of importance in the subsequent stages of the collaboration. This is likely to be the case 
when  the  collaboration  encounters  some  unforeseen  circumstances  requiring  an  emergency 
intervention on the CEO’s part (cf. Zaheer et al. 2002). In sum, strategic-level trust is primarily 
important in the initial stages of collaboration, but also later on if the alliance experiences crisis 
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In light of the above discussion, and considering the tasks and roles of the top managers, as 
discussed above, we conceptualize strategic-level trust as the shared attitude of the company’s 
top boundary spanners towards the partner firm (cf. Inkpen and Currall 1997) and its members 
(cf. Gulati & Gargulio 1999). 
5.1.4. Operational-level Trust 
Compared to top managers, organizational actors at lower hierarchical levels play quite different 
roles. Specifically, boundary spanners of lower levels in organizational hierarchy are responsible 
for the actual implementation of the collaboration (Doz, 1996) and the efficient execution of its 
everyday tasks (Zaheer et al. 2002). By carrying out the operational tasks of the collaboration, 
they effectively link the two organizations across their boundaries (cf. Inkpen & Currall 1997). 
Trust between boundary spanners, involved in the every-day implementation of the alliance, 
would thus have significant consequences for how the alliance unfolds over time (Zaheer et al. 
2002). In line with the above and in contrast to strategic-level trust, we define operational-level 
trust between organizations as trust shared by the non-executive boundary spanners of the 
collaborating organizations towards the partner organization and its individual members. Thus 
similar to the strategic level, both the partner organization and/or its individual members can be 
the objects of operational-level trust.
5.2. VIOLATIONS OF TRUST: DEFINITION AND TYPES
Trust violation has been defined as a situation where one party perceives that the partner has 
intentionally exploited dependency by failing to fulfill expectations with respect to its behavior, 
or acting in a way that violated the trustee’s values (cf. Bies & Tripp, 1996; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper 
&  Dirks,  2004;  Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993).  “[B]ecause  trust  is  perception-based  rather  than 
“objective”, we expect that trustor perception of violations will matter as much or more than the 
“objective reality””(Bell, Oppenheimer & Bastien, 2002: 67).
Violation of trust can occur along a number of different dimensions in which the perception of 
trustworthiness is rooted (Bell et al., 2002).  It can be related to expectations  with regard to Trust repair 95
context-specific task reliability or the perception that the partner does not share the same key 
values (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). This is akin to the distinction proposed by Kim et al. (2004) 
between violations of competence-based trust and violations of integrity-based trust. While the 
former refers to the violation of trustor’s perception that the trustee possesses the skills and 
abilities that the job requires, the latter refers to the violation of trustor’s perception that both 
parties hold congruous values (Kim et al, 2004). 
Violation of Trust at The Strategic Level vs. at The Operational Level
In their role as strategy makers, top executives are responsible for initiating and directing the 
strategic  actions  of  their  organizations  (e.g.,  partner  choice,  resource  contributions  or 
collaborative arrangements), and are not engaged in the everyday implementation of the alliance 
tasks. Their role is also likely to be equally (or even more) pivotal when the collaboration runs 
into unforeseen problems (Zaheer et al., 2002). Such problems are likely to occur when the very 
basis of the collaboration is undermined. Examples include appropriation of proprietary know-
how (Hamel, 1991) or deliberate distortion or withholding of crucial information (Parkhe, 1993b; 
Williamson, 1985).  Such occurrences would affect the perceived level of integrity of the partner 
and potentially put in question the possibility of continued collaboration. 
Additionally,  some  strategic  decisions  of  the  partners,  although  not  directly  related  to  the 
collaboration at hand, may have serious consequences for the focal partners. For example, a 
decision to ally with the partner’s rival (Gimeno, 2004), or to enter a new market, which up till 
then has been the domain of the partner, can profoundly affect the strategic-level trust. Such 
decisions do not concern partner’s competence, as they are not connected with the joint tasks of 
the partner, but they may be an indication of the presence of value incongruity between the 
partners. For all the above reasons, strategic–level managers are likely to perceive integrity-
based violations more than operational-level employees (cf. Bell et al., 2002). We thus expect 
strategic level trust violations to be predominantly related to the values of the partners.
In  contrast,  operational  level  employees  are  predominantly  involved  in  the  everyday 
implementation of the alliance tasks. The competent, timely and accurate delivery on the tasks 
that  each  of  the  parties  is  expected  to  perform  is  of  crucial  importance  at  this  level.  The Chapter 5 96
operational level employees who engage in the joint execution of alliance tasks depend on each 
other for such competent and timely delivery. Delays or failure to deliver on the part of the 
partner can have negative consequences for the achievement of alliance goals as well as those 
specific to each organization. This interdependence makes competence-based trust essential to 
the smooth functioning of the alliance. Compared to strategic-level employees, operational-level 
employees  dealing  with  their  counterparts  at  the  partner  organization  are  likely  to  perceive 
ability-related issues more (Bell et al., 2002). Initial trust at the operational level has also been 
argued to be established based on “occupational role identification, role-specific norms, and the 
awareness that trust is a functional and expeditious response to these individuals’ role-related 
responsibilities for the day-to-day operation of the alliance.” (Zaheer et al., 2002: 19). Violations 
of trust at the operational level would therefore be more likely related to the perceived task 
reliability of the partner’s boundary spanners as reflecting the fulfillment of their role-related 
responsibilities. Therefore, we propose the following:
Proposition 1: Violations of strategic-level trust would be predominantly related to the 
partners’ perceived value congruence, while violations of operational-level trust would 
be primarily task and competence (reliability) related.
5.3. TYPES OF REMEDIES
Two types of remedies for repairing trust have been identified in the literature: non-legalistic and 
legalistic. Non-legalistic remedies encompass apology (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Schlenker & 
Darby, 1981), denial (Kim et al., 2004), explanation (Sitkin & Bies, 1993), and some form of 
compensation for the losses caused by the breach (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). The non-legalistic 
remedies offer the trust violator a chance to convince the trustor of his innocence, apologize and 
make up for the damage caused, explain his behavior, as well as demonstrate good faith effort 
and  change.  Legalistic  remedies  have  been  defined  in  the  intra-organizational  context,  as 
bureaucratic techniques,  like  for  example  formalization  or  standardization,  which  reduce the 
need to rely on interpersonal trust that has been violated (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). This implies that 
legalistic remedies substitute for the lost trust with some safeguards, which is in contrast to non-
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this idea to an interorganizational context, we conceptualize legalistic remedies as explicit rules 
and  procedures  meant  to  safeguard  against  the  recurrence  of  trust  violations  and  the 
consequences  of  such  violations  in  case  they  do  recur.  Such  measures  can  be  considered 
legalistic  to  the  extent  that  they  “mimic  legal  forms  and  move  beyond  legal  /  regulatory 
requirements (Sitkin & Bies 1993)” (Sitkin & Roth, 1993: 373).
Extant literature suggests that the effectiveness of the two types of remedies for dealing with 
various violations of trust differs. First, as far as the value-related trust violations are concerned 
legalistic remedies are likely to be largely ineffective. They may be a tool for symbolizing unity 
of culture – a tangible demonstration of the fact that parties share common values - as well as a 
way  of  making  explicit  and  enforcing  that  culture  (Edelman  1990;  Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993). 
However, the fact that they are explicit in character makes them largely ineffective in repairing 
violated  value-related  trust  (Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993).  Zucker  (1977:  728)  argues,  “applying 
sanctions  to  institutionalized  acts  may  have  the  effect  of  de-institutionalizing  them”.  The 
persistence of institutionalized cultural norms and values rests to a large extent on them being 
tacit (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Making the institutionalized beliefs and behaviors explicit through 
sanctioning leads to a perception of them being less objective and less impersonal as it “may 
indicate that there are other possible, attractive alternatives” (Zucker, 1977: 728). When trust 
violation is related to perceived value-congruity, formalization may create “a sense of distance 
and differentness that will not only make differences more salient than similarities but will also 
foster  the  interpretation  of  even  superficial  differences  as  indicative  of  deeper  value 
incongruities.” (Sitkin & Stickel, 1996: 198). Moreover, not only are the legalistic remedies 
ineffective in dealing with integrity-based trust violation, they can also escalate the problem 
(Sitkin & Stickel, 1996) as they increase perceived interpersonal distance, are impersonal in 
character and fail “to address the tendency of perceptions of value incongruity to generalize 
beyond the immediate situation.” (Sitkin & Roth, 1993: 373). 
Non-legalistic measures, in contrast, can be expected to be much more effective in repairing trust 
violations related to value incongruity. The importance of socialization has been stressed as way 
of achieving a unified cultural perspective in an intra-organizational context  (Van Maanen & 
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more effective in repairing breaches of trust related to partners’ integrity (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). 
Therefore, informal and personal processes, rather than legalistic ones, should be more effective 
in arriving at cultural congruence between two partnering organizations and in repairing trust 
based on perception of such congruence. 
Therefore, at the strategic level, where trust and thus also its violations are likely to be related to 
partners’ value congruence, we conclude that the non-legalistic remedies would be more suitable 
in  dealing with  trust  violations  than legalistic remedies.  The  above  expectation  seems to  be 
additionally supported by the finding that trust between top level managers of two collaborating 
organizations is based on “a comprehensive set of personal factors [such as] prior interaction, 
common interests, individual achievements and competence, and personal commitment to the 
project.”  (Zaheer  et  al.,  2002:  15).  This  is  in  contrast  to  individuals  lower  down  in  the 
organizational hierarchy who tend to form mutual trust based on task-related, readily observable 
characteristics (Bell et al., 2002; Zaheer et al., 2002). The fact that trust at the strategic level is 
based on social and personal factors, unrelated to the task performed, further strengthens our 
argument regarding the appropriateness of non-legalistic remedies for repairing such trust at this 
level. Accordingly we propose the following:
Proposition 2:  At the strategic level, non-legalistic remedies would be more efficient in 
repairing violated trust than legalistic remedies.
When integrity-based trust is violated, the trustor is likely to assume that such occurrence is 
representative of the character of the trustee. A one-time violation of value-related trust, is likely 
to lead to a perception of general value incongruity and consequent expectation that a violation 
will recur (cf. Sitkin & Roth, 1993).  As Kim et al. (2004) argue:
“[P]eople intuitively believe that  those  with  high  integrity  will  refrain  from 
dishonest  behaviors  in  any  situation,  whereas  those  with  low  integrity  may 
exhibit wither dishonest or honest behaviors depending on their incentives and 
opportunities. For this reason, a single honest behavior is typically discounted 
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behave honestly in certain situations (…). However, a single dishonest behavior 
is considered to offer a reliable signal of low integrity, given the belief that only 
persons of low integrity will perform in dishonest ways.”  (Kim et al,  2004: 
106). 
Also, empirical research has revealed that in judging others’ morality individuals tend to weigh 
negative behavior more than positive behavior (Kim et al., 2004; Martijn, Spears, Van der Plight, 
& Jakobs, 1992;). Additionally, a violation of a certain value can lead to generalization of the 
incongruity to other values of the partner. Sitkin & Roth (1993) argue that if one single value is 
violated, the trustor to achieve cognitive consistency is likely to perceive that all of the trustee’s 
values are incongruous. However, other scholars argue that relationships are multifaceted and 
while partner maybe viewed as trustworthy in one area, s(he) may simultaneously be viewed as 
untrustworthy in another (Lewicki et al., 1998). That implies that trust and distrust can coexist in 
one  relationship  and  distrust  in  one  area  need  not  and  should  not  be  generalized  to  others 
(Lewicki et al., 1998). We believe that the two arguments can be reconciled if we assume that 
distrust  is likely to  be generalized to  other related values but  not to all values. Overall, we 
conclude that even though trust and distrust can coexist in one relationship, consequences of a 
value  violation  can  extend  significantly  beyond  the  narrow  area  in  which  it  occurred  by 
negatively affecting the perception of the trustee’s general trustworthiness. 
Therefore, since “once a thief, always a thief” and “a cheat will also be liar” heuristics seem to 
hold with respect to value-related trust, the non-legalistic remedies are likely to be efficient only 
to the extent that the trustee can prove that the violation of value-congruence did not occur (if 
violation is a matter of trustor’s perception) or that it was not intentional (there were contextual 
factors that led to the occurrence of the violation). Therefore, in case of integrity-based trust 
violation, the only way to “save” trust is to prove one’s innocence. Thus an apology, which 
involves admission of guilt and regret for the violation (cf. Schlenker & Darby, 1981) is unlikely 
to  be  effective for  rebuilding  integrity-based  trust.  Although  an  apology  may  convey  to  the 
trustor the impression that the trust violator is overall not such a bad person (Ohbuchi, Kameda 
& Agarie, 1989: 219) – thus limiting the generalization of the violation to other related values –
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trustee with respect to the value that has been violated. From that perspective, denial, whereby 
the trust violator declares the allegation of intentionality of breach to be untrue is likely to be a 
more effective strategy for dealing with integrity-based trust violations
6 because it limits the 
perceived guilt of the trust violator
7 (Kim et al, 2004). For the same reason, an explanation, as an 
attempt to affect the trustor’s perception of trustee’s responsibility for the breach of trust, his 
motives for committing the breach and/or the unfavorability of the consequences of the breach 
(Sitkin & Bies, 1993) can be considered to be a viable strategy for restoring integrity-based trust 
between partners.
However,  when  a  violation  occurs,  it  is  not  readily  clear  whether  it  was  intentional  on  the 
trustee’s part or not. Therefore, an important cognitive activity that follows the violation of trust 
is the determination and assignment of responsibility; trust  will only then be violated if the 
violator’s actions are perceived to have been freely chosen (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). When the 
trustor attributes the causes of violation to situational factors independent of the trustee, the trust 
would likely not be disrupted (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Therefore, following a violation of 
trust the causality between the breach and the trustee’s actions needs to be established. The 
trustor can investigate the situation himself or rely on the social account provided by the trustee 
(Bies & Tripp, 2002).   In other words, when a violation of integrity-based trust occurs, the 
parties would  resort  to  non-legalistic remedies,  in  an effort to  demonstrate  (the  trustee)  and 
establish (the trustor) whether the violation has been committed intentionally or not. 
If  the  trustor  can  with  reasonable  certainty  conclude  the  intentionality  of  the  trustee  in 
committing the breach, the repair of trust will be very difficult. If on the other hand, the trustor 
establishes with reasonable certainty that the violation was not intended, the trustee may get a 
‘second chance’, that is go on probation, during which his/her integrity or lack thereof can be 
tested. In empirical research, denial, a type of non-legalistic remedy, has been found to be more 
effective in repairing trust violations (of any type) when no subsequent evidence of guilt was 
                                                
6 We do not go into the issue of whether the violation was in fact not intentional, rather we choose to focus only on 
the extent to which the trustee is able to convince the trustor that this indeed was the case. The ethical aspect of the 
trustee potentially misleading the trustor in this respect is beyond the scope of this paper. 
7 Denial not only reduces the perceived guilt but also the intended redemption. However, given that the benefits of 
reducing the perception of guilt will outweigh the costs of reducing the positive integrity information, denial should 
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revealed (Kim et al., 2004). In general therefore, we expect the effectiveness of repair efforts by 
means  of  non-legalistic  remedies  to  depend  on  whether  the  trustor  eventually  attributes 
intentionality in committing the breach to the trustee or not. 
Proposition 3: At the strategic level, the effectiveness of non-legalistic remedies will be 
conditional on the trustor’s ability to attribute non-intentionality of trustee in committing 
the violation.
We turn now to discuss the effectiveness of the two kinds of remedies for repairing competence-
based trust violations. Extant literature seems to suggest that both legalistic (e.g., Sitkin & Roth, 
1993) as well as non-legalistic remedies (e.g., Kim et al., 2004) are appropriate in this case. Kim 
et al. (2004) discuss the appropriateness of different non-legalistic remedies for dealing with 
competence-related  and  integrity-related  trust  violations.  They  argue  and  find  that  when  a 
violation  concerns  matters  of  competence,  trust  repair  should  be  undertaken  by  means  of 
apology, which they define in terms of acknowledgement of responsibility and regret for having 
breached the trust (Kim et al., 2004). Overall, however, their analysis supports the claim that 
(some) non-legalistic remedies are useful for tackling reliability-related trust violations.
Also legalistic remedies have been argued to be effective measures for dealing with competence-
based trust violations. By addressing context-specific problems and promoting reliability such 
measures are likely to be effective in repairing violations related to partners’ task reliability. 
First, as far as the context-specificity is concerned, violations of task reliability trust are likely to 
be perceived as isolated, one-of incidents. This is in contrast to comparable violations of value 
expectations,  which  as  was  argued  above,  would  likely  lead  to  the  perception  of  general 
incongruity  and  expectation  of  repeated  breaches  (Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993).  Second,  legalistic 
measures by comprehensively specifying the requirements and contingencies related to a given 
task, can be effective at restoring reliability-related trust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Obviously the 
more restricted the area in which the reliability breach occurs, the easier it would be to predict 
and specify all the relevant contingencies and draw up formal rules and procedures for dealing 
with them (cf. Arrow 1974; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Therefore while legalistic mechanisms are not 
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ameliorating reliability problems specific to a particular context would be much greater (Sitkin & 
Roth, 1993). 
Even though both non-legalistic and legalistic remedies have been argued to be appropriate for 
operational-level (i.e., competence-related) trust violations, we believe that there are factors that 
affect the relative effectiveness of the two types of measures. In particular, we posit that the 
frequency  with  which  the  violation  occurs  is  such  a  factor.  When  the  consistency  of  the 
individual’s behavior is perceived to be low, the causal attribution of the behavior to the person’s 
characteristics is unlikely (McArthur, 1972).  Therefore, to the extent that a trustor views a task-
related  violation  to  be  an  isolated  or  random  event,  his/her  perception  of  the  trustee’s 
trustworthiness  should  not  be  affected  (Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993).  This  is  due  to  individuals’ 
tendency  to  assign  greater  significance  to  positive  competence-related  information  than  to 
negative information concerning competence (Martijn, Spears, Van der Plight, & Jakobs, 1992). 
While a single successful performance is likely to lead the trustor to the conclusion that a trustee 
is  competent,  a  single  failure  to  perform  is  likely  not  to  be  interpreted  as  a  signal  of 
incompetence  (Kim et al., 2004). This is based on the assumption that an incompetent trustee 
would not have been able to achieve such high level of performance, while under particular 
circumstances, both a competent as well as an incompetent trustee can fail to perform at the 
expected level (Martijn et al., 1992). Since an incident of reliability violation would likely be 
considered to be an anomaly in trustee’s behavior, we argue that apology would be a sufficient 
measure  to  deal  with  the  violation.  Although  apology  confirms  trustee’s  intentionality  in 
committing the violation, such information in case of reliability-related breach would however 
unlikely devalue the perception of the trustee’s general competence level (Kim et al., 2004). 
Therefore if the violation remains a sporadic occurrence, apology would likely be an effective 
strategy for dealing with violation of reliability-related trust. 
However, as the violation increases in frequency and becomes a regular occurrence, it would be 
more effective for the parties to undertake some form of legalistic remedy. As the frequency of 
violation goes up, the reliability-violating behavior of the trust is likely to be assumed to be a 
typical behavior, in which case the trustor would start expecting that the violation will occur 
repeatedly in the future (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). What all of the above implies is that up to a Trust repair 103
certain point, a violation is considered to be an isolated or an out-of-ordinary event, in which a 
simple apology may suffice. Above that threshold of violation frequency, however, this would no 
longer be the case and the trustor would likely undertake action, in form of a legalistic remedy to 
safeguard against future violations of similar type. We therefore, propose what follows:
Proposition 4:  At the operational level, the effectiveness of the non-legalistic remedies 
for repairing trust will decrease as the frequency of the violations increases.
Proposition 5: At the operational level, the effectiveness of the legalistic remedies for
repairing trust will increase as the frequency of the violations increases.
In line with our argument so far, when the operational level trust is violated repeatedly (i.e., 
reliability-related  violation),  repair  of  such  trust  can  be  accomplished  through  legalistic 
measures. Introduction of such legalistic measures, however, lies in the domain of the strategic 
level managers. Therefore, repair of operational-level trust by means of legalistic measures must 
be initiated at the strategic level, as it is the strategic-level managers who have the power to 
design and change the collaborative interface of the alliance. Such repair intervention would be 
undertaken when the information about the breach of trust at the operational level reaches the 
strategic level. Once the information does reach the top, the expediency with which legalistic 
measures designed by the strategic-level are then implemented at the operational level would 
affect the success of trust repair efforts.  In contrast to top-level boundary spanners, lower-level 
boundary spanners have little influence on the collaboration policies of their organizations, but 
rather operate within their bounds (Zaheer et al. 2002). So, the effectiveness of repairing a breach 
of trust at the operational level would be greater the quicker the information about the violation 
reaches the top and the more efficiently the measures that it undertakes are implemented at the 
operational level, both of which depend on the level of vertical coordination and control in the 
trustor organization.
Organizations use a variety of vertical linkages to “coordinate activities between the top and the 
bottom of an organization” (Daft, 1998: 205). The higher the level of vertical coordination and 
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strength of the linkage goes up, in turn, a higher extent of communication and coordination 
between the levels is to be expected (cf. Daft, 1998). Perrone et al. (2003) advance a similar 
argument,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  individual  organizational  member,  i.e.,  role 
autonomy. They define role autonomy in terms of the boundary spanners’ freedom to devise 
actions and behaviors, necessary to perform their tasks as well as the necessity to coordinate with 
other functional areas (cf. Perrone et al., 2003). Lower level of role autonomy would thus imply 
greater need for coordination with other functional areas. 
We  argue  that  operational  employees  with  low  levels  of  role  autonomy,  besides  greater 
interdependence with other functions in the organization, would also experience a greater level 
of dependence on their superiors, while employees with greater role autonomy would experience 
lower level of both the horizontal as well as vertical interdependence. This would imply that the 
upward  information  flow  (from  the  operational  level  to  the  strategic  level)  as  well  as  the 
downward command flow (from the strategic to the operational level) would be precipitated. 
Therefore, a low level of autonomy would result in higher speed with which the information 
about reliability breaches at the operational level would reach the strategic level. At the same 
time, low autonomy would also lead to higher efficiency with which the legalistic measures for 
repair of trust would be implemented at the operational level 
In sum then, when the violation frequency at the operational level reaches a certain threshold, the 
behavior of the trustee is no longer assumed to be a matter of exception and consequently an 
apology from the trust violating partner is likely not to be sufficient. As a result, the repeated 
occurrences  of  reliability-related  violations  would  get  reported  to  the  higher  levels  of 
organizational hierarchy, which would result in introduction of legalistic remedies to safeguard 
against subsequent, future violations and restore reliability-based trust. The greater the level of 
vertical coordination manifested in the presence structural devices such as hierarchical referral, 
vertical  information  systems,  the  more  efficient  the  two-way  communication  in  the 
organizational hierarchy is likely to be (Daft, 1998). Therefore, the closer knit the operational 
and strategic levels are the sooner information about trust violations at the operational level 
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signals of the trust being breached do not reach the top management level), the feasibility of 
repairing trust at that level may be compromised. We therefore, propose the following:
Proposition  6:  At  the  operational  level,  the  effectiveness  of  legalistic  measures  for 
repairing trust will be negatively related to the level of the autonomy afforded to the 
operational level employees.
5.4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have undertaken to analyze the issue of trust repair in an interorganizational context. We 
accomplished this by identifying two distinct levels of analysis – strategic and operational –
distinguished  according  to  the  different  roles  that  incumbents  of  various  positions  in
organizational hierarchy have in the functioning of their organizations and thus also the alliance. 
While the former reflects the attitudes of the top-level organizational boundary spanners, the 
latter captures the attitudes of lower-level boundary spanners. 
We  have  argued that  violations  of  trust  at  the strategic  level  are likely  to  be  related to  the 
perceived value incongruity between the partners, while at the operational they are likely to have 
the  task  reliability as  its  primary  object.  Further,  we  have  also  posited  that  the  appropriate 
remedies for mending integrity-based trust violations are non-legalistic in nature while repair of 
reliability-related trust violations could be accomplished both by means of legalistic as well as 
non-legalistic remedies, depending on the frequency with which the violation occurs. What these 
two arguments point to is that repair of strategic level trust would necessitate employing of non-
legalistic remedies. The feasibility of repairing trust with such measures, however, would depend 
on  the extent to which the trust  violator can convince the trustee of his innocence, e.g., by 
disaffirming the causal link between his behavior and the trust breach, or by making clear that he 
had no other option. Repair of trust at the operational level, in turn, would call for the use of non-
legalistic remedies  at  low frequencies  of  the  violation  occurrence  and  legalistic measures  at 
relatively higher frequencies of the violation occurrence. Finally, since the repair of operational 
trust violations by means of legalistic remedies must be initiated at the strategic level, the degree 
of  vertical  coordination  and  control  in  the  organization  would  affect  the  speed  with  which 
introduction of such measures would be undertaken and accomplished.Chapter 5 106
There are a number of implications of our analysis. First and foremost, it points to the fact that 
since  the  nature  of  trust  violations  at  the  two  analyzed  levels  is  likely  to  be  different,  the 
effectiveness of different types of remedial actions would also vary across levels. The use of 
inappropriate remedies would not only yield trust repair efforts ineffective, but also in some 
cases further destroy trust. For example, while legalistic remedies may be effective in dealing 
with operational-level trust violations, it might not be so for dealing with violations of trust at the 
strategic level. Moreover, employing legalistic remedies in the latter case can lead to further 
deterioration  of  trust  at  this  level.  In  general  therefore,  remedial  actions  undertaken  in  an 
inappropriate manner may in addition to not contributing to repairing trust would also actually 
deepen the problem rather than solve it.
At the same time, although legalistic remedies would not be effective in repairing trust at the 
strategic level, they may be effective in preserving the collaboration. As we argued above, due to 
the generalization effect, violation of perceived  value congruence may put the possibility of 
continued collaboration in question (given that the violator’s intentionality is contended by the 
trustor). Moreover, due to the power inherent in the strategic-level positions, breakdown of trust 
at this level can result in decisions with severe strategic consequences for both partners, for 
example termination of the collaboration. In such circumstances, drafting a contract in greater 
detail to safeguard against similar future integrity-related violations could allow the partners to 
continue the collaboration, but this is different from saying that it would help to repair trust. 
Trust  would  not  be  repaired,  because  making  the  common  values  to  which  the  parties  are 
supposed to adhere explicit would not restore the belief in the value congruence of the partners. 
Rather, it may bring the parties to further question the value congruence. Additionally, because a 
violation of one value is likely to be generalized to other (related) values and because no contract 
can provide for every possible contingency, a legalistic measure such as a contractual remedy 
cannot restore the positive perception of the trustee’s overall character. Therefore, a legalistic 
measure would not repair strategic-level trust but it can substitute for the broken trust and so 
become  the  basis  of  continued  collaboration.  Such  collaboration,  however,  would  lack  the 
advantages that a trusting relationship between partners brings about, i.e., resilience to external 
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Moreover, we believe our analysis sheds some light on the ongoing debate in the literature with 
regard to whether trust and formal contracts should be deemed as substitutes (Ghoshal & Moran, 
1996; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997) or complements  (e.g., Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In 
our  case,  we  could  draw  a  certain  extent  of  similarity  between  formal  contracts  and  legal 
remedies. Our analysis implies that both may be true in an interorganizational setting, with the 
substitutability argument holding at the strategic level and complementarity argument being true 
at  the  operational  level.  Operational  level  trust  being  related  to  task  performance  and 
occupational roles (Zaheer et al., 2002), it can be effectively mended by means of legalistic 
(Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993)  measures,  as  these  restore  and  preserve  the  partner  reliability.  This 
suggests that at this level of analysis trust and legalistic measures would be complements. At the 
strategic  level  however,  trust  being rooted  primarily in  the  perceptions  of  value  congruence 
legalistic measures would not only be ineffective at repairing it, but would likely further harm it. 
At this level then, trust and legalistic measures can be considered to be either independent or 
negatively related, i.e., substitutes. 
Finally, our discussion indicates that compared to operational level trust, violation of strategic 
level trust is potentially much more severe in consequences. There are two reasons for that. First, 
due  to  the  organizational  role  of  the  strategic  level  actors,  and  the  power  assigned  to  their 
position, violation of trust at that level can result in direct and severe consequences for the 
collaboration as well as both the partners (e.g., termination of the collaboration or significantly 
reduced commitment to the collaboration). Second, since the violation of trust at the strategic 
level  is  likely  to  be  related  to  perceived  lack  of  value-congruence,  and  since  the  one-time 
violation in this respect is likely to be generalized to the overall character of the partner, trust at 
this level is less resilient, as failure to prove innocence just once will render trust repair virtually 
impossible. In that sense, if the trustee is unable to establish its innocence denial as a non-
legalistic strategy may have worse consequences than an apology. In other words, strategic-level 
trust can be said to be more fragile than operational-level trust, not in terms of strength, but 
rather  in  the  sense  that  a  singular  violation  can  cause  its  irreversible  collapse.CHAPTER 6
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Hunter  &  Schmidt  (1990)  began  the  preface  of  their  well-known  book  “Methods  of  Meta-
Analysis” with the following sentences, “Scientists have known for centuries that a single study 
will not resolve a major issue…..thus, the foundation of science is the cumulation of knowledge 
from  the  results  of  many  studies”.  However,  single  studies  that  deal  with  a  single  or  few 
relationships in depth lay the foundation stones upon which cumulative studies rest. In other 
words, just as a single tree does not make a forest, there can be no forest without trees. The four 
chapters in  my dissertation  balance the act of attending to  important  and relevant details of 
science without losing sight of its larger picture. 
Over the past  couple of  decades research on alliance  performance has  grown in  importance 
tremendously and with it the number of determinants of alliance performance has mushroomed 
as well. The first paper of my dissertation takes on an important task of taking stock of empirical 
research on alliance performance by not only synthesizing results across studies to generalize 
findings but also by examining novel and important theoretical relationships that provided a 
coherent  picture  of  the  determinants  of  alliance  performance.  The  second  paper  of  my 
dissertation identifies the boundary conditions of the widely studied relationship between trust 
and  alliance  performance.  Although  the  meta-analysis  revealed  that  trust  is  the  strongest 
determinant of alliance performance, it also indicated the presence of moderators-- a consistent 
pattern of which was not revealed by the moderator analysis. A detailed examination of the trust-
performance relationship in the second paper revealed the conditions under which trust matters 
more or less to alliance performance. 
The second paper establishes the importance of trust; the third paper examines the conditions 
under which such a vital asset is produced. Whereas the second paper shows that trust is needed 
more under behavioral uncertainty and less under environmental uncertainty, the third paper 
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presence of the two types of uncertainties. The first three papers showed that trust is an important 
asset and also that cultivating this asset involves costs. Given that trust is not costless, violating it 
in a relationship is likely to have serious consequences for the sustenance of the relationship. The 
fourth paper completes the picture by theoretically analyzing the efficiency of legalistic and non-
legalistic remedies in restoring trust at different levels in the organizational hierarchy. 
6.1. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
Prior  empirical  research  on  alliance  performance  has  adopted  a  variety  of  theoretical 
perspectives,  which  have  not  often  been  integrated.  The  emphasis  on  the  development  and 
testing  of  new  theory  rather  than  on  empirical  generalization  has  led  to  over  100  distinct 
variables  being  investigated  as  antecedents  of  alliance  performance.  Thus,  despite  extensive 
research no clear consensus exists regarding the antecedents of alliance performance. The meta-
analysis of alliance performance in the first paper is the first to conduct a quantitative synthesis 
of the extensive literature and obtain empirically precise generalizations on the determinants of 
strategic  alliance  performance.  The  empirical  evidence  provided  strong  evidence  for  the 
importance and the unique contribution of initial conditions, governance structure, and post-
formation  dynamics  for  understanding  alliance  performance.  Moreover,  certain  unexpected 
findings  (e.g.,  the  link  between  prior  ties  and  both  contractual  safeguards  and  information 
exchange) that our meta-analysis revealed emphasize the need for new theoretical and empirical 
work  investigating  in  more  detail  the  nature  of  these  relationships  and  the  underlying 
mechanisms.
Findings of the second paper indicate that the positive relationship between trust and alliance 
performance  is  stronger  when  concerns  about  behavioral  uncertainty  are  high  (due  to 
interdependence  between  partners  and  inter-partner  competition)  and  weaker  when 
environmental  uncertainty  is  high  (due  to  environmental  instability  and  unpredictability). 
Though  previous  research  provides  general  support  for  the  idea  that  trust  is  beneficial  to 
alliances, it has not yielded a general theory regarding the conditions under which trust facilitates 
and hinders alliance performance. We have presented such a theory, based on the distinction 
between behavioral and environmental uncertainty, and shown empirically that, apart from the Overall conclusions 111
positive  direct  relationship  between  trust  and  alliance  performance,  more  subtle  interaction 
effects can be distinguished. Our theory and findings imply that partners should expend efforts in 
developing  interorganizational  trust  only  when  the  potential  improvement  in  alliance 
performance justifies such an effort, which in turn depends on the type of uncertainty faced by 
the alliance. This study challenges conventional wisdom in that it shows trust to be a double-
edged sword, with a performance-enhancing potential that increases under certain conditions but 
decreases under other conditions.
The third paper focused on the formal (i.e., equity versus non-equity alliances) and informal 
(quality of information exchanged within the alliance) determinants of trust, and the conditions 
under which these facilitate or hamper the cultivation of trust. Consistent with prior research, the 
findings indicate that the quality of information exchanged between partners is conducive to the 
cultivation of resilient trust (Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2000). However, we did not find a 
significant relationship between equity alliances and fragile trust. Moreover, the results show that 
the quality of information exchanged between partners matters more to resilient trust when both 
behavioral and environmental uncertainty is high. Our findings also support our argument that 
equity alliances facilitate the cultivation of fragile trust under behavioral uncertainty and hinder 
its cultivation under environmental uncertainty. Thus, the third paper refines existing research on 
the determinants of interorganizational trust and provides insights on when to invest in certain 
formal and informal mechanisms of cultivating inter-organizational trust.
The  fourth  and  final  paper  of  the  dissertation  analyzes  the  issue  of  trust  repair  in  an 
interorganizational  context.  We  identify  two  distinct  levels  of  analysis  –  strategic  and 
operational.  While  the  former  reflects  the  attitudes  of  the  top-level  organizational  boundary 
spanners, the latter captures the attitudes of lower-level boundary spanners. We have argued that 
violations of trust at the strategic level are likely to be related to the perceived value incongruity 
between the partners, while at the operational they are likely to have the task reliability as its 
primary  object.  Further,  we  have  also  posited  that  the  appropriate  remedies  for  mending 
integrity-based trust violations are non-legalistic in nature while repair of reliability-related trust 
violations could be accomplished both by means of legalistic as well as non-legalistic remedies, 
depending on the frequency with which the violation occurs. This study points out that since the Chapter 6 112
nature of trust violations at the two analyzed levels is likely to be different, the effectiveness of 
different types of remedial actions would also vary across levels. Furthermore, it argues that 
remedial actions undertaken in an inappropriate manner may not only fail to contribute to the 
reparation of trust, but may actually deepen the problem rather than solve it. Our discussion also 
indicates that compared to operational level trust, violation of strategic level trust is potentially 
much more severe in consequences.
6.2. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The papers in this dissertation offer several opportunities for future research. This dissertation 
has focused on inter-organizational trust. Trust is part of a web of concepts regarding relational 
and partner specific assets. It is vital that future research works toward clarifying how these 
concepts relate to each other, e.g. in terms of cause and effect, substitute and complement, as 
well as how they can best be operationalized. For example, partner reputation, which is one of 
the  partner-specific  assets,  might  condition  the  relationship  between  trust  and  alliance 
performance. Network literature has emphasized that reputed partners are likely to have better 
access to resources in the network (Gulati, 1998). This resource access is likely to benefit the 
alliance. However, a reputed  partner is likely to  contribute its rare network resources to the 
alliance only when  it  trusts  the alliance partner.  Future research could  examine  the benefits 
derived from trust in the presence of other partner specific and relational assets.
Research has identified other organizing mechanisms in alliances besides trust, such as formal 
contracts (Poppo  &  Zenger, 2002;  Carson, Madhok & Yu, 2006) and routines  (Zollo et al., 
2002). Scholars have been debating whether trust and formal contracts function as substitutes 
(e.g., Gulati, 1995) or complements (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Carson, Madhok & Yu, 2006). 
Contract  law  varies  across  institutional  settings  (Arrighetti,  Bachmann  &  Deakin,  1997). 
Therefore, whether trust and formal contracts function as substitutes or complements may vary 
across institutional settings. For instance, in institutional settings such as Japan or the United 
states where relationships are primarily dictated either by trust or formal contracts, respectively, 
these two governance mechanisms are more likely to replace or substitute each other. Similarly, 
benefits arising from trust might increase or decrease in the presence of routines, depending on Overall conclusions 113
whether routines complement or substitute trust. Examining whether trust and routines coexist or 
supersede each other can be a fruitful area for future research. 
Furthermore,  prior  research  has  utilized  the  same  variable  to  operationalize  both  trust  and 
routines. Gulati (1995) used prior ties to capture trust, whereas Zollo et al. (2002) suggest that 
prior ties with a partner indicate the presence of well-developed routines between the focal firm 
and its partner. A possible way of resolving this issue is to examine whether prior ties reduce the 
detrimental effects resulting from sources of internal tension in alliances other than those relating 
to behavioral uncertainty. A potential candidate could be cultural differences between partners 
(Pothukuchi et al, 2002). Conflicts due to cultural differences do not result from concerns about 
behavioral  uncertainty  such  as  knowledge  appropriation,  but  from  differences  in  ideologies, 
values and management styles of partners (Parkhe, 1991). Mechanisms such as devising formal 
training programs to learn about each other’s culture can go a long way in reducing conflicts 
arising due to cultural differences (Parkhe, 1991). Routines, rather than trust are likely to play an 
important facilitating role when cultural differences are high. The manner in which prior ties 
moderate  the  relationship  between  cultural  difference  and  alliance  performance  might  yield 
indirect insights into whether prior ties capture trust or routines. If prior ties capture routines 
instead of trust, it is likely to reduce the detrimental effect of cultural distance by positively 
moderating  the  negative  relationship  between  cultural  distance  and  alliance  performance.  
Research examining the role of prior ties in minimizing the detrimental effects of differences due 
to national, societal and organizational cultures could shed more light on this issue.
Also the manner in which trust is associated with relational governance deserves further research 
attention. Whereas Carson et al. (2004) equate trust to relational governance; Poppo & Zenger 
(2002) consider trust as one of the relational norms constituting relational governance besides 
flexibility, solidarity and information exchange. Other relational norms might play a role in the 
cultivation of trust; the third paper of this dissertation examined the manner in which information 
exchange is related to trust. Future research could examine how other relational norms such as 
solidarity and flexibility are related to trust, as well as to each other.Chapter 6 114
The  first  two  papers  of  this  dissertation  examined  an  important  alliance  outcome,  alliance 
performance.  The  role  of  trust  in  facilitating  or  hindering  other  alliance  outcomes  such  as 
knowledge creation and knowledge transfer are fruitful areas for future research. Researchers 
have  acknowledged  the  importance  of  the  recipient’s  absorptive  capacity  for  successful 
knowledge  transfer  (Inkpen  &  Dinur,  1998).  A  possible  extension  would  be  the  impact  of 
relative  absorptive  capacities  of  the  partners  on  knowledge  creation.  An  imbalance  in  the 
absorptive capacities of the partners could result in knowledge appropriation by the partner with 
stronger absorptive capacity in lieu of knowledge creation. The risk of knowledge appropriation 
is likely to depend on the type of knowledge created (incremental vs. substantial innovation) in 
the alliance. Inter-organizational trust could be a possible contingent factor that mitigates fears 
for knowledge appropriation in substantial knowledge creation alliances in spite of inequity in 
partner absorptive capacities.
6.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Prior  research  examining  process  or  relational  aspects  of  alliances  are  not  only  few  and 
fragmented  (Yan  &  Zeng,  1999)  but  also  remain  distanced  from  outcome  theories  (Parkhe, 
1993a). Development of a complete theory of alliances will not be possible “until theories of 
processes  evolve  substantially  beyond  their  current  stage  and  are  effectively  merged  with 
theories of  outcomes”,  Parkhe (1993a:  262).    Parkhe (1993a)  calls for  an integration  of  the 
“diverse  aspects”  of  inter-firm  alliances  that  “have  remained  inchoate,  as  if  they  were 
unconnected,  rather  than  being  tightly  interwoven  aspects  of  the  common  phenomenon  of 
[alliances]” (Parkhe, 1993a: 232). This dissertation has made significant strides in this direction.115
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: Survey Items Used in Scales
Alliance Performance. (=0.90) (5 point Likert type scales ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). 
 The objectives for which the collaboration was established are being met.
 Our firm is satisfied with the financial performance of the collaboration.
 Our foreign partner firm seems to be satisfied with the financial performance of the collaboration.
 Our firm is satisfied with the overall performance of the collaboration.
 Our foreign partner firm seems to be satisfied with the overall performance of the collaboration.
Fragile Trust. ( =0.82) (5 point Likert type scales ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’).
 Our foreign partner always meets its obligations towards the relationship.
 Our foreign partner trusts that our firm always meets our obligations toward the relationship.
 We trust our foreign partner will not deviate from the terms of the agreement
(Resilient) Trust
8. ( =0.85) (5 point Likert type scales ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). 
 Sometimes our foreign partner changes facts slightly in order to get what they want. (R)
 Our foreign partner has promised to do things without actually doing them later. (R)
 Our firm is generally doubtful of the information provided to us by our foreign partner. (R)
 Our foreign partner firm is generally doubtful of the information we provide them. (R)
 Our foreign partner has given us truthful and valuable information even when it did not form part of the 
contract.
Quality of Information Exchanged. ( =0.81) (5 point Likert type scales ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’). 
 Our foreign partner firm has provided relevant information whenever we asked them for it.
 We are promptly notified by our foreign partner whenever any major change occurs at their firm.
 We get clear information about the plans of our foreign partner concerning the collaboration well in advance.
 How often do senior managers from your firm communicate with their counterparts in the foreign partner firm? 
(1=daily; 5= once a month or less)
 How often do senior and middle managers in your company make business trips to your foreign partner firm? 
(1=twice a month or more; 5= once a year or less).
Procedural Justice. ( =0.81) (1 = Not at all, 5 = Always). 
 Do senior managers from your foreign partner firm communicate with senior managers from your firm 
before making any strategic decision?
 Are senior managers from your firm free to challenge and refute the strategic views of senior managers 
from your foreign partner firm?
 Are those managers from your foreign partner firm who are involved in strategic decision making well 
informed and familiar with the local situations of your firm?
 Does your foreign partner firm give your firm a full explanation of the final strategic decisions made by 
them?
                                                
8 Items capturing Trust in Chapter 3 and Resilient Trust in Chapter 4 are the same.Remedy and rationale for adopting the remedy Implementation of the remedy in our study
(Procedural Remedy 1(PR)) Criterion and predictors from different sources.
Obtaining  measures  of  dependent  and  explanatory  variables  from  different 
sources as much as possible helps control common method or single respondent 
bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
We obtained data on most (3/4) of the moderator variables and on several control variables 
from archival sources. 
(PR2) Protecting  respondent  anonymity.  This  technique  decreases 
respondents’  tendency  to  be  socially desirable,  acquiescent  or  lenient  when 
crafting their responses (Podsakoff et al., 2003: 888).
Our cover letter assured respondents complete anonymity.
(PR3) Scale-reordering. Reduces the likelihood of respondents guessing the 
relationship  between  the  predictor  and  criterion  variables  and  consciously 
matching their responses to the two measures (Parkhe, 1993b). 
In our questionnaire the trust and alliance performance items were placed far apart from 
each other – namely, about 50% of the relevant questionnaire pages apart. Items were not 
grouped together by variable, and the variables were not labeled based on the reported 
constructs (trust etc.).
(PR4) Reducing item ambiguity. Careful attention to the wording of items 
helps reduces item ambiguity (Tourangeau, Rips, Rasinski, 2000).
We  were  careful  to  avoid  vague  concepts,  avoid  double-barreled  questions  and  keep 
questions  simple,  all  steps  which  reduce  item  ambiguity (Tourangeau,  Rips,  Rasinski, 
2000).  We  pretested  the  survey  with  Indian  managers,  which  helped  us  identify  and 
replace a small number of ambiguous words.
(Statistical  Remedy  1(SR)) Partial  correlation  adjustment.  If  after  partial 
correlation adjustment any of the zero-order correlations that were significant 
before the adjustment remains significant, this indicates that the results cannot 
be attributed to common method. (Lindell & Whitney, 2001).
All our significant zero-order correlations remained significant after the partial correlation 
adjustment, suggesting that common method bias was not a serious problem in our study.
(SR2) Significance  of  the  interaction  terms.    Significant  interaction  terms 
suggest that the results are less likely to be affected by single respondent bias. 
(Brockner, Siegel, Tyler & Martin, 1997).
All our interaction effects are significant, including the one interaction that involves two 
survey-based  items.  With  significant  interactions  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  single 
respondent  bias  as  the  respondents  are  unlikely  to  have  consciously  theorized  the 
moderated relationships when responding to the survey 
(SR3) Triangulation using archival sources. Triangulating survey data with 
data from secondary sources is often used to check for convergent validity of a 
construct (Parkhe, 1993b; Keats and Hitt, 1988; Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma & 
Tihanyi, 2004).
-The correlation between the subjective and secondary alliance performance measures 
(i.e., return on capital employed) available for 35 equity alliances was highly significant (r 
= 0.38, p=0.02), given that it was computed on a small sample (n =35).
-We compiled archival data on the number of Indian partner employees for 66 Indian 
firms in our sample The data obtained from the two sources correlated highly, 0.98 
(p<0.000).
- We also obtained archival data on the number of foreign employees for a sub-set of 52 
foreign firms. The resulting correlation was 0.97 (p<0.000). Survey data was available on 
68 foreign firms
(SR4) Triangulation  using  field  interviews.  Code  interview-based  data  to 
establish reliability and validity of variables. (We used the interview notes to 
validate the trust variable because our interview focused mainly on the quality 
of the relationship between the partners. Because the interview notes did not 
provide enough useful data on how well the alliance performed, we could not 
use them to validate the alliance performance construct.)
We used interview data available for 10 alliances to validate the trust measure. Two 
independent coders categorized the interview responses using three-point scales to indicate 
the extent to which inter-organizational trust existed in the relationship. We did not exceed 
three-point categorization for ease of interpretation of the interview data (e.g., Lau & 
Woodman, 1995; Lee, Mitchell, Wise & Fireman, 1996). The correlations between the 
trust scale obtained from the survey and the interview notes coded by the independent 
raters is 0.70 (p < 0.05). No discrepancy was noted regarding variable content.
(SR5) Harman’s one-factor test.  If a substantial amount of common method 
bias exists in the data, a single or general factor that accounts for most of the 
variance will emerge when all the variables are entered together (Podsakoff et 
al, 2003).
An unrotated principal components factor analysis on all the variables measured using the 
survey instrument revealed four factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which together 
accounted for 59 percent of the total variance; also, the first (largest) factor did not 
account for a majority of the variance (19.71%).
APPENDIX 2: Remedies Undertaken Against Common Method Bias and Single Respondent BiasSAMENVATTING: DUTCH SUMMARY
De afgelopen twee decennia kunnen worden bestempeld als een periode waarin bedrijven in 
sterk toenemende mate hun heil hebben gezocht bij strategische allianties, alsmede een periode 
waarin dit fenomeen in toenemende mate centraal is komen te staan in academisch onderzoek. 
Strategische  allianties  kunnen  gedefinieerd  worden  als  relatief  duurzame,  coöperatieve 
overeenkomsten  voor  gezamenlijke  ontwikkeling,  productie  en/of  distributie  van  producten. 
Eerder onderzoek naar allianties heeft zich met name geconcentreerd op vragen aangaande de 
keuze van partners om een alliantie aan te gaan, de keuze van een geschikte partner en structuur 
voor de alliantie en de evolutie van allianties over tijd. Hoewel het effect van elk van deze 
factoren op de performance van allianties is aangetoond, wordt het vergroten van inzicht in de 
determinanten  van  alliantie  performance  nog  altijd  beschouwd  als  één  van  de  belangrijkste 
doelen in dit onderzoeksgebied.
In  voorliggende  dissertatie  stel  ik  de  relatie  tussen  alliantie  performance  en  één  van  haar 
determinanten –  vertrouwen  tussen  ondernemingen  (interorganizational  trust)  –  centraal.  Het 
proefschrift bestaat uit vier papers die elk op hun beurt ons inzicht in bovengenoemde relatie 
trachten te verdiepen, alsmede onderzoeken op welke manieren deze vorm van vertrouwen kan 
worden  gecultiveerd  en  hersteld.  Het  eerste  paper  presenteert  een  meta-analyse  van  de 
determinanten van alliantie performance op basis van data over 15.201 allianties afkomstig uit 78 
empirische onderzoeken. Meta-analyse is een statistische techniek bedoeld voor het aggregeren 
van  resultaten  van  meerdere  empirische  studies,  terwijl  het  tegelijkertijd  corrigeert  voor 
potentiële verklaringen voor de variatie tussen de resultaten van deze verschillende studies, zoals 
sampling error en measurement error. Het eerste paper heeft derhalve met name als doel: (a) het 
identificeren en nauwkeurig schatten van de effecten van die factoren die, te midden van het 
brede  scala  aan  variabelen  dat  inmiddels  is  bestudeerd,  alliantie  performance  significant 
beïnvloeden, (b) het evalueren van de generaliseerbaarheid van deze effecten over verschillende 
empirische contexten en verscheidene operationalisaties van alliantie performance, en (c) het 
schatten van het gezamenlijke effect van beginvoorwaarden, governance structuur en partner 
gedrag  op  alliantie  performance  door  middel  van  de  ontwikkeling  en  toetsing  van  een 
overkoepelend conceptueel raamwerk bestaande uit die factoren die het meest veelvuldig zijn 
gerelateerd  aan  alliantie  performance.  De  empirische  resultaten  van  de  meta-analyse  leveren Samenvatting 118
sterk bewijs voor de unieke contributies van beginvoorwaarden, governance structuur en de post-
formatie  dynamiek  aan  ons  inzicht  in  alliantie  performance.  Daarnaast  benadrukken 
verscheidene  onverwachte  bevindingen  (e.g.,  de  link  tussen  prior  ties  en  zowel  contractual 
safeguards  als  het  delen  van  informatie)  de  benodigdheid  van  vernieuwend  en  verdiepend 
theoretisch  en  empirisch  onderzoek  naar  de  aard  van  deze  relaties  en  de  onderliggende 
mechanismen.
Het tweede paper onderzoekt of, en in welke mate, het effect van interorganizational trust op 
alliantie performance contingent is op uncertainty. De theorie bouwt voort op het onderscheid 
tussen behavioral uncertainty, welke betrekking heeft op de potentiële acties van de alliantie
partners,  en  environmental  uncertainty,  welke  zijn  oorsprong  vindt  buiten  de  alliantie.  Het 
kernargument is dat trust van groter belang is voor alliantie performance in geval van behavioral 
uncertainty (als gevolg van de interdependentie tussen partners en hun onderlinge concurrentie) 
en van minder belang is in geval van environmental uncertainty (als gevolg van de instabiliteit en 
onvoorspelbaarheid  van  de  omgeving).  De  analyse  is  gebaseerd  op  een  survey  van  126 
internationale allianties tussen Indiase bedrijven en hun buitenlandse partners. Ik heb in het kader 
van dit paper gekozen voor de survey methodologie vanwege de beperkingen die gepaard gaan 
met  het  verkrijgen  van  objectieve  data  voor  het  operationaliseren  van  de  onafhankelijke 
(interorganizational  trust)  en  de  afhankelijke  (alliantie  performance)  constructen  die  centraal 
staan in de studie. Het survey en de interviews, uitgevoerd tijdens pretests, leidden tot rijkere 
data over deze constructen en een beter begrip van het fenomeen. Wat betreft de empirische 
resultaten van dit paper vinden we allereerst dat de positieve relatie tussen trust en alliantie 
performance inderdaad sterker is in geval van sterke behavioral uncertainty en zwakker in geval 
van sterke environmental uncertainty. Hoewel eerder onderzoek doorgaans ondersteuning vindt 
voor het idee dat trust voordelig is voor allianties, heeft dit niet geleid tot een algemene theorie 
inzake de omstandigheden waaronder trust alliantie performance vergemakkelijkt en bemoeilijkt. 
In  dit  paper  hebben  wij,  gebaseerd  op  het  onderscheid  tussen  behavioral  en  environmental 
uncertainty, een dergelijke theorie ontwikkeld en hebben wij empirisch aangetoond dat er naast 
de  positieve  directe relatie  tussen  trust  en  alliantie performance subtielere  interactie-effecten 
werkzaam zijn. Onze theorie impliceert dat partners alleen dan inspanningen moeten leveren om 
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performance deze inspanningen rechtvaardigt, hetgeen op zijn beurt afhankelijk is van het type 
uncertainty  waarmee  de  alliantie  wordt  geconfronteerd.  Het  onderzoek  betwist  derhalve 
gevestigde wijsheid door aan te tonen dat trust een “double-edged sword” is met het potentieel 
performance te verbeteren in sommige situaties maar het te verzwakken in andere situaties.
Het derde paper relateert de formele (equity alliantie) en informele (kwaliteit van de gedeelde 
informatie) determinanten aan twee verschillende vormen van trust, respectievelijk, contractual 
en  relational  trust,  en  onderzoekt  de  voorwaarden  waaronder  de  formele  en  informele 
determinanten de cultivatie van de twee verschillende vormen van trust vergemakkelijken of 
bemoeilijken. Er wordt gesteld dat equity allianties de cultivatie van contractual trust faciliteren 
in  geval  van  behavioral  uncertainty  maar  de  cultivatie  ervan  in  de  weg  staan  in  geval  van 
environmental uncertainty, terwijl de kwaliteit van de tussen partners gedeelde informatie de 
cultivatie van relational trust faciliteert in geval van zowel behavioral als relational uncertainty. 
Om dezelfde redenen als hierboven genoemd in het kader van het tweede paper is de analyse 
gebaseerd  op  een  survey  van  126  internationale  allianties  tussen  Indiase  bedrijven  en 
buitenlandse bedrijven uit 21 landen. Overeenkomstig resultaten uit eerder onderzoek vinden we 
dat de kwaliteit van het delen van informatie zich leent voor de ontwikkeling van “resilient trust” 
(e.g., Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2000). Echter, we vinden geen significante relatie tussen 
equity allianties en “fragile trust”. Bovendien wijzen de resultaten uit dat de kwaliteit van het 
delen  van  informatie  meer  bevorderlijk  is  voor  resilient  trust  wanneer  zowel  behavioral  als 
environmental uncertainty sterk zijn. De bevindingen bevestigen tevens ons argument dat equity 
allianties de cultivatie van fragile trust faciliteren in geval van behavioral uncertainty en dit in de 
weg  staan  in  geval  van  environmental  uncertainty.  Aldus  verfijnt  het  derde  paper  bestaand 
onderzoek naar de determinanten van interorganizational trust en biedt het nieuwe inzichten in 
de situaties waarin ondernemingen zouden moeten investeren in bepaalde formele en informele 
mechanismen voor het cultiveren van deze vorm van trust.
Het  vierde  en  laatste  paper  neemt  een  meer  longitudinale  benadering,  in  acht  nemend  dat 
interorganizational trust opgebouwd, afgebroken, en wederom hersteld kan worden. Het paper 
bestudeert “trust repair”  tussen  ondernemingen door het identificeren van  twee afzonderlijke 
analyseniveaus – strategisch en operationeel – waartussen onderscheid wordt gemaakt aan de References 120
hand van de rollen die organisatieleden met verschillende hiërarchische posities hebben in het 
algeheel functioneren van hun organisatie, alsmede, daardoor, in dat van de alliantie. We stellen 
dat het schenden van vertrouwen op strategisch niveau gerelateerd is aan het gepercipieerde 
waardeverschil tussen de partners, terwijl het op operationeel niveau waarschijnlijk met name 
invloed heeft op task reliability. Als gevolg hiervan stellen we dat de geschikte remedies voor het 
herstellen van strategic-level trust non-legalistisch zijn en dat hun effectiviteit afhankelijk is van 
de mate waarin de partij die het vertrouwen heeft geschonden haar onschuld kan bewijzen aan de 
andere partij. Herstel van operational-level trust zou echter kunnen worden bewerkstelligd door 
middel  van  remedies  van  zowel  legalistische  als  non-legalistische  aard,  afhankelijk  van  de 
frequentie  waarmee  schending  plaatsvindt.  Tenslotte  stellen  we  dat,  aangezien  herstel  van 
operational-level trust door middel van legalistische remedies  geïnitieerd dient te worden op 
strategisch niveau,  de  mate van verticale  coördinatie  en aansturing  binnen  de organisatie  de 
snelheid beïnvloedt waarmee de introductie van dergelijke maatregelen ondernomen en bereikt 
wordt. Al met al levert dit theoretische paper een belangrijke contributie, onder andere door erop 
te wijzen dat onjuist toegepaste remedies niet alleen een grote kans lopen hun uiteindelijke doel 
– het repareren van trust – niet te realiseren, maar het probleem daadwerkelijk kunnen vergroten.REFERENCES
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